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Abstract 
This dissertation examines a significant—yet seemingly banal and largely unstudied—
question of urban living: car parking. While car parking has emerged as a problem in 
various parts of the world throughout the twentieth century, the rapid motorisation since 
1991 has made it a particularly intense topic in the former Soviet Union. By 
investigating the problematic of parking governing in the city of Tallinn (Estonia) the 
dissertation has two aims. Firstly, it draws attention to the role of materialities in urban 
research. It is argued that to govern means to govern in relation to materialities. Thus, 
the research develops the notion of material governmentality inspired by the work of 
Foucault and the actor-network studies on the agency of things. Secondly, the 
dissertation re-conceptualises the notion of ‘post-socialism’. While the term ‘post-
socialism’ is often utilised for cities located in Eastern Europe it is routinely 
comprehended as spatially and temporally bounded. To make the term more applicable, 
it is revised into a concept allowing attention to various continuities and anti-
continuities emerging in aspects, rather than in terms of cities and societies in general. 
Material governmentality and post-socialism are explored in the dissertation through 
three cases dealing with different facets of the parking regulations in Tallinn. Firstly, the 
thesis looks into the legal debates on the governing of car parking, analysing questions 
about the constitutionality of the state in a society wishing to move away from the 
totalitarian practices found under socialism. Secondly, the thesis investigates the 
contradictions of the ‘will to govern’ and ‘legal voids’ as they emerge in relation to 
materialisations and post-socialist continuities of parking standards and failing 
regulations of parking operators. Thirdly, the research investigates the ways in which 
governing procedures are affected by the continuities of the Soviet spaces using the case 
of a Soviet housing estate.  
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1 Introduction 
In parking, the contest over power is the power to exert and to challenge legal as well as 
social notions of rights, presentations of identity, and claims of ownership to sites of 
property. (Marusek, 2012, p. 2) 
[T]he problem posed by contemporary neoconservatives and communitarians alike: how 
can one govern virtue in a free society? It is here that we can locate our contemporary 
‘wars of subjectivity’. (Rose, 1999, p. 46) 
 [M]aterial objects should not be thought of as the stable ground on which the instabilities 
generated by disputes between human actors are played out; rather, they should be 
understood as forming an integral element of evolving controversies. (Barry, 2013, p. 12) 
Why should any social scientist be interested in car parking? What could be of interest 
in questions about where to park, for how long and for what price? These are issues that 
drivers have to put up with in cities all over the world, but they appear so mundane and 
common that an urban scholar—especially one who is more theory oriented—would 
hardly even notice. I think that this is a mistake. Car parking is more than a mundane 
matter. The least that this dissertation aims to achieve is to convince the reader that car 
parking is important for urban studies as well as for social research in general. But the 
aim of the thesis is more ambitious than that. 
When the city officials of Tallinn chose to modify a line on a map that separated a paid 
parking zone from areas where parking was free in the beginning of 2010, they did not 
realise what they would unleash. The authorities had decided to increase the paid 
parking zone of Tallinn into a residential area neighbouring the Old Town. This set off a 
citizen protest that, as one of the activists summarised, drew together a diverse group: 
some who were pro car use, some who simply disliked the leading political party of 
Tallinn, as well as those campaigning for other things altogether. For a brief period of 
time, the debate between these activists and the city became a major media event, 
covered by all the major national media outlets. Eventually, in the heat of this protest, 
the city government backed off from its plan. This fight against paid parking hints at the 
significance of the seemingly mundane practice of car parking present in many cities 
today.  
However, the ‘freedom to park’ goes even deeper into questions of urban 
governmentality; it can have a constitutional significance. Take for example the 
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question of the wheel clamp; a device used to immobilise incorrectly parked vehicles. In 
1994, the Estonian Supreme Court ruled that the city of Tallinn’s practice of using 
wheel clamps on cars that are in violation of parking rules was against the national 
Constitution. Being a young boy at the time I did not understand the implications of 
those debates. But the memory remained with me that wheel clamping was so illiberal 
that a democratic country would not carry it out. Arriving in the UK, I was surprised to 
learn that wheel clamping was a common practice. What I remembered from the 
Estonian debates suggested that such a device could not possibly be used anywhere in 
the democratic world. It was this dissonance that led me to think more carefully about 
car parking as a concern for both of urban living and that of governance. This case is 
investigated more thoroughly in Chapter 6, but the way that this issue linked materiality 
and governing also sparked an interest in uncovering the formation of local governance 
in Estonia as it has unfolded in relation to car parking over the last twenty years; and 
this is what the thesis is about.  
With increasing car use, governments in many places have faced questions over the 
ways in which automobility should be governed. As cars are immobile for more than 90 
per cent of time (Shoup, 2005), the provision of parking spaces is one of the central 
challenges presented by mass automobility. Tallinn has seen a massive increase in car 
ownership since the collapse of the Soviet Union. With the increase of car ownership 
recent and rapid in Tallinn, the local government has faced a serious test of its capacities 
to govern car parking. In Estonia, private automobiles have turned from objects that are 
hard to acquire to a nearly ubiquitous element within urban environments, with 
ownership almost trebling between 1991 and 2011
1
. This broadening of automobility 
transformed questions of parking regulations into questions about how much different 
parts of the state can intervene into citizens’ lives. However, the physical form of 
cities—characterised by density and problems of circulation—in many ways 
necessitates the active directive governing by various city authorities. In order to deal 
with the question of parking—which often quickly transforms into the question of the 
‘freedom to park’—the city of Tallinn had to wrestle with the legal framings of 
freedom.   
                                                          
1
 In 1991 there were 161 cars per 1000 inhabitants and in 2011 the number was already 428 cars per 1000 
inhabitants. 
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The aim of the dissertation is thus to explicate urban environments as entities that are 
governed but where governing is both a material endeavour and has to deal with various 
ways in which the past becomes to matter. The research commenced with one 
underlying question: How can automobile use be regulated in relation to the 
individuals’ ‘right’ to conduct their life in the way that they deem appropriate? This 
principal question has been investigated through three sub-questions: 
 
 In what ways does the Soviet history influence notions of freedom and practices 
of state intervention? 
 What particular techniques to govern automobility have been developed in 
Tallinn, how are these put into practice, and with what effects?  
 In what ways is materiality relevant for the practices of governing? 
Through an analysis of these three questions, the thesis aims to contribute to the field of 
urban studies by drawing attention to mundane aspects of cities (car parking); by 
combining actor-network theory and governmentality into a research framework 
(material governmentality); and advancing the strand of research in urban studies 
formed around comparative urbanism by bringing in perspectives of ‘post-socialist 
cities’. These three aims of contributing to urban studies lead to three main lines of 
argumentation in the research.  
First, I draw attention to the minor aspects of cities that tend to be forgotten. I argue that 
if properly brought into focus such aspects are informative for social analysis. Thus, 
while cities are commonly seen as complex entities, there is still more effort needed to 
unpack that complexity in ways that the otherwise insignificant entities are not 
transformed into wider processes or pre-given categories (such as neo-liberalism or 
processes of capitalism). At the same time, however, power relations should also not be 
downplayed. Secondly, I draw attention to materiality as an actor in processes that are 
usually seen as merely legal, political or social. I will elaborate on the active 
engagement of artefacts in governmental practices to show how materiality matters for 
understanding why certain perspectives have been taken in the governing processes. 
Thirdly, I will draw attention to the socialist past that enters as a continuity and anti-
continuity to the contemporary society influencing the ways in which things are done. 
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This observation leads me to re-consider the notion of ‘post-socialism’ and to treat it 
less as a term characterising a context or a condition and more as a de-territorialised 
concept that can be introduced to the analysis if and when it offers analytical potential.  
I will introduce these three concerns briefly in the introduction before outlining the way 
in which my thesis addresses them.  
1.1 Cities and complexity 
Complexity as a key characteristic of cities is noted by many major figures of urban 
scholarship (see also Amin and Thrift, 2002; Wachsmuth et al., 2011). Notions such as 
‘heterogeneity’, the city stimuli and many-sidedness that create drama appear already in 
writings of earlier thinkers of urbanism (Wirth, Simmel, Mumford). Similarly, Edward 
Soja (2000, p. 12) notes about urban life that ‘[t]here is too much that lies beneath the 
surface, unknown and perhaps unknowable, for a complete story to be told.’ In Urban 
Experience the eminent Marxist urban scholar David Harvey (1989, p. 1) acknowledges 
the ‘million and one surprises that confront us on the street’. From the governmentality 
perspective, Osborne and Rose (1999) express the ‘complex multiplicities’ that the 
existing cities are. In contemporary poststructuralist urban research, the complex and 
multiple nature of the city is taken even further and pointed out by many (Amin and 
Graham, 1997; Amin and Thrift, 2002; Farías and Bender, 2010). Thus, at least at the 
abstract level authors from different time periods and belonging to various theoretical 
camps agree on the ontology of the urban. The city as a complex form of socio-spatial 
organisation with heterogeneous processes directed by various actors and leading to 
often unknown outcomes is a perspective that would be agreed by authors drawing on 
Marx, Weber, Lefebvre, Foucault or Deleuze. Yet, while there is an agreement on what 
the city is, there are diverging understandings concerning how to approach the city.  
Firstly, in urban studies neo-Marxists have approached urban phenomena by focusing 
on processes that seem to be underlying and structuring. For instance, referring to 
Marx’s reprimand that ‘if everything were as it appears on the surface then there would 
be no need for science’ (cit in Harvey, 1989, p. 10), Harvey (p. 13) seeks to construct ‘a 
theory of the historical geography of capitalism in general and the role of the urban 
process under capitalism in particular.’ The Marxist intellectual apparatus is preferred 
by Harvey (ibid., p. 10) for its ‘explanatory power’ as ‘by showing how the underlying 
concepts can, when put in motion, help us understand all kinds of surface occurrences 
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that would otherwise remain incomprehensible.’ Thus, the analytical framework that 
focuses on the developments of capitalism such as ‘processes of capital circulation; the 
shifting flows of labor power, commodities, and capital; the spatial organization of 
production and the transformation of time-space relations’ (ibid., p. 7) is used by 
Harvey not because he claims that to be everything that takes place in the city—as he 
well acknowledges its complexity—but because it reveals what might otherwise not be 
noticed.  
However, such a framework that aims to simplify the complexity or find underlying 
currents might be turned into a reductionist way of analysis. Notions of ‘underlying 
processes’ and ‘surface occurrences’ have indeed the prevalence to render much of this 
complexity invisible. If what matters is the circulation of capital, then everyday 
practices or nonhuman agency indeed would not appear exciting and be thus ignored. 
These assumptions necessarily have invited critique from a number of scholars 
interested in more nuanced stories of urban or those interested in other processes—such 
as patriarchal power relations—neglected by Marxist analysis (see Duncan and Ley, 
1982; Rose, 1984; Rose, 1993; Thrift, 1996). Edward Soja (in 2000, p. 94), who is 
otherwise sympathetic to neo-Marxist approaches
2
, echoed his concerns of drawing too 
much from Marx and Engels by citing Lefebvre’s warning that the ‘illusion of 
transparency’ found in those approaches means that ‘the spatial specificity of urbanism’ 
(ibid. , p. 94) is in danger ‘to disappear a subject worthy of serious analysis’ (ibid. , p. 
94). Rather than reducing urban phenomena, then, the neo-Marxist perspective should 
remain more attentive to urban diversity with the use of a simplifying model that is 
merely a ‘model’.  
The second perspective on urban complexity that I would like to stress here is an 
approach that faces complexity head on without wanting to simplify it with a model. 
This approach—although not unitary—draws from actor-network theory (ANT), 
science and technology studies (STS), assemblage theory and non-representational ways 
of analysing the city. Even though some proponents of this manner of research have 
been closer to the dominant neo-Marxist framework in urban studies (e.g., Graham and 
Marvin, 2001; McFarlane, 2011a), others have stressed the departure from neo-Marxism 
                                                          
2
 Even though Soja sees the urban condition as diverse and is, thus, attentive to complex analysis, he still 
mainly falls back to similar assertion of the primacy of capitalist urban processes as neo-Marxist 
approaches. 
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offered by assemblage and actor-network theory (Amin, 2013; Farías, 2010; Latham, 
2002, 2003). Assemblage and actor-network approaches provide a sensibility through 
which to see cities as relational and multiple where non-human entities also have a role 
to play. Analytical tools that are open to the variety of elements that play a part in urban 
life—tools that are more symmetrical and flat—are not necessarily superior to more 
structural ways of analysis, but by being more nuanced they might offer a more accurate 
comprehension of the urban condition as we experience it. Simone (2011, p. 356) thus 
notes in defence of assemblage urbanism that ‘the impetus to think about assemblages 
as a modality through which the urban instantiates itself seems to reflect a desire to 
make more use, better use, of all that exists in urban life.’ The urban is, indeed, 
necessarily much more complex than any analysis that would seek to find one 
underlying process or force could capture. Cities often exceed the framings that analysts 
bring forward which is noted perhaps most forcefully by Amin and Thrift (2002, p. 30): 
‘Cities are machines of consumption? Yes, but never just that. Cities are artefacts of the 
state? Yes, but never just that. Cities are generators of patriarchy? Yes, but never just 
that.’  
The notion of assemblage as well as the intellectual apparatus from ANT and STS—
with their ethos attuned to the emergent and the seemingly unimportant but potentially 
decisive ingredients of the urban—might just be better equipped for the task of 
theorising the complex urban phenomenon than neo-Marxist approaches. Assemblage 
thinking has provided tools to open up an alternative vision of the city whereby car 
parking appears as a significant issue to be studied. But in addition to noting the 
assembling of diverse set of elements, one also should note that cities are traversed by 
regulatory practices and intentions that necessitate the use of analytical perspectives that 
are attentive to governing. Whether recognised or not, whether successful or not, 
modern cities are governed by a myriad of regulations (Valverde, 2012, 2011). Those 
regulations include urban planning, management of streets and other utilities, traffic 
rules as well as a number of rather small regulations. These require the maintenance of 
certain qualities of properties or designate who, where and when can park their 
individual automobiles. In this dissertation I offer analysis that draws attention to the 
materialities in the governing processes by combining writings of Foucault and those 
inspired by his work with the literature organised around the ANT. The concept I invent 
and introduce in this thesis is material governmentality. 
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1.2 Material governmentalities 
As Foucault (2007) claimed, to govern means to govern in relation to something and 
someone. In modern societies and as the case of car parking regulations vividly reveals, 
such governing is unable to direct the behaviour of artefacts and individuals but has to 
take into consideration their needs and wishes. Such governing practice is what 
Foucault (2007) alongside many other writers drawing on his work (see in particular 
Barry et al., 1996; Burchell et al., 1991; Dean, 1996; Rose, 1999; Rose and Miller, 
1992) have elaborated upon through the notion of governmentality. While definitions 
vary, governmentality is an ongoing problematisation about how to govern in relation to 
freedom which should thus not be excessively restricted. A stream of research on 
governmentality has elaborated on governing techniques that rather than working 
against freedom, govern through freedom (Rose, 1999). According to such takes on 
liberal governmentality, in ‘advanced liberalism’/neo-liberalism citizens are subjected 
to take care of their own lives and find ways to better their conditions while also being 
beneficial for the society as a whole. Nevertheless, one should be careful in stressing the 
shifts in governmental thought, as the state is a complex entity that does not act in unity 
with various aims and elements pushing in different directions (Desbiens et al., 2004; 
Mitchell, 1991). Moreover, a number of authors have observed that materiality also has 
an important role to play in terms of how governing is done (Barry, 2001; Braun, 2014; 
Bulkeley et al., 2007; Darling, 2014; Joyce, 2003); they thus provide an inspiration for 
the term ‘material governmentality’ investigated in this thesis.  
Materiality, firstly, is often a concern itself leading to the demands of governing. The 
exploitation of resources, climate change and pollution are all changes in the ways that 
materialities are configured: thus, these concerns are equally pertinent for social and 
natural sciences. But urban materialities in particular are often such that they demand an 
intervention. Urban overcrowding, development of slums, decrease in water quality and 
spread of diseases are all questions that have at least as much to do with material 
relations as with social matters. Thus, the way they are tackled involves material 
interventions such as water systems (Gandy, 2005) and modernist urban planning of 
sewage and streets which rather than only being material include also moral and social 
concerns (Joyce, 2003). In this context, we can note that car parking is a twentieth 
century concern about how to control the flow of cars in the streets while still allowing 
access to different shops, services and other places (Norton, 2008). More recent 
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conceptualisations of parking regulations have linked parking to social and 
environmental justice and saw management of parking as a way in which it is possible 
to work towards a modal shift from car-based mobility to alternative and more 
sustainable modes (see in particular Shoup, 2005).  
Secondly, material entities themselves resist and alter actions directed to them. As 
Latour (2005) argued, materialities should not be conceptualised as intermediaries 
whereby input defines output but should rather be thought of as mediators with agency. 
Using a speed bump to reduce a vehicle’s speed is in many ways different than merely 
putting a traffic sign demanding a driver to do so (Latour, 1992). In the following 
chapters I consider how particular materialisations change the way in which citizenship 
rights are seen (Chapter 6) and shape how an activity is related to the conceptualisations 
of legality and state regulation (Chapter 7). Nevertheless, I am not arguing here that 
materiality should be seen as agentic in itself. Rather, I follow Bennett (2010) in 
conceptualising material entities to work in assemblages including multiple different 
human and non-human actants.  
Governing, thus, is itself a complex task with complications emanating from 
expectations of citizens, contradictions in state apparatus and various materialities. But 
the way in which these three aspects matter owes significantly to the historical 
continuities and changes which somewhat vary from place to place. As Chapter 6 to 8 
will show, the material governmentality of car parking in Tallinn is in many ways 
shaped by the local past, present and anticipated future that provides spatial and 
institutional conditions for ‘post-socialist’ developments. We should thus note the ways 
in which localities matter beyond being merely ‘area studies’.  
1.3 Re-considering ‘post-socialism’ 
The line of thinking, variously named ‘comparative urbanism’ (McFarlane and 
Robinson, 2012; Nijman, 2007; Robinson, 2004), ‘relational comparative approach’ 
(Ward, 2010) and ‘global urbanism’ (AAG 2013 session) draws from a postcolonial 
critique to increase the attention of urban studies to cities ‘beyond the West’ (Edensor 
and Jayne, 2012) as more than empirical cases for ‘western’ theories or as more than 
mere objects of development. This also means the revision and revitalisation of 
concepts emerging from scholarship regarding non-Western contexts. This has occurred 
with the term ‘informality’ (see, e.g., Bunnell and Harris, 2012) but similar revision and 
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revitalisation can be accomplished with terms previously capable of no more than 
describing a region. 
This dissertation deals with the notion of ‘post-socialism’. In its previous uses within 
urban studies, the term has either referred to a spatio-temporal context (a post-1991 
Central and Eastern Europe) or, taken a bit further, has been used to consider the 
relational and hybrid nature of societies and cities. Nevertheless, in both of its usages it 
refers to the city or society as a totality in which case it still remains a tendency to—or 
potential for—considering CEE cities as backwards or on a pre-set path from socialism 
to capitalism. Such perspective would thus not allow cities in CEE (as Tallinn is) to be 
on the equal plane with those that currently enjoy central position in urban studies. This 
dissertation, instead, revises the notion into a concept that can be used to make sense of 
certain aspects of cities and societies both in Central and Eastern Europe and all over 
the world. Such a revised concept of post-socialism—a de-territorialised concept—
would not be applied to cities or societies in general as a ‘totality’ defined as post-
socialist but used where relevant for the analysis of certain issues such as freedom, the 
Constitution, parking standards which are all discussed in the dissertation. Cities thus 
remain ‘ordinary’ (Robinson, 2006; see also Amin and Graham, 1997) and can be 
described with the use of different concepts including the concept of ‘post-socialism’.  
By re-configuring the term ‘post-socialism’ to apply to certain aspects of cities and 
societies whilst keeping the connection between ‘post-socialism’ and comparative 
urbanism, the research offers a way to attend to cities as complex entities made of 
multiple elements including non-humans, and with local characteristics of cities also 
still recognisable. Being attentive to ‘post-socialism’ as well as to the complexity and 
materialities of urban is thus an integral part of the dissertation.  
1.4 The outline of the thesis 
The thesis calls to attend more thoroughly to the socio-materiality of cities. It is argued 
here that in order to more fully understand what kind of entities and processes cities are, 
one should draw attention to governing and materiality. In liberal societies, however, 
these are intertwined with questions of freedom about how much citizens can be 
regulated and in what ways. In Tallinn, these questions are also related to post-socialist 
changes, continuities and anti-continuities. In this dissertation, the attention is thus 
drawn to the ways in which materiality matters in the processes of governing car 
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parking, and how the past—as in that of the Soviet era—affects contemporary 
processes. To better comprehend those two aspects—materiality and post-socialism—
the dissertation develops the concept of material governmentality and revises the notion 
of post-socialism into a de-territorialised concept. These two concepts are then used in 
the empirical chapters (Chapters 6 to 8) in relation to specific cases regarding car 
parking governing processes in Tallinn.  
The theory section is divided into three chapters. Chapter 2 introduces the concept of 
material governmentality in two parts. Firstly, it outlines the Foucault’s notion of 
governmentality suggesting we follow less its conceptualisation as a liberal 
governmentality and more its sentiment to capture the various ways of governing in 
relation to freedom. Secondly, the chapter introduces the agency of things by moving 
from more general actor-network concerns of the dispersal of power and the role of 
materialities in socio-material assemblages to the politics of material entities. The 
chapter ends by drawing out the concept of ‘material governmentality’.  
Chapter 3 takes the notion of material governmentality to discuss socio-material 
governing in cities. The material character of cities has been particularly inviting for 
directive diagrams of governing such as police power that draw more heavily from the 
administrative logic than from the legal logic that is driven by liberal ideas about how 
the state and an individual should be related. In particular the chapter outlines 
automobility and car parking as specific material concerns that have been problematised 
and made subject to governing by transport planning.  
Chapter 4 suggests ways in which the notion of ‘post-socialism’ as used for cities could 
be redefined to make it more attentive to the critiques offered by comparative urbanism. 
The chapter outlines the emerging literature of comparative urbanism, draws out the 
previous ways in which post-socialism in cities has been thought about both as a spatio-
temporal container and as a condition and finally suggests a novel approach of post-
socialism as a de-territorialised concept. Post-socialism as a de-territorialised concept 
applies to particular aspects in cities and societies rather than aims to totalise their 
experience and is thus a more attentive tool to understand cities as ‘ordinary’ rather than 
subject to fixed paths of development. Post-socialism as a de-territorialised concept is 
then elaborated on in terms of continuities and anti-continuities in Tallinn providing, 
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then, an introduction to the city of Tallinn. This discussion will be extended in the 
empirical part of the thesis.  
The reflection on methods used in the thesis by Chapter 5 is followed by three empirical 
chapters. The cases were selected so that they would, firstly, cover the post-1991 
Tallinn temporally and spatially: while Chapters 6 and 7 reflect mainly on the central 
city, then Chapter 8 is about housing estates located in the outskirts of Tallinn. 
Secondly, each chapter offers a take on materiality in governing procedures: Chapter 6 
shows material limits on governing (attending to parked cars); Chapter 7 elaborates on 
how materiality re-orders relations in terms of governing (attending to the surface 
material) and Chapter 8 highlights the way in which materiality allows for certain 
models of governing (attending to the physical urban plan). Thirdly, each chapter 
provides a slightly different take on post-socialism: while Chapter 6 highlights anti-
continuity, Chapter 7 and 8 show continuity (the former demonstrates continuity in 
governing methods and the latter in the physical space). Each empirical chapter can be 
read as a stand-alone case study as they build on different sets of material as well as 
advance a different argument. Nevertheless, taken together they all give meaning to the 
two core concepts of the thesis: material governmentality and post-socialism.   
Chapter 6 elaborates on material governmentality and post-socialism by looking into the 
legal complexities of governing resulting from the materiality of parked cars and the 
constitutional curtailment of state power in a society that aims to be liberal and depart 
from how the Soviet state was or was imagined to be subjecting its citizens. The 
introduction of paid parking in Tallinn in 1993 was marred with a decade of 
uncertainties about how to make drivers actually pay for it. The early measure—the 
wheel clamp—was effective but in its effectiveness also highly contentious leading to 
constitutional debates and the resultant illegality of wheel clamping, first in 1994 and 
then finally in 1998. Another measure of governing—the parking fine—was similarly 
controversial being subject to various Supreme Court and Parliament debates. 
Nevertheless, it was finally accepted as a regulatory device with the city government of 
Tallinn legally assured significant powers to govern car parkers. This eventual 
acceptance of the local state power—although with debates lasting over a decade and 
still through complex legal manoeuvring—comes down to the materiality of parked cars 
which could not be regulated in the liberal ways that the legal actors of Estonia 
imagined.   
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Chapter 7 elaborates on the concepts of material governmentality and post-socialism by 
discussing the encounter between the ‘will to govern’ and the ‘legal void’ in regulating 
parking on private land in Tallinn. The chapter attends to materiality and post-socialism 
as ways to understand the diverging state power in relation to urban planning in Tallinn 
by analysing parking standards as ‘strong state’ and off-street parking lots on derelict 
land as ‘weak state’. The chapter, thus, encounters materiality by conceptualising the 
parking lots’ surfaces which have become a key component in defining whether a local 
state has capacity to use urban planning on private land in Estonia or not. While parking 
standards deal with paved parking lots, then private businesses exist in a ‘legal void’ 
(legal but unregulated) precisely because the ‘urban void’ (a derelict land) is combined 
with legal comprehension of urban planning in Estonia. Urban planning in the country 
is concerned merely with what is defined as ‘constructions’ and these parking lots were 
not seen as ones. In addition to materiality, the chapter attends to the importance of 
Soviet history—which form post-socialist continuity—that makes the parking standard 
an accepted governing technology possessed by the local state despite this tool’s 
significant power to direct matters on private land while the relative novelty of the 
parking business on private land has raised questions over whether it should be 
regulated at all by city authorities. Thus, the ‘will to govern’ is subject to various 
concerns apart from the desire of governors (which is what some authors, such as 
Valverde, 2012 tend to focus at) and is in this case curtailed by certain legal 
imaginations. 
Chapter 8 deals with material governmentality and post-socialism in terms of governing 
car parking in a Soviet era housing estate. The chapter introduces the ‘parking problem’ 
in Tallinn’s oldest housing estate Mustamäe where the ‘problem’ has emerged in 
interaction with the increased car ownership and the incapacity of the residential 
district—planned according to modernist ‘neighbourhood utopias’—to accommodate 
those cars on existing parking spaces. Residents have thus informally extended parking 
spaces onto grass. The local state has stepped in, but rather than having a radically new 
vision it merely formalises what housing estates have already done. The state is thus at 
the same time active and relying on the agency of individualised actors. The chapter 
argues, firstly, that the physical plan of the housing estate with buildings located in vast 
parks and roads meandering between these as cul-de-sacs affected the choice of 
centralised governing tool because it has been difficult to parcel the area into privately 
owned land plots. Secondly, the chapter shows how the decision to privatise buildings 
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to their residents in the early 1990s in Estonia led to the lack of financial capacities of 
city governments with the governing in housing estate done through communities—flat-
owners’ associations (FOAs). Such a neo-liberal technique of governing—centralised 
but working through individual actors—is thus not so much an ideological one but a 
pragmatic response to dealing with the ‘parking problem’ in the material and 
institutional environment of the city of Tallinn. 
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2 Material governmentality 
This chapter introduces and elaborates on the notion of material governmentality. The 
term material governmentality underlines that governmental intervention takes place 
against and in relation to the agency of things. I introduce this term in order to capture 
the city as a complex but governed entity, and thus form a foundation for forthcoming 
analysis on car parking regulations in the city of Tallinn.  
I deal with governmentality—which is one part of the concept of ‘material 
governmentality’—not because I am interested in the expansion of the state into more 
aspects of life, which is the way the term has often been defined. Instead, 
governmentality is a useful framework to capture the problematics of governing in 
liberal societies. As Walters (2012) argues, in the studies of governmentalities there has 
been a ‘tendency of researchers to find the practices of surveillance and (self-)discipline 
lurking in all sorts of unexpected places’ (p. 52). Similarly, there has been a tendency to 
define neo-liberalism – ‘as the political question of the day’ (p. 42) and to focus on the 
state as the main—if not the only—actor whose documents and programmes contain the 
up-to-date procedures of how to govern. Instead, Walters discourages turning 
‘governmentality’ and other Foucauldian terms into concepts with more coherence and 
‘applicability’ than Foucault himself provided. Walters suggests approaches that are 
more ‘fluid’ and closer to the empirical case; that governmentality should not be applied 
but rather encountered in the practice of critical exploration of ‘events’. 
Governmentality is thus seen in this thesis as an ongoing problematisation—and the 
ongoing and often failing introduction of plans, projects and technologies—of how to 
govern in relation to freedom
3
. 
The problematisation of governing involves a variety of actors (such as different parts 
of the ‘state’, particularly the complicated interaction of ‘legal’ and ‘administrative’ 
sides of the state), tools (textual, symbolic and physical), moments of confrontation and 
generation of ideas on how to find solutions. But the problematisation of governing 
must be careful not to neglect materiality, particularly when the governing concerns 
                                                          
3
 The difference between ‘governmentality’ and ‘liberal governmentality’ as used here should be 
clarified. While the latter offers an answer to how to govern in relation to freedom as ‘governing through 
freedom’ then the former takes freedom as one of the concerns that governing procedures have to tackle 
whereby ‘governing through freedom’ would be just one option rather than the only or the main option.  
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cities. Firstly, materiality matters in cities as it causes ‘problems’—such as multiple 
problems of density and circulation—that result in ‘wills to govern’ (Miller and Rose, 
1990; Rose, 1999; Rose and Miller, 1992). Secondly, materiality affects the process of 
governing: certain forms of materialisation make governing easier or, vice versa, restrict 
the means that governing authorities can use. Materiality is thus a tool in the hand of the 
governing power but also in many ways exceeds the governing capacity. This 
observation brings out the material forces that participate in the making of social life.  
The way in which materiality enters into analysis from studies of socio-technical 
systems, actor-networks or assemblages differs significantly from how it has been 
represented in much sociological research. In the latter approaches, material objects are 
conceptualised as parts of consumption, as signifying taste, or as personal attachments 
whereas the former approaches have shown that without certain objects, other 
phenomena would not exist or would be different: there is no high-speed internet 
without cables under the sea, moving in the city (including the spatial characters of the 
city) by car is different than by bicycle or public transit, or, to take a banal example, 
‘hitting a nail with and without a hammer’ is not the same (Latour, 2005, p. 71). Things 
do not have to determine social issues to be important, but not taking them into 
consideration would not only ‘miss half the story’ as Andrew Barry notes (2001) but 
misrepresent the question in mind. ‘Things’ are not just interesting examples through 
which sociological concepts can be thought, or which interact with humans in the 
embodied being in the world (as Dant, 2005 perceives material objects). Rather, things 
participate in the processes of life by influencing the ways in which social actions are 
carried out.  
The chapter introduces ‘material governmentality’ through two sections. Section 2.1 
sets up the notion of governmentality through the work of Michel Foucault and 
researchers who have built on his observations. Section 2.2 introduces the second 
component of material governmentality, bringing material agency into the discussion 
while also elaborating on the political relations that matter is entangled in. This chapter 
thus builds a framework for the following chapter—Chapter 3—that elaborates on the 
concept of material governmentality by attending to urban materiality and its governing, 
introducing the particular urban problem of automobility: car parking.  
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2.1  ‘Governmentality’ 
While the basic principles can be traced back to Michel Foucault’s (1926–1984) 
previous writings, governmentality is a theme that he developed in the lectures he gave 
in the last years of his life. In his first lectures on the topic, Security, Territory, 
Population in 1978, Foucault marks the shift from archaeologies of knowledge, which 
formed the theme of his earlier writings, to the genealogy of governmental technologies 
associated with the idea of governmentality (see Walters, 2012), and frames his 
thoughts away from representations to the ways of doing things as they take place and 
are ‘embedded within programmes for the direction and reform of conduct’ (Dean, 
2010, p. 27). Although Foucault did not publish work directly on governmentality, his 
lectures have been an inspiration for many Anglo-American writers, including 
influential edited collections already more than a decade ago (Barry et al., 1996; 
Burchell et al., 1991) and a number of works inspired by governmentality: the topics 
covered include social technologies like insurance and measurement of risk (Castel, 
1991; Defert, 1991; Ewald, 1991), statistics and other quantitative techniques (Hacking, 
1991; Joyce, 2003, ch 1; Rose, 1991), regulations of car driver behaviour (Merriman, 
2005; Packer, 2008; Seiler, 2008) and publications that critically assess connections and 
applicability of governmentality and other Foucault’s work to geography (Crampton 
and Elden, 2007; see also Huxley, 2008). Through the project of governmentality, 
Foucault and researchers inspired by his work have re-thought basic concepts like 
freedom and (neo-)liberalism through notions of technologies, subjectification and 
normalisation, to which I will turn in the following section. Foucault’s ideas have 
functioned as a starting point for many writers, from whom I mainly use the ideas of 
Nikolas Rose (Rose, 1999) on freedom and Mitchell Dean’s (Dean, 2010) as well as 
William Walters’ (Walters, 2012) elaboration on governmentality more generally.  
The term governmentality can be defined in a wide or narrow sense (Dean, 2010; 
Walters, 2012). In a wider meaning it refers to the rationality and art (tekhnē) of 
government; that is, the comprehension of how to govern—shape, lead, guide, direct, 
manage—the conduct of human beings in their relations. Studies of government, hence, 
are moved away from the analysis of political ideologies. Government, that is ‘conduct 
of conduct’, concerns both government of others and government of the self taking 
place through the mediation of various authorities and agencies, and not just ‘the state’ 
(Lemke, 2000; see also Dean, 2010). There is a ‘multiplicity’ and ‘immanence’ of 
25 
government (Foucault, 2007). As Foucault elaborates, a variety of actors govern (for 
instance, the head of the family, or convent) not just ‘the Prince’ (or the head of a state) 
but these governments take place in the state and are connected through downward and 
upward continuities. Proper governance of the self is necessary for good governing of 
the household and the state (upward continuity), while if the state is governed 
appropriately, the family and the self can be expected to be governed properly as well 
(downward continuity). Governmentality in the wider sense consists of technologies of 
government that are formed in different historical periods and can coagulate into a 
general practice of carrying out government in a particular historical period and social 
context. Liberal governmentality—the governmentality in a narrower meaning—is one 
such specific historical and located form of governmentality.  
In this restricted meaning, governmentality has been used to refer to the particular way 
of governing that describes modern liberal mode of governance, which has developed 
from the earlier liberalism to ‘advanced’ liberalism of the late 20th century (Rose, 1996). 
In his lectures, the emergence of the liberal mode of government was what Foucault was 
particularly concentrating on, tracing its appearance as a dominant mode back to the late 
18
th
 and early 19
th
 century. Still, as the genealogical analysis of Foucault shows, most of 
its forms, techniques and rationalities, three of which are particularly important, have 
had much longer histories. First, the shepherd-flock relationship (in other words, 
pastoral governmental technology, which means acting on the will of subjects indirectly 
but by sharing responsibility for their development), has its roots in Christianity. 
Second, Raison d’État, the reason of the state, dates to the 16th century and shares ideas 
of the Science Revolution, by seeking to replace the reason of God with another 
naturalness—society. The third form of government—police (as taking care of the 
increase of the state’s forces while keeping the good order)—has its intellectual and 
practical history in the 17
th
 and 18
th
 century Europe. Foucault (2007) shows how in late 
18
th
 and early 19
th
 century European political thought and practice, these forms were 
framed and altered but also critiqued and rejected in relation to the concept of 
‘economy’ as the logic of society, which needs not only to be respected but would lead 
to state failure when not taken into consideration. The emergence of governmentality is, 
hence, associated with the emerging ideas of political economy. This, then, is what 
Foucault means by government in a narrower sense: ‘institutions, procedures, analyses 
and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, 
albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its 
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major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical 
instrument’ (Foucault, 2007, p. 108).  
In the next section, I will deal with the liberal mode of governmentality (named ‘liberal 
governmentality’ by Walters, 2012), which, however, is not seen here as a fixed and 
clear-cut entity (and certainly not simply equated with neo-liberalism). By discussing 
the liberal governmentality I introduce the comprehension of society as a separate entity 
from the state as well as other conceptualisations such as governing through freedom, 
subjectification, normalisation and counter-conduct. After I have discussed liberal 
governmentality I move on to elaborate on the general insights that Foucauldian 
governmentality provides for the understanding of the ‘state’ that this thesis pursues. 
2.1.1 Liberal governmentality 
The fundamental point of liberal governmentality is the comprehension of society as 
having its own logic and ways of functioning. Society is characterised by certain 
regularities such as the number of births, deaths and accidents, which can be 
documented and analysed through techniques of statistics themselves dated to around 
the end of 16
th
 and the beginning of the 17
th
 century (Foucault, 2007, p. 104). There is 
henceforth a ‘naturalness of society’—a civil society that is different from the state and 
more than just the sum of individuals, and whose well-being should be the concern of 
the state (see ibid., p. 349). A particular problem that emerges, then, is how to govern 
‘the society’ while it has its own ways of behaviour and it is not possible to direct in the 
last instance its actions. The liberal governmentality answer to ‘how to be governed, by 
whom, to what extent, to what ends, and by what methods’ (Foucault, 2007, p. 89) is to 
‘act at a distance’ in both a constitutional and spatial sense (Rose, 1999). The regulation 
of the population would thus be done through making subjects capable of acting on the 
self in order to sustain and improve their own life, which, then, would also achieve 
benefits for the society. Individuals appear as and are made to be quasi-professionals 
capable of choosing experts who could help them improve living: a psychologist, car 
mechanic or home designer (Rose, 1999). Therefore, government takes place through 
freedom, which is not just an ideology forming a cornerstone of liberalism, as it is often 
seen, but also a mode of governing that Joyce (2003) defined as an absence of restraint 
as a restraint—‘the active and inventive deployment of freedom as a way of governing 
or ruling people’ (p. 1). 
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Freedom has often been seen as something always present and natural but under threat 
by rules and regulations (Bauman, 1988). However following Foucault, freedom should 
rather be seen as a technology, as capabilities for practicing; ‘[t]o do things, one needs 
resources’ (Bauman, 1988, p. 2). It is this latter meaning of freedom which informs 
understandings of liberal governmentality by Foucault and other writers, notably 
Nikolas Rose, whose Foucauldian elaboration on freedom in Powers of Freedom (Rose, 
1999) is an important contribution for understanding the liberal concept of freedom. As 
the writers on governmentality argue, freedom is not an essential property of 
individuals, something that would appear if all the state activities were removed, as 
most liberals define freedom (Dumm, 1996), but it appears only through an active 
making (cf. Tally, 1999). To be free in a liberal mode of government means that one has 
tools, knowledge and an environment that allows one to be free. This view suggests that 
there is no ‘freedom’ in the abstract but that the situation that one calls ‘free’ is created 
through a myriad of actions. Freedom is enabled and constrained through a set of 
governmental technologies, it is an ‘artefact of government’ (Rose, 1999), it ‘does not 
arise in the absence of power: it is a mobile historical possibility arising from the lines 
of force within which human being is assembled, and the relations into which humans 
are enfolded’ (ibid., p. 96). In the words of Foucault (2008, p. 65), ‘[l]iberalism is not 
acceptance of freedom, it proposes to manufacture it constantly, to arouse it and 
produce it’. Life according to liberal governmentality, therefore, enfolds with the 
presence of constant governmental interference.  
Moreover, considering regulations developed from the perspective of liberal 
governmentality, these would not so much be imposed on people but would be 
managing behaviour in a way that acknowledges the behaviour of individuals who have 
their aims, habits, and who can act differently from the desires of the state. The power 
of the state, therefore, instead of imposing its will or oppressing individuals’ will and 
behaviour, rather is concerned with nurturing subjects who are self-responsible and 
capable of action on their own. Foucault’s understanding is of a productive modern 
subjection rather than a repressive one (Seiler, 2008). The power that is involved in 
subject formation is a power that enhances the capabilities of individuals to practice 
freedom. This is characterised by the term ‘subjectification’—meaning that the subject 
is an object of government but an object that should appear as capable of its own action 
to shape itself, being thus also a benefit for society. This concept of subjectivity 
challenges the liberal ideology which sees ‘the individual’ as ‘produc[ing] themselves’ 
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(Seiler, 2008). Rather, subjects according to liberal governmentality, ‘are produced 
through discursive practice, and act within specific historical frames, which themselves 
undergo inevitable transformation’ (ibid., p. 4).  
In this line of thinking, freedom is not just produced through specific interventions or 
actions on the self, but it is also created through normalisation, that is ‘creating or 
specifying a general norm in terms of which individual uniqueness can be recognized, 
characterized and then standardized’ (O'Malley, 1996, p. 189). Normalisation is a 
process through which certain conducts appear as taken-for-granted ways of doing, 
leading to individuals and practices which follow the ‘norm’ being enabled, supported 
and even trained through education and policies, while deviations from the norm are 
subject to stricter governmental interventions through disciplinary technologies (Rose, 
1999). Norms, as Dean elaborates, do not derive ‘from a general view of the cosmos, of 
being or of human nature’ but depend on the particular ‘things, activities, facts or 
populations’ to which they are applied (Dean, 2010, p. 142). These kinds of norms are 
not characterised as the will of anyone in particular or common interest but rather reflect 
‘a common standard’ (e.g., Dean refers to traffic law as an example). These norms 
designate the space of typical conduct, which in liberal governmentality means that an 
individual is autonomous, self-responsible and striving for self-realisation (Rose, 1999). 
To be free in a modern liberal society, therefore, is to be a normal subject who is self-
directed but capable of being tutored by ‘the engineers of the human soul’ according to 
the norm (or the ‘standard’ in other words) in order to be able to achieve the norm (ibid, 
p. 76).  
The last point in the section I would like to consider is the openness of this 
understanding of conduct and the ‘conduct of conduct’. Although Foucault’s 
conceptualisation would seem to lead to an all-encompassing notion of power, where 
even freedom is part of governing, the theory is open to politics through revolts that 
seek to enact alternative ways of governing, which Foucault named counter-conducts. 
Counter-conduct is a rather unstudied topic—being picked up only by a few studies (in 
geography, e.g., Cadman, 2010; Holloway and Morris, 2012; see also Davidson, 2011;  
Dean, 2010)—even though Foucault devoted one lecture and the last part of the 
concluding lecture to the topic in the 1978 course Security, Territory, Population 
(Foucault, 2007, pp. 191 – 226, 355 – 357). Furthermore, the introduction preceding the 
lectures in the English edition by Arnold I. Davidson (2007) thoroughly considers the 
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theme. Counter-conduct is a concept that shows the political possibilities of Foucault’s 
governmentality without going into narratives of public and visible resistance to (what 
might be called) Power with a capital P. In a nutshell, counter-conduct means striving to 
be governed differently: by different actors, towards different goals and by different 
technologies. In other words, conduct—as an activity of conducting but also the way 
one conducts oneself or lets oneself be conducted and behaves as a form of conduct—is 
desired to be altered. In liberal governmentality, counter-conduct can also mean 
changing practices of the self as a resistance to other forms of government; that is, 
altering the forms in which one conducts oneself.  
Foucault elaborates counter-conduct through five domains developed in the Middle 
Ages that discredited pastoral power: asceticism, communities, mysticism, 
problematisation of Scripture, and eschatological beliefs. What is significant is that 
these practices are not ‘absolutely external’ but are ‘border-elements’ of pastoral 
power—‘the art, project, and institutions for conducting men, and the counter-conducts 
that were opposed to this, developed in correlation with each other’ (Foucault, 2007, p. 
355). These five domains of counter-conducts are parts of Christianity or are different 
directions of and from it, countering pastoral power by, for instance, valuing athletic 
contests through exercises on the self or by privileging experience that by definition 
escapes pastoral power. Contemporary examples of soft counter-conducts would mean 
changing practices of the self by, for example, eating vegetarian food (Dean, 2010, p. 
21), consuming fair trade products, or riding a bicycle instead of driving a private car. 
These are conducts that are not necessarily antagonistic to the whole of liberal 
governmentality—as they would mean, for instance, acting out in self-interest and in the 
general framework of circulation of goods and people—but suggest alterations in some 
instances of it—saving animals by not eating them, providing profit for producers who 
would not attain it in the business as usual, and keeping the atmosphere cleaner. All in 
all, counter-conduct can be summed up as follows. First, it is a ‘struggle against a 
certain type of conduction and for another form of conduct’ (Davidson, 2007, p. xxx) 
that is done by someone else, by other means or for other reasons. Second, counter-
conduct exists in the current normalised conduct containing elements of it, however, not 
in its centre but on the margin. Finally, it is always present and can be developed by 
acting on the self, which depending on the circumstances can broaden to include more 
individuals practicing it or extend into the ways others are conducted. Therefore, 
counter-conduct offers a concept for analysing challenges that have been provided to 
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automobility, which, as the concept elaborates, are not necessarily big alternatives with 
explicit critique and programmes of alternative ways of living but are also practical 
means that can in fact alter dominant governmentalities.  
To conclude, the liberal mode of government is characterised by the figuration of 
population beyond the state that is amenable to being governed through freedom, by 
means of subjectification and normalisation while being supplemented and opposed by 
counter-conduct. In this framework, the improvement of the shared pool of resources 
(e.g., public space, air quality) through change of behaviours would fit into the liberal 
mode of conduct as subjectivities are not altered: that is, freedom and individuality are 
still possessed by subjects, even if produced by governing actions. Liberal 
governmentality is not changed when the normalised conduct is challenged but 
individuals remain subjectified in the same way. Liberal governmentality with its 
understanding of the production of freedom that individuals are subjected to, appears as 
a dominant frame for how Foucault’s writings are understood. Nevertheless, this is not 
the only way to conceptualise governmentality. In the following section I explore ways 
in which authors have thought about moving beyond liberal governmentality while still 
‘encountering governmentality’ (Walters, 2012) by taking seriously some key concerns 
with the Foucauldian governmentality thinking.  
2.1.2 Beyond liberal governmentality 
Various authors have criticised the practice of implying too much coherence to the 
notion of governmentality (Collier, 2009; Valverde, 2006; Walters, 2012). Collier 
(2009, p. 98) points out that governmentality has been ‘prone to reification, as though it 
were a coherent regime that dominated an epoch.’ However the ‘“epochalist” 
misreading” of Foucault, as Valverde (2006) notes, is not entirely without foundation 
from his works even though Foucault has provided many warnings against such 
‘misreading’. Still, to define governmentality as merely the contemporary condition of 
neoliberalism is to ‘commit the synechdocal error’ of confusing parts such as techniques 
of governing with a neo-liberal whole (Collier, 2009, p. 98). Instead, as Collier (2009, p. 
79) further notes, with the lectures in the late 1970s, Foucault shifted his analysis away 
from epochal thinking to ‘“topological” analysis of power that examines how existing 
techniques and technologies of power are re-deployed and recombined in diverse 
assemblies of biopolitical government.’ Thus, using governmentality in this limited 
sense of a liberal governmentality that analysts can then recognise in various instances 
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might give the framework analytical precision but it is not what Foucault had in mind—
as he used the term inconsistently (Collier, 2009; Walters, 2012), and it does not 
elucidate the capacity governmentality studies could really have. Here, I want to 
highlight three features from the analysis of governmentality, which can make the 
concept especially useful for the following analysis of governing cities elaborated 
through the ‘agency of things’ (next section) and through car parking regulations in the 
city of Tallinn (Chapters 6 to 8). These features reviewed below are: the attentiveness to 
details which makes various concerns (such as morality) beyond governing techniques 
pertinent to governmentalities, assuming society to have its own logic and dispersal of 
power into multiple elements.  
First, governmentality approaches propose that studies of state practices should be 
attentive to details, contingent processes and genealogies of governmental techniques 
(Walters, 2012). Such analysis is first and foremost an open-ended investigation that 
through a detailed research avoids application of readymade concepts seeking, instead, 
to develop language through the study itself (Walters, 2012). One should thus move 
away from ‘applicationism’ and see governmentality as a toolbox for critically 
encountering various governmental practices (Walters, 2012). In that way, the analyst 
will confront all sorts of concerns. For instance, one such concern that has been raised 
by previous Foucauldian research is the role of morality and non-experts in the 
governmental processes. As Rose (1999, p. 103) elaborates: 
The economy was to be understood [in the first half of the nineteenth century] in 
terms of its own laws and causalities, and political interventions upon it were to 
be limited in the light of these. But the moral domain was construed as a proper 
territory for action by politicians, the churches, philanthropists and others – 
although exactly what was to be regulated, how and by whom was a matter of 
contestation. 
Government is an ‘intensely moral’ activity, concerning questions such as how one 
governs one’s own conduct and how to properly govern the conduct of others (Dean, 
2010, p. 19). While ‘the social’ is divided into spheres—like the economy, legal system 
or public health—which are seen to have their internal way of functioning and 
specialists who can engineer their order, government can act on them through moral 
calculations (Rose, 1999). Valverde (1998), for instance, showed how alcohol, the 
spaces of its consumption and consumers, have been subjects to governmental 
technologies discussed and formed through moral considerations of what constitutes a 
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proper use of alcohol and its violation, who is normal and who is delinquent. In a 
similar vein Paterson (2007) notes the politics of subjectivity in how driving is defined 
as what normal people do while cycling is constructed as deviant, but the use of car 
itself involves a moral consideration of who can use it, what are proper ways of using it 
and what constitutes dangers, much as for alcohol (see Garvey, 2001 on the example of 
Norway). Morality, hence, is a field in governmentality that opens issues of making and 
remaking of proper conduct to non-specialists. That is, the study of governmentalities 
cannot only concern itself with the rationalities of governing but has to take into 
account all sorts of social concerns such as moralities of what could be governed, to 
what extent and by whom. Thus, this thesis elaborates on the moral concerns regarding 
whether it is a state duty to regulate car parking (such as the activities of parking 
businesses discussed in Chapter 7) or what precise technologies can be used for 
governing violators of parking rules (Chapter 6).  
Second, the governmentality relies on an understanding that ‘society’ has its own logic 
of processes that state institutions must take into consideration in the practices of 
governing. In liberal governmentality, as was shown in the previous section, the concept 
of subjectification is a way to link the ‘will to govern’ and freedom of subjects. 
Governing—as self-governing—thus takes place beyond the state while directed by 
state institutions acting at a distance. However, there are two concerns with such a 
liberal governmentality perspective. First, it sees governing as an action for the benefit 
of the society while in practice there could be various groups of interests, corruption and 
prejudices against certain portions of society (Walters, 2012). Second, while in liberal 
governmentality governing appears to successfully nudge individuals into the process of 
‘governing through freedom’, in practice governing often fails to achieve what it aims 
for. Government, according to Rose and Miller (1992, p. 190) ‘is a congenitally failing 
operation’ whereby ‘[t]hings, persons or events always appear to escape those bodies of 
knowledge that inform governmental programmes, refusing to respond according to the 
programmatic logic that seeks to govern them.’ Rose and Miller (1992, p. 191) further 
point out that ‘[w]e do not live in a governed world so much as a world traversed by the 
“will to govern”, fuelled by the constant registration of “failure”, the discrepancy 
between ambition and outcome, and the constant injunction to do better next time.’ In 
practice freedom can thus still appear for actors as freedom from the state which they 
seek to keep away from their lives by law or some other means. For the analysis of this 
paper, the internal logics of society at a distance from state apparatuses is considered as 
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a field of problematic and debate in its own right: which governmental techniques could 
work; how to govern so that the freedom of individuals and social groups is retained; 
which institutions are capable and responsible authorities to govern? The analysis of 
governmentalities cannot be concerned only with governing as a self-contained 
endeavour but must also take into account the complications emerging from the 
behaviour of societies: they are not always governable in the ways that regulators 
devise.  
Third, the Foucauldian analysis of governmentality relies on the microphysics of power 
that is dispersed in multiple elements while the elements themselves retain their specific 
capacities (Murdoch, 2006). Murdoch (2006, p. 48) thus claims that ‘Foucault sees 
power almost everywhere. And he sees power almost everywhere because he believes it 
comes from almost everywhere’. The king’s head has been cut off in Foucault’s 
analysis, to turn his own words on political science back to his work (Lemke, 2000). 
The power is seen to be pulverised into thousands of points and carried out by numerous 
actors in smaller and larger acts. ‘Mechanisms of power are an intrinsic part of all these 
relations [e.g., sexual relationships] and, in a circular way, are both their effect and 
cause’ as Foucault (2007, p. 2) emphasizes. Therefore power is not seen as one group 
dominating another, but rather a ‘game of strategy’ where some try to control the 
conduct of others who escape it or control yet others (Foucault, 2003 [1984]). Power for 
Foucault is a relational property: it is not internal to actors but emerges in the 
connections with various elements that include humans as well as non-humans 
(Murdoch, 2006; see also Deleuze, 2006 [1986]). Such observations do two things for 
analysis. First, those otherwise thought of as powerful actors are downgraded into a set 
of dispersed elements. In Foucault’s analysis, different forms of power, whether 
disciplinary or sovereign power, are just different technologies of government (Lemke, 
2000). The neo-liberal critique of the welfare state, for instance, can be seen not as an 
attack on certain government institutions but a problematisation of specific ideals of 
government (Dean, 2010, p. 43). In that way, Foucault’s writings have diverged from 
more traditional Marxist left-wing writings as he does not delimitate classes nor seek 
any kind of radical change of the centre of power through, for example, revolution. 
Indeed, in his life-time, Foucault was involved in distancing himself from Marxism and 
associated his views more with a ‘second left’ that is more open to new questions 
concerning everyday life, gender issues, or self-management (Senellart, 2007). Second, 
the actors assumed otherwise to be weak appear as more important for the analysis. 
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These actors include human, institutional as well as various non-human actors in their 
multiple materialisations.  
Foucault indeed considers a number of technologies (both social and material): flows in 
the city, schools, ships and prisons. Foucault (2007), for instance, was concerned with 
the problem of circulation in the city, that is the circulation of goods and people. 
Moreover, even though it can be argued that there is a lack of an explicit treatment of 
‘thingness’ (Thrift, 2007), the theory itself is not hostile to material objects in their 
multiple relations. This line of research has been elaborated by, for instance, Barry 
(1996) using the case of telegraph cables, Osborne (1996) using the example of drainage 
system and Joyce (2003) using a number of different 19
th
 century technologies 
including streets and street lighting. 
Whereas things are part of governmentality networks and tasks are delegated to them, 
they are not just passive objects but form limits and possibilities of what can be done, 
which necessitates more attention to their functioning. The government is not only 
about human subjects but human subjects in their relations where these relations involve 
not just other humans but also nonhumans, as Foucault clearly asserts, using an example 
of governing a ship: the captain of a ship is not only concerned with orders to sailors but 
has to consider the vessel, goods on the vessel, sea, currents and winds (Foucault, 
2007). In the next section I will draw attention to the agency of things in practices of 
governmentality by first considering Foucauldian understandings of the materiality of 
social life. The section ends by considering the ‘agency of things’ through the literature 
on actor-networks, particularly by Bruno Latour, and the literature around the ‘politics 
of things’. 
2.2 The agency of things 
In Foucault’s account, government is inevitably a technical matter. Practices of 
government rely on an array of more or less formalised and more or less specialised 
technical devices from car seat-belts and driving codes to dietary regimes; and from 
economic instruments to psychotherapy. (Barry, 2001, p. 5) 
Jim Gerrie (2003) carried Barry’s suggestion further and proposed to see Foucault as a 
philosopher of technology, as his work on power shares many parallels with a 
‘philosophy of technology’. After all, since Foucault was talking about ‘technologies of 
governance’, this cannot be too radical a claim. Importantly, Foucault’s understandings 
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of power are close to the positions of philosophers of technology, for example 
suggesting that (ibid., p. 14) ‘technology is not simply an ethically neutral set of 
artifacts by which we exercise power over nature, but also always a set of structured 
forms of action by which we also inevitably exercise power over ourselves.’ Foucault 
also made a ‘prolific use’ of technological metaphors, such as system, technique, 
procedure, and referred to ‘complex technical arrangements’ like prisons, schools, 
factories, and cities. For Foucault, power is ‘something that is at work in every instance 
of our lives’ being inscribed into specific practices and technical devices through 
‘rational formalisation of human behaviour’ (ibid., p. 16). The ‘truth’ (whether it is an 
understanding of sexuality or the use of cars for urban transport) is constituted through 
wide-scale acceptance accompanied by actions: that is ‘normalisation’, ‘the process by 
which such structured forms of thought and practice are widely adopted’ (ibid., p. 20). 
Power, therefore, is not exercised by anyone in particular but is inscribed in activities, 
spaces and devices that are normalised and function in the flow of everyday life without 
individuals necessarily noting how the influence on conduct is actually happening.  
However, although Foucault is interested in ‘things’ and can be called a philosopher or 
social theorist of technology, he explores this not by focusing particularly on devices 
and materialities in society, but by noting the role they might have in a theme he is more 
interested in: subject-thing(s) connections in the population, stressing primarily the 
‘subject’. Nevertheless, two books have more thoroughly looked at the governance of 
and through material objects. These are Patrick Joyce’s (2003) Foucauldian analysis of 
liberalism of a city and Andrew Barry’s (2001) study of the politics of technologies. I 
will now turn to these studies. 
Joyce’s The Rule of Freedom (2003) offers an account of how materiality is configured 
to ‘perform agency in a particular way’ (p. 120) by studying technologies of nineteenth 
century cities: pipes, sewers, lights and roads. Through material configurations, 19
th
 
century liberal governments could practice liberal governmentality; that is, government 
of citizens without physical embodied interference. The moral reform of the city was 
linked with sanitary reform—the shaping of citizens involved not just altering their 
conduct but altering their conduct through material environment. Sanitary and moral 
reform worked through the ‘governance of space’—regulating houses and piped 
water—forming underground sanitary city and aboveground moral city. This is a liberal 
infrastructure, as argued by Joyce, as it was governing without a personal contact, 
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without an ‘undue interference’ (p. 70): the home and family were left to themselves, 
while the attainment of hygiene was made possible by the infrastructure. The ‘social’, 
which, as we saw in Section 2.1, is perceived to have its own logic since the 18
th
 and the 
19
th
 century, was permitted ‘to operate freely, and according to its own equilibrium as a 
natural system’ by interventions in the material world (p. 70). The city was configured 
in a way that ‘people and things could circulate freely’ (p. 11), for instance, by creating 
wider and straighter streets and improved lighting, but also through rules that governed 
proper conduct on the streets (walking on one side of the pavement and prohibitions on 
obstructing free passage on the carriageway, for instance). However, the ‘forms of 
competency, and of agency were present in material things and processes, but not 
always present to the consciousness of contemporaries’ (p. 184) which the forms of 
sanitary system as well as ‘objective’ cartography showed most clearly. The ‘political’ 
effect of the taken-for-granted material environment results precisely from the fact that 
they are rendered ‘technical’ – that is outside of the political (p. 7). As a result, not only 
politicians and bureaucrats but also engineers are entangled in the politics of governing.  
Barry’s Political Machines (2001) looks at contemporary developments in European 
societies, which he claims to be technological societies where (p. 2) ‘specific 
technologies dominate our sense of the kinds of problems that government and politics 
must address, and the solutions that we must adopt.’ Barry borrows the term from 
Deleuze and Guattari and describes these societies as ‘arrangements’ (assemblages) 
made up of multiple elements including technological components that are constantly 
manipulated and continually resist manipulation, rather than being merely passive 
elements. In this sense Barry accords more power to the material elements than Joyce 
did, seeing governing through artefacts as an often failing enterprise. In arrangements 
any attempt to challenge the existing social order involves an ‘effort to contest the 
development and deployment of technology as well’ (p. 9). For instance, referring to the 
European Union, the integration of this economic and political entity also involved 
technological configuration through standardisation (‘harmonisation’), which, however, 
has been and is a complex and ongoing process. For instance, the measuring of the 
quality of swimming water—which might seem a rather straightforward matter—in the 
way it would be comparable among different EU countries, turned out to be a complex 
issue largely due to the different laboratory practices in various countries, but also due 
to difficulties with negotiations in reaching a consensus. Even twenty years after the 
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start of harmonisation of beach water quality measurements (in 1975), an agreement had 
not been reached (p. 77).  
Moreover, apparently technical matters can become political issues on the national scale 
when they transfer the interests of one party (a nation-state, for example) to the 
concerns of another: ‘normal’ chocolate, a ‘safe’ abattoir, or ‘good quality’ air would 
not be defined the same way in every place. Using an example of Southwark in the 
South London, Barry showed how measuring air quality to identify polluting vehicles 
and govern drivers to be environmentally responsible, turned out to be a complex 
problem, shaped by measuring techniques, vehicle technologies, public perception, 
topologies of urban space, international scientific relations, and rationales of local 
government politicians. ‘“Air quality” has multiple realities’, notes Barry (p. 171–2), its 
existence ‘depends on whether a series of connections can be maintained between air 
and the institutions which measure it and finance this measurement.’ The chemistry of 
air is therefore political (p. 155), it is ‘an element in a transnational political project’ (p. 
209). What gives Barry’s argument its strength and causes it to diverge from the 
understandings of Joyce is his view of materiality as (re-)directing political action in 
itself. The intention by governments, thus, fails due to particular material arrangements 
or, alternatively, a wide set of political processes are set in motion by material 
entanglements. This is also captured by Barry’s later work where he discusses the 
notion of ‘material politics’ (Barry, 2010, 2013). 
To conclude from these two influential books on governing materiality (Barry, 2001; 
Joyce, 2003), matter both performs and is made to perform which means that every 
governmental activity necessarily involves material configuring and re-configuring. 
However, the way in which matter acts, that is, the ways in which it changes the social 
action that is involved in its making and performing—so that social science cannot be 
done without taking material objects seriously—is still somewhat unclear. I will 
elaborate below on the key issues that are important for developing a concept of 
material governmentality. First, there is the question as to how power is dispersed 
resulting in the mediation of governance, which therefore, as it is described by Peter 
Miller and Nikolas Rose (e.g., Miller and Rose, 1990), is taking place ‘at a distance’ 
(individuals, indeed, are governed through a number of ‘things’). The question of how 
precisely this affects what the governance of the social entails is a core concern of the 
empirical chapters of this thesis. Second, there is the question of the politics of 
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materiality: how technologies become ‘matters of concern’ (Latour, 2005) and 
contested; in other words, how matter becomes ‘political’. 
2.2.1 The dispersal of power and the effects of materialities 
The ‘indirect’ nature of government is a common everyday experience of modern 
Western society: while we know that we are citizens, pay taxes and have ideas about 
what will happen if we do not behave according to the law, life seems to be unfolding 
without direct influence of state institutions. The influence of the state, and more 
broadly of government, happens through a wide array of objects, documents, projects 
and processes. Government, therefore, takes place ‘at a distance’ (Miller and Rose, 
1990), where it acknowledges that society has its own behaviour which could be shaped 
by adjusting the materiality of the social life and making use of different regulatory 
technologies (Joyce, 2003). The term governing ‘at a distance’ is adapted from actor-
network theory and from its two key figures, Bruno Latour and Michel Callon (see 
Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987, pp. 217–257), by Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose who 
describe it as ‘indirect mechanisms by which rule is brought about’ including a diverse 
set of different techniques—such as computation, calculation, building designs and 
standards—entangled into complex mechanisms, ‘through which it becomes possible to 
link calculations at one place with action at another’ (Miller and Rose, 1990, p. 9). 
Thus, while the general thrust of ANT expands from Foucaldian understandings of the 
dispersal of power into networks (Murdoch, 2006), the notion ‘acting at a distance’ is 
openly drawn from ANT (Rose, 1999). This notion suggests the involvement of many 
nonhumans—legal documents, communication technologies, infrastructures—in 
relation to the practices of governing. 
Acting/governing ‘at a distance’ also implies a very dispersed view of the state. 
Valverde (2009, note 1, p. 179), thus, claims that ‘“[t]he state” does not do anything’, 
‘specific legal mechanisms do, however.’ For example, the parliament—while being an 
institution with the highest political authority in democratic societies—can act only 
through making and voting for legal measurements; or the police are one of very few 
state agents having the right to physically touch the body of a citizen, and are governed 
by a myriad of rules prescribing what they can or cannot do. In thinking about ‘the 
state’ acting, we have to think carefully about the mechanisms—apparatuses, to use the 
Foucauldian term or assemblages, to use the Deleuzian one (they both work in that 
context)—through which actions in one place are translated into actions in another. 
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Especially, we should not assume a smooth connection between governing practice and 
governmental outcomes: the mediating nonhumans do affect the outcome of whatever 
intention is input to them.  
These nonhumans, therefore, are not straightforward outcomes of human or government 
intent but respond to actions in many ways, often in a way that is unintended. The active 
role of non-humans in social life is a point that the literature of actor-network theory 
puts forward strongly. It seeks to lift non-humans out from being a mere background or 
tool for humans’ actions and thought, and to approach ‘things’ in such a way that they 
are seen as central elements in society—not constituting social relations in the last 
instance but important enough to be configured into a social analysis. Things are, 
therefore, actants—that is any type of entities, from material objects to ideas, that do 
things (Latour, 2005, p. 55). The action of nonhumans becomes visible by a small 
exercise that Latour (1992, p. 229) suggests: ‘every time you want to know what a 
nonhuman does, simply imagine what other human or other nonhumans would have to 
do were this character not present.’ However the important concern to discuss further is 
in what way(s) materiality matters for understanding concerns otherwise thought of as 
social (governing procedures, for instance)?  
Throughout his writings, Latour does not want to ascribe agency to clear-cut humans, 
organisms or objects but prefers notions like quasi-objects, hybrids, cyborgs, and 
actants. Any pure form—human or nonhuman, Nature or Culture but also global and 
local—is not possible because everything is ‘delegated, mediated and translated’ by a 
diverse set of intermediary entities (Latour, 1993 [1991]). No technological project (a 
new transport system, whether Personal Rapid Transit as in Latour’s example (Latour, 
1996 [1993]) or a bicycle city) is born as viable (profitable and effective). The project is 
made viable by interested humans and interested nonhumans, some of which might 
work and fit to the system easily while others might need to be ‘tamed’ (Latour, 1996 
[1993]). The technological—what is often seen as merely technical—has its own 
demands (for instance, other devices, careful use, or huge sums of money) without 
which it would not be born or will go on ‘strike’ (Latour, 1996 [1993]; see also Latour, 
1992). The technology is not a purely human nor wholly inhuman thing, it is a 
translation between ‘what humans inscribe in it and what it prescribes to humans’ 
(Latour, 1996 [1993], p. 213). For example, costs might be minimised by using a 
cheaper piece of equipment in the technological system but this might have 
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unanticipated effects, such as the system breaks down more often, it is heavier, or less 
easy to maintain. Tasks can be carried out by different entities (Latour, 1992): in some 
cases, an entity can be human or a collective of humans, or the task can be delegated to 
nonhumans.  
There are different ways to solve the same problem. For instance, in an example that 
Latour gives (1992), the task of getting the door of La Halle aux Cuirs in Paris closed in 
an orderly fashion every time one goes through could be achieved through disciplining 
humans, disciplining one human (the porter) or by delegating the task of opening and 
closing the door to a nonhuman. The paradigmatic relations amongst different entities 
form a space of options where choices might become available (the electronic door-
opener has not existed forever), normal (for example, a porter might be ‘rational’ in the 
case of an expensive hotel, but not for a university) or unusable at some moment (the 
malfunction of the door-closer in Latour’s example necessitated disciplining people 
who pass through the door). Nonhumans are, then, acting and acting in order to carry 
out tasks delegated to them, but while doing whatever they do, they influence the course 
of action. In other words, they mediate instead of being only intermediary (Latour, 
2005). 
In similar vein to Latour, Jane Bennett (2010) argues for ‘material vitality’ and ‘vital 
matter’ that make things happen. However, Bennett builds more explicitly on Deleuze’s 
and Guattari’s notion of ‘assemblage’. Her aim, thus, is not so much to argue for the 
direct causality of matter—not making it immediately agentic, which might be rebutted 
on the grounds of humanism, vitalism or social scientific practices—but to grasp how 
humans and nonhumans ‘conjoin’, to act through certain ‘freedom of choice’ while 
being influenced and influencing others. Nonhumans, in her account, are ‘inextricably 
enmeshed’ into assemblages through heterogeneous connections that affect other 
nonhuman or human actants to be agentic. ‘[N]onhuman agency’, therefore, appears as 
‘the condition of possibility of human agency’ (p. 98).  
In summary, authors working on actor-network theory or assemblage theory provide an 
understanding of society as inclusive not only of human connections but of a wide 
selection of nonhumans, who affect humans (and other nonhumans) while having 
vitality that is not reducible to any superior or underlining agency. Being attentive to the 
materialities of nonhumans is not just important to understanding what they are, but it is 
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also necessary in order to understand human agency. Rather than concerning ourselves 
with whether purposive human agents or material artefacts have priority (e.g., Tonkiss, 
2011), we should be focusing on ‘the agentic power of human-nonhuman assemblages’ 
(Bennett, 2005, p. 455). The car—whether parked or a mobile one—is thus a participant 
in an assemblage of automobility where not only the materiality of the car is important 
but also various other entities such as driving licences, parking spaces and parking 
meters, and other less obviously material entities including constitutions, private 
companies and associations. Such socio-materialities allow the automobility system to 
exist; some of those socio-materialities are investigated in the empirical part of the 
thesis in Chapters 6 to 8.  
2.2.2 The politics of materiality 
The second concern with the agency of things relates to the political properties of 
technological arrangements: in what ways do things perform (which they can do in 
socially unjust ways and in which they might be open to discussion and contestation)? I 
will look at this question through three interrelated smaller concerns. Firstly, the 
problem might be framed in terms of the capacity of the technological system: whether 
politics is inherent to the technological devices and systems, or the politics is in the 
particular arrangement of the social and cultural environment around the technology 
(Winner, 1986). Secondly, the politics of materiality also raises questions concerning 
how normal ways of doing things are materialised, considering that things can be made 
otherwise (Bijker, 1995). Thirdly, the politics of materiality concerns connections 
between material objects and their physical properties on the one side and institutional 
processes in various levels of governmental practice on the other side. Such 
interlinkages between the material and institutional are described as ‘material politics’ 
by Andrew Barry (2010, 2013). These three takes on the politics of things are associated 
with three researchers and their work. In relation to the first concern, Winner shows the 
embeddedness of politics in artefacts. In relation to the second concern, Bijker draws in 
the user groups and various technological frames to understand the emergence of 
technological power. And concerning the third, Barry opens up the question of the 
politics of things by proposing a ‘material politics’ that links physical reality with 
political deliberations in various levels of institutional power.  
First, technology matters for politics due to the political influence it embeds. In a book 
entitled The Whale and the Reactor political scientist Langdon Winner (1986) 
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differentiates analyses of the politics of technology into two claims: softer and stronger. 
The softer claim suggests that the politics of artefacts results from the setting which can 
be rearranged, while the stronger claim notes the power of technology itself, so that the 
technology can exist only in particular political contexts—the technology thus 
determines the social context. He uses the example of nuclear energy for the latter, as it 
requires a ‘benign priesthood of scientists’ (p. 52), while for the former he refers to the 
example of the socially unjust construction of bridges by Robert Moses in New York 
that were too low for buses carrying poorer and black people, limiting their access to 
parks and beaches thus by implication meant for white middle-class car owners. The 
power was embedded into the materiality of bridges, but, as it is important to this 
discussion, it could have been planned otherwise, while the nuclear power could not 
exist in any other way. Still, as Winner (1986, pp. 8–9) makes clear, automobiles in 
their material form pose limits (in addition to all sorts of capabilities that they make 
possible), for instance, in terms of conversation with an acquaintance on the street: ‘The 
attempt to extend a greeting and invitation, ordinarily a simple gesture, is complicated 
by the presence of a technological device [the car one drives] and its standard operating 
condition.’  
It is difficult to delimit issues as neatly matters of a technical device or the social 
arrangement, but the form of technology might through its make-up be more compatible 
with one type of society than with another. The system of automobility is difficult to 
combine with eco-friendly and small lively neighbourhoods à la Jane Jacobs (though, 
note some examples, particularly Mitchell et al., 2010; but also Dennis and Urry, 2009 
to remake, or 'reinvent' the automobile system), while a bicycle would fit there. The 
‘softer’ and ‘stronger’ claims of technology could be seen as a difference between who 
are the engineers of those technological systems. While with the stronger claim (i.e., the 
technological dominance) the experts are the leading engineers, with the softer claim 
(i.e., social dominance), moral, legal or administrative ‘engineers’ receive a more 
prominent role. Although in discussions of highways systems, highway engineers have 
an important position regarding the technical details of road design, in urban questions 
such as parking regulations, a wide range of ‘social’ and ‘moral’ concerns and actors 
find their way to the stage of deliberation. In Chapter 6 we will thus encounter the 
parliament and other judicial institutions in deliberating parking matters in the city of 
Tallinn.  
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Second, the politics of artefacts emerges in the arrangements whereby certain practices 
have achieved a taken-for-granted character. Closure and stabilisation in meaning and 
practices form what Bijker (1995, p. 264) defines as ‘technological frame’ that is ‘at the 
same time constituted by interactions of members of the relevant social group, and 
result in “disciplining” the members of that relevant social group.’ Technologies are 
characterised by interpretive flexibility that is the condition for politics (‘things can be 
otherwise’) but at the same time they can become fixed and obdurate. Having achieved 
obduracy—the technological lock-in where other ways of doing things are weakened if 
not unimaginable—the technology can be seen as having achieved major force, almost a 
technological determinism (Bijker, 2001). The other ways of doing things are invisible. 
In terms of cars, for instance, a certain common sense has been formed which considers 
the driver as the agent of automobility, who might be negligent or malicious while cars 
themselves—even though the ‘danger [is] written all over them’ in terms of their mass, 
speed and design—have been defined as ordinary objects unlike guns or steamboats 
(Jain, 2004, p. 84). In parallel to technological change, moreover, different social 
changes also occur. In Bijker’s (1995) elaboration of the development of the bicycle in 
the nineteenth century, for example, the concerns of women cyclists, safety and clothing 
as well as the design of the vehicle were linked together. The shifting of design away 
from large wheel ‘ordinary’ to the modern safety bicycle was enmeshed with the 
concern of female cyclists whose right to mobility was one of the forces behind shaping 
design but was itself also supported by the more contemporary design features. The 
technological and social are thus linked together as normalised ways of doing things in 
relation to the particular material arrangements.  
Third, materiality itself could be seen as a political actor in the assemblages they are 
entangled in (Barry, 2013; Mitchell, 2002). Materials, such as metals, cannot be 
‘explained away as an expression of political ideology or economic interest’ (Barry, 
2010, p. 90) but form themselves fields of concerns. In Barry’s (2010, 2013) discussion, 
for instance, the failure of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipe’s coating material was 
related to failures of political arrangements. However, not just seeing the material 
failure as an index of institutional failure as some actors in the pipeline politics did, 
Barry (2013, p. 153) saw material elements as particles of ‘lively and dynamic 
assemblages that may act in unanticipated ways, serving as the catalyst for controversies 
and thereby contributing to the transformation of political situations.’ The failures of the 
paint used for the pipeline to withhold corrosion was thus not just a reflection of 
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institutional and Political (with big P) processes but was entangled into political debates 
by, for instance, emerging as a central point for discussions in the British parliament. 
The tiniest of aspects, thus, can be related to ‘big’ political processes and not in a way 
that the latter determines the former.  
In material politics, materiality both constrains and enables actions. On the one hand, 
then, the political ideology or economic relations are not capable of determining (or 
circumscribing) the causality of all the material processes. Thus, for instance, the 
physical properties of oil pipes caused delays in international projects (Barry, 2010), 
electrical network’s failing led to disruptions of economic activities and showed the 
limits of neoliberal politics (Bennett, 2005), and the materiality of heating systems 
curtailed market-oriented political imaginations (Collier, 2011). Materiality exceeds 
thoughts, imaginations and projects as it is often ‘uncooperative’ with the governing 
projects (Bakker, 2003, see especially pp. 31–33). However, on the other hand 
materiality could also be manipulated by actors with the intention of revising and 
influencing power structures. Barry (2013), for instance, shows how land-owners 
manipulated material entities such as trees and beehives in order to be designated as 
‘affected’ by the international pipeline construction and claim compensation. Similarly, 
in Chapter 7, private parking businesses have achieved being defined as ‘legal void’ 
precisely due to the way they have positioned materiality: the unpaved surface keeps 
them outside of the local government’s urban planning techniques. As it both constrains 
and enables, materiality is not so much agentic in itself but matters in various ways in 
the assemblages it is positioned into (cf. Barry, 2013; Bennett, 2010; Mitchell, 2002).  
To conclude, these three takes on the politics of materiality exhibited by the work of 
Winner, Bijker and Barry highlight how materiality comes to possess political effects 
and rationales, is subject to re-making and obduracy but also curtails and conditions the 
activities of institutions.  
2.3 Chapter conclusion: ‘material governmentality’ 
This chapter discussed the term material governmentality that is introduced and 
advanced in this thesis. The chapter thus, firstly, opened up this framework by 
introducing literature on governmentality especially by looking at the ways to move 
away from the widespread but narrow conceptualisations of this Foucauldian term. 
Secondly, the chapter discussed the agency of things showing how materiality can be 
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‘uncooperative’ and affect the courses of action through complex assemblage relations. 
Material governmentality is made of two components: on the one hand, the constant but 
often failing governmental intervention framed in relation to freedom and liberty, and 
on the other hand, the agency of things that manifests how materiality often exceeds 
intentions directed to them. Material governmentality draws attention to the ways in 
which social life is governed through a variety of largely micro-political regulations 
involving material elements as targets and tools of governing which, thus, direct and 
limit the course of governing activities. Furthermore, governing is entangled in the 
politics of who, in what ways and how much can govern, which are all questions closely 
related to particular historical and regional politics (hence the discussion of post-
socialist cities in Chapter 4). Material governmentality provides a framework for 
thinking about governing of urban automobility systems and car parking, explored in 
this research. There are three core elements of this framework that will shape the 
discussion in the following chapters.  
First, governmentality literature provides material governmentality with an 
understanding that power is dispersed and entangled in multiple relations. In terms of 
automobility, for instance, whereas it seems reasonable to suggest that in many 
instances there are powerful figures behind constructing the car-using urban lifestyle 
(multinational companies, for instance), there is no vicious force that wants to kill 
people in car crashes, destroy natural resources and poison people with exhausts in the 
cities. The micropolitics of power also draws attention to the myriad governmental 
regulations that, while they might appear to be irrelevant for an analyst interested in 
Politics (with big P), are active participants in shaping the ways things are organised 
and ordered in the society. Hence, in the following chapter and in the empirical chapters 
(Chapters 6 to 8), I will provide an analysis of how urban by-laws and governing 
actions are central to the politics of automobility in post-socialist Tallinn. 
Second, governmentality is not merely about the aims of governing or the success of 
governmental tools but draws attention to counter-currents and failures. On the one 
hand, governing procedures might be resisted on the grounds of freedom. Governing 
might be carried out by unaccepted authorities or via measures that are perceived to be 
restrictive rather than productive of freedom. On the other hand, there is much in urban 
life that cannot be properly brought under governmental control. The phenomenon—a 
particular material entity, for instance—might be difficult to represent in regulatory 
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documents, or the way it is thought to be regulated in the documents cannot be 
translated into actual practice due to the character of that phenomenon. The next aspect 
of material governmentality elucidates the latter point.  
Third, power relations are mediated by myriad material elements which should not be 
seen as agentic necessarily ‘in their own right’ but rather through the assemblage 
relations they are entangled in (cf. Barry, 2013; Bennett, 2010; Mitchell, 2002). 
Henceforth, automobiles themselves and the assemblages that are formed around them 
are among other entities regulated by material objects (e.g., wheel clamps, speed bumps, 
parking lots) and even while apparently acting at the behaviours of the individuals 
involved in automobility (most particularly the driver) the action is directed through 
manifold objects (including legal documents and technical devices of the car) which 
affect the way in which governmental rationales work. Often, the intentions of human 
actors fail to succeed due to those materialities: for instance, the intention to enforce 
paid parking in accordance with existing legal principles was impossible in Estonia due 
to the material relations of parked cars (Chapter 6). Things are not intentional creatures 
directing humans, but they still influence the course of action. 
The next chapter takes the discussion on material governmentality forward in relation to 
the specific problematic of the urban and introduces the question of car parking through 
existing academic and professional literature to build a background for forthcoming 
empirical analysis about car parking in Tallinn. 
 
47 
3 The material governmentality of cities and cars 
In this chapter, I move closer to the case of this thesis by bringing material 
governmentality into contact with the urban, and the problematic of car (im)mobility. 
While urban government and governance has been largely approached from the position 
of policy research (Cochrane, 2007; McCann and Ward, 2011) as well as politics 
(Pierre, 2011), this thesis tries to capture the contribution of urban phenomena to 
governing by approaching the urban as a particular type of socio-material problematic. 
An urban environment evokes questions such as the circulation of people, goods, fluids, 
electricity and information whereby the density of the urban character gives the 
questions their specificity. City regulations are thus often focused on details and are 
directive, rather than liberal, in their nature. Nevertheless, despite mundane and 
unspectacular character of regulations—such as water provision, road maintenance, 
building codes, parking regulations—they still may be subject to critical scrutiny and 
generate friction among a number of citizens as they might come into conflict with 
freedom. Regulations are not merely technical but a political—even if at first sight 
micro-political—matter. This is what the thesis reflects upon through the case of car 
parking in Tallinn, for which this chapter provides an introduction by bringing together 
topics of urban condition, governmentality and auto-(im)-mobility.  
These topics are investigated through three sections followed by a conclusion. In 
Section 3.1, I analyse the socio-materiality of cities drawing out how the materiality of 
the city has been previously analysed. This is then followed in Section 3.2 by a 
discussion of urban regulations with the approaches advanced by Mariana Valverde and 
other socio-legal scholars who have looked into the mundane regulations of various 
urban questions. This discussion forms a starting point for the treatise of automobility 
which is discussed in Section 3.3 and for the treatise of car parking elaborated in 
Section 3.4. 
3.1 Urban studies and materiality 
The city is commonly characterised by its complexity. The complexity, furthermore, is 
embroiled in the question of what constitutes ‘the urban’ and what the analyst should be 
looking at. A large set of urban geography and urban studies writings have seen cities as 
socio-material or socio-technical entities that are not created by humans alone (see 
Amin and Thrift, 2002; Gandy, 2002; Graham and Marvin, 2001; Hommels, 2005). To 
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capture the non-human and material character of cities, various approaches have been 
utilised. Here I will visit two of those: the approach drawing on science, technology and 
society studies, and the investigation inspired by ANT and assemblage thinking
4
.  
The city as a socio-technological ensemble (STS and the city). One of the proponents of 
the STS approach, Hommels (2005), argues that the city can be analysed using the same 
conceptual understandings as utilised for other technological systems. She thus explores 
the ‘co-evolution’ of the technological and the social in the city as a ‘seamless web’ of 
various material and social elements through concepts borrowed from science, 
technology and society studies (ibid.). Similarly, Aibar and Bijker (1997) approach the 
city as a kind of artefact and town planning as a form of technology. Thus, they are able 
to delineate technological frames of different groups, noting that the contemporary city 
contains elements of different frames (see Section 2.2.2). Both Hommels’ and Aibar’s 
and Bijker’s work (see also Graham and Marvin, 2001) show how the city is made of 
artefacts with obduracy resulting from the embeddedness and domination of certain 
technological frames, rather than the mere physical existence of materiality. Even 
though physical elements such as highways or modernist housing developments are 
central in their analyses, the aim is not to make them agentic but to see them as socio-
technologies. The main target of STS research has been the understanding of science 
and technology as enclosed fields of knowledge and development which the STS 
research then tries to deconstruct by showing the multiple social processes at work. The 
conceptual contribution that the STS framework (alongside other similar approaches 
such as ANT) has added to urban research is the attention given to the active role of 
material artefacts in the socio-technical ensemble of the city. The ANT and assemblage 
thinking I elaborate on next, nevertheless, have been even more attuned to the question 
of material agency.  
Assembled urbanism (ANT/assemblage and the city). There are many antecedents to 
ANT/assemblage in urban studies (in particular Amin and Thrift, 2002; Graham and 
Marvin, 2001; Latham, 2002, 2003; but also Jacobs, 2006; Massey, 2005) but it has 
                                                          
4
 An additional approach would be political ecology that highlights the nature in ‘cyborg 
urbanisation’(Gandy, 2005), but this is not investigated here more thoroughly as the question of nature 
does not manifest an important analytical concern in this thesis. Also more Marxist takes on urban 
materialities can be noted  (e.g., Kaika and Swyngedouw, 2000) but similarly to Marxist analysis in 
general, such analyses do not so much focus on the agency of things being more interested in relations of 
commodification and production.  
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emerged forcefully in recent years with the edited collection by Farías and Bender 
(2010) and the debate in the City journal in 2011 by assemblage proponents such as 
McFarlane (2011a, d) and Farías (2011), sceptics (Brenner et al., 2011; Tonkiss, 2011; 
Wachsmuth et al., 2011) and those whose work tends to align with assemblage (in 
particular Simone, 2011). With critiques targeted mainly towards political economy as 
the dominant way to understand cities, assemblage/ANT research has worked 
intensively to bring the forgotten forces of a multiplicity of minor artefacts to the fore in 
conceptualising cities. McFarlane (2011b), thus, has shown the role of various 
minuscule tools such as used train tickets or stones in the hands of slum-dwellers as 
political weapons; Ureta (2014) discussed urban politics through debates of location and 
the physical parameters of a bus stop, and the edited collection by Farías and Bender 
(2010) offer multiple case studies such as an obdurate highway (Hommels, 2010), 
buildings (Guggenheim, 2010) and Bus Rapid Transit system (Pineda, 2010). Even 
though such a wide array of case studies of particular projects might raise concerns 
about lacking attention to the ‘bigger picture’ or not providing an overriding theory, 
Walter’s (2012, p. 123) response in terms of Foucauldian genealogical research is 
relevant here: ‘the genealogical enterprise should not be judged on the basis of one or 
two articles alone but in terms of a collective undertaking in which a bigger picture is 
built up, study by study.’ This thesis offers one such critical encounter with urban 
materialities acting in the governing processes of cars and car parking.  
The urban environment with its concentration of human and nonhuman bodies, objects 
and various flows encourages and even requires authorities to intervene. The following 
section shows two governmental frameworks that have emerged in previous urban 
research and deal with ways in which materialities are related to urban governing. These 
are liberal diagram and directive diagram for city governing.  
3.2 Governing the urban materiality 
Seeing the activity of government as first and foremost regulating rather than policy-
making draws attention to the mundane nature of government: many of the activities 
remain not explicitly reflected upon, they are done because they seem to be necessary or 
simply because that is the way things have always been done. Rather than having a 
master-vision (Scott, 1998), there is much that is ‘unsystematic’, ‘indeterminate’, and 
‘unintended’ in the governing practices of the state as Painter (2006, p. 763) 
characterises the ‘prosaic geographies of stateness’. The state is not a unitary actor as it 
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is made of different authorities on a different scale of governing, while these actors are 
also drawing from different logics such as legal and administrative ones. Nevertheless, 
at least in modern bureaucratic states, it is possible to identify the ‘will to govern’ 
(Miller and Rose, 1990; Rose, 1999) that functions in between the divergent rationales. 
The ‘will to govern’ aims to regulate, but it has to take into account freedoms of 
different actors that are often also curtailing it.  
I would divide city governing and its relation to urban materiality here into two broad 
sets or ideologies of regulations (that can be called ‘diagrams’): the ‘liberal diagram’ 
(Osborne and Rose, 1999) and the directive diagram (what Valverde, 2012 sees as 
illiberal and patriarchal governing, but in my view these words are too strong to capture 
the essence of this diagram). The former is a governmental rationale that seeks to 
govern through freedom of subjects; the latter, by contrast, aims to order matters in the 
city down to the details. While the former prefers to leave decision-making to the 
individual actors, the latter aims to govern following moral principles or prescriptions of 
various specialist fields of knowledge and governing. They are almost diametrically 
opposite but are co-present even though not always in the same instances of governing. 
Furthermore, both presume the necessity to regulate but approach the objective from 
diverging angles. 
The liberal diagram for city governing. The liberal diagram is associated with ideas of 
neo-liberalism and advanced liberalism (Rose, 1996) and seeks to govern through 
freedom. Osborne and Rose (1999, p. 758) argue that the liberal diagram, instead of 
trying to fix the ungovernable character of the city, has sought to ‘harness’ its multiple 
energies ‘in the interest of each and of all.’ The governing is done not only by the ‘state’ 
but by multiple authorities and by subjects themselves, through what is described as a 
governing of the self. In a recent paper, Lanz (2013) shows how citizens in 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods of Berlin are made responsible and capable actors for 
their own development. Similarly, Raco and Imrie (2000) note the ‘government through 
community’ in the case study of the Single Regeneration Budget that stresses the 
empowerment of citizens who as ‘active citizens’ should be capable of autonomy and 
self-determinism to govern themselves and their community. However, in addition to 
the subjectification of citizens by indirect governmental means, studies have noted 
techniques of governing through the physical environment. Jones et al (2010), thus, 
critically analyse street design as a way to shape the environment of decision-making; 
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that is, to ‘nudge’ citizen behaviour via material space under the mode of government 
called ‘libertarian paternalism’5. Allen (2006) elaborates on the physical features of 
public space that seduce users through ambient power. The liberal diagram of governing 
aligns itself with notions of freedom and liberalism by sustaining a vision of the self-
responsible individual, but as a form of regulation it still preserves the vision of the 
aims of regulation. The liberal diagram of city governing, to summarise, is about 
generating conditions and providing support for subjects’ to govern themselves in a 
‘right way’, which, hence, would support the development of the collective more 
generally. 
The directive diagram. In opposition to the liberal diagram, the directive diagram is 
about the multiplicity of measures to direct subjects by saying more precisely what they 
must do or what they must not do. Rather than giving freedom for actors to decide their 
actions, the directive diagram is detailed and precise, accompanied by a flexible and 
specific application. The directive diagram is not about providing freedom but saying 
how things have to be. One of the most extensive discussions on these questions of city 
governing is provided by a legal scholar Mariana Valverde (2009, 2011, 2012). Her 
work studies not the ideas but the ‘actual operation of government’ (Dubber and 
Valverde, 2008, p. 5) focusing especially on the pragmatic reasoning and practices of 
local municipal regulations, drawing inspiration from sources such as Foucault’s notion 
of governmentality (Valverde, 2006; Rose et al., 2006). However, Valverde argues that 
the contemporary urban governing is neither liberal nor neoliberal, but characterised by 
‘a pre-liberal, premodern logic of governance that is more reminiscent of absolute 
monarchies than of modern democracy’ (Valverde, 2012, p. 164). The municipality 
follows the nuisance principle and is inclined to regulate what needs to be done—
Valverde uses the example of the height of grass in front-lawns—whereas the country-
level laws are more liberal by following the harm principle characterised by limits of 
actions to otherwise free individuals. This is what leads her to claim that the 
municipality is a paternal governing authority (Valverde, 2012). Furthermore, urban 
governing is characterised by cutting-through legal complexity to make certain things 
happen. As Valverde argues, urban governing is not often about the precise words of the 
                                                          
5
 Even though one might want to see their discussion as an example of ‘material governmentality’, it 
cannot be called like that as they do not pay attention to a key component of the concept: the agency of 
things.  
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rules—which in the examples she uses have become so complex that they are 
unknowable—but is more concerned with what is actually done.  
Valverde somewhat over-stresses the freedom of bureaucrats and lower level governors 
as they are in many ways curtailed by other sources of power. For instance, local 
governments still confront the power that emanates from the legal field and draws its 
force from private property (see Chapter 6 below). Nevertheless, Valverde’s elaboration 
of urban governing brings it closer to the administrative logic than to the legal one. The 
open-ended, heterogeneous and flexible power that particularly characterises urban 
governing is often reflected in the literature through the term ‘police power’ which in 
the US constitutional law has also gone through debates on the limits of state 
intervention in the private sphere (Revell, 1999).  
Police power is described by Dubber (2004, p. 101) as ‘the most expansive, least 
definite, and yet least scrutinized, of governmental powers’ which, as Dubber and 
Valverde (2008, p. 3) further argue, ‘is essentially boundless’ and indefinable. 
According to Blomley (2011, p. 6), ‘[p]olice powers are remarkably promiscuous, open-
textured, flexible and far-reaching.’ Police power includes the police institution that we 
mainly associate with the word today, but also a wide selection of other governing 
activities that follow morality and/or seek to limit nuisance or obstruction. Police power 
is a concept of the US constitutional law capturing the permissible scope of federal or 
local level governing procedures in relation to the Constitution and rights of property as 
long as they relate to health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the public 
(Encyclopædia Britannica Online, 2014 ‘police power’).  
As various authors have noted (Blomley, 2011; Foucault, 2007; Levi, 2008; Novak, 
1996; Valverde, 2006), police powers are particularly active at the local level—in towns 
and cities. Although Foucault saw police power more as a relic of the past 
overshadowed by liberal modes of governing in contemporary times, in Valverde’s as 
well as Blomley’s discussions it is still a major governing tool in present-day urban 
environments. According to Valverde (2011, p. 280), for instance, the presence of 
‘embodied, experiential, and relational categories’ such as nuisance and other guides for 
police power, are not a resistance or a survival of old ways of doing but rather 
‘necessary component[s] of contemporary urban governance.’ Police and urbanisation 
are linked, or for Foucault even the same thing (2007, p. 337). The city with its density, 
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diversity and need for circulation invites regulations that not only let individuals act 
freely but says exactly what is or is not to be done. The examples of concerns inviting 
police power are extensive. One of the important concerns with effects on private 
property is that of fire safety, which rationalises certain building designs and locations 
of building in relation to each other. Similarly, urban problems necessitating the 
directive diagram are that of access to drinking water, reduction of pollution, collection 
of waste and management of traffic that in some parts of cities can get congested. The 
latter—via term ‘circulation’—has been singled out as particularly a concern for police 
power (Foucault, 2007; Levi, 2008). 
The history of police power in city management goes back centuries. Novak (1996), 
thus, shows the extent of police power in the 19
th
 century America where it was used to 
govern marketplaces, bars and public roads and waterways. The police power developed 
further in the early 20
th
 century with the increase of bureaucratic administrative state 
(Novak, 2008) and extended into new urban governing techniques such as zoning. 
Zoning has been the principal police power that after significant legal debates from 
1910s to 1920s in United State became an urban planning tool to govern a number of 
urban ills at the expense of private property rights of individual land owners (Revell, 
1999). According to Revell (1999), the police power of zoning extended from rather 
limited concerns of regulation in terms of health and safety to more extensive aims of 
public welfare taking into account public interests vis-à-vis private property rights 
during the first quarter of twentieth century. Zoning has eventually developed into an 
urban planning tool that is taken for granted in USA and all over the world.   
The discussion on police power highlights that social interaction in the city is not just a 
subject for legally sanctioned individual freedom, but is intersected by multiple expert 
fields that govern this dense urban co-existence. Thus, in addition to the legal logic 
framing liberal thought we can also note the administrative logic possessed by the 
municipal departments and supported by the knowledge of specialists. Not every field 
of expertise recommends that the best way to govern is to leave the decision making to 
the individual actors. Rather, they often seek to achieve a beneficial condition by 
techniques aligned with the directive diagram. For instance, urban and transport 
planning, while following ideas of participatory and collaborative modes of planning 
(Healey, 1997; Innes, 1996), have an extended set of knowledge and techniques which 
aim for planning sustainable and lively cities. The reasons for this rely on the condition 
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of urban environment; due to its density a number of individuals seeking their rights 
could easily lead to conflicts and limit capacities to move (Blomley, 2011).  
With the use of cars subjected to police powers since the early days of the automobile 
(Norton, 2008), car parking has also become subject for governing by measures such as 
parking requirements, parking caps and the paid parking system. The introduction of the 
latter is comprehended by some observers as ‘feudal’ power of the city asking for 
money for the use of its property (as Valverde, 2012 does). For transport planners, 
however, paid parking is rather an effective tool for regulating the use of the urban 
commons by managing circulation and reducing pollution (e.g., Shoup, 2005). The 
administrative logic might look illiberal from the point of view of legal logic, but it 
aims to improve the living conditions of the collective. A large number of car drivers 
enjoying their freedom to park easily leads to the limitation of access for others and thus 
curtails their freedom. Depending on the perspective, paid parking also possesses 
elements of liberal diagram. From the point of view of sustainable transport 
management, the monetisation of car parking provides persons with the choice of 
whether to drive or use an alternative and more sustainable transport mode (see Shoup, 
2005). Thus, the administrative response for paid parking system has been utilised to 
find a balance between restrictions and freedoms in managing the existing urban space.  
In the following section I will specifically address the material governmentality of 
urban mobility which will be the focus of the rest of this thesis. I review the literature 
on automobility that has brought the artefact of the car as a material object into the 
focus of social analysis. This is followed, then, with an overview of the politics of 
automobility and regulatory activities that concern car parking, where I hope to give a 
more affirmative place for the field of transport engineering than it usually receives in 
critical urban research (such as Blomley, 2011). Car parking is an apt case for reflecting 
on the questions of material governmentality, as it rests in the middle of the conundrum 
regarding liberalism and need for governmental intervention in urban environment: 
while density necessitates regulations of car parking, such regulations are in a complex 
relationship with the understandings of individual freedom. Some of the ways of 
governing could become ‘normal’ (such as parking standards discussed in Chapter 7) 
while others are complicated and contested (such as paid parking regulations discussed 
in Chapter 6). 
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3.3 The material governmentality of automobility 
Traffic congestion is caused by vehicles, not by people in themselves. (Jacobs, 1992 
[1961], p. 229) 
[I]nstead of writing the history of the motorcar as a tale of individuation, it must be 
interpreted as a story of increasing standardisation and institutionalisation. . . .  the 
automobilist is now a neatly institutionalised actor—well guarded by the automobile 
owners’ clubs, driving schools and traffic regulations. (Beckmann, 2001, p. 601) 
The invasion of the automobile and the pressure of the automobile lobby have turned 
the car into a key object, parking into an obsession, traffic into a priority, harmful to 
urban and social life. The day is approaching when we will be forced to limit the rights 
and powers of the automobile. Naturally, this won’t be easy, and the fallout will be 
considerable. (Lefebvre, 2003 [1970], p. 18) 
Jane Jacobs in the above quote has neatly captured the nature of the problem this thesis 
is grappling with. In her view, the appropriate target of governmental intervention is 
cars, their actions and the use of space. Even though I would agree with Blomley’s 
(2011) critical assessment of engineers turning people into technical figures of 
‘pedestrians’ (he uses the word ‘ped’) which neglects the political being of citizens, 
such a simplified figure is much easier to comprehend in terms of automobiles. The car 
has a size, mass and speed that affect its accommodation on streets and parking lots, and 
raises concerns in terms of safety. The materiality of the car is very much present in 
practice and should not be something forgotten in the engineering literature nor in 
sociological analysis. Objects, then, are not just intermediaries but they mediate action 
(Latour, 2005), as discussed in Section 2.2. This section sets up the topic of how car 
parking is governed by building connections between material governmentality and 
automobility. The starting point here is the recent sociological interest in automobility 
which through building on a systems approach to car usage, has allowed for a more 
materialised understanding of urban automobility, while also bringing attention to how 
governmental activities help to produce automobile subjects and spaces. In this section, 
I will highlight cars as things that afford practices while being also normalised and 
positioned in different assemblages depending on the socio-political context we 
consider. 
3.3.1 Automobility in literature  
The car is brought into focus in recent sociological analysis—with a considerable body 
of literature already emerged (for a review, see Merriman, 2009; see also Freund and 
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Martin, 1993)—by thinking about cars in relation to systems, where cars are just one—
albeit, constitutive—element. Multiple elements of automobility form a complex 
network that extends all over the world. The elements include in addition to cars also 
roads, parking lots and garages, petroleum supplies, traffic signs and regulations, and 
numerous other smaller and larger entities (Urry, 2004). Automobiles are one of the 
‘technical artefacts’ of modern societies which have become paradigmatic and 
‘interwoven into the tissue of contemporary society’ (Beckmann, 2001, p. 593), enabled 
through the hard infrastructure of physical environment and soft infrastructure of 
institutions and regulations, resulting in what can be called ‘the automobile-related 
transport system’ (Beckmann, 2001, p. 595). In that system, as Beckmann (2001, p. 
595) notes, ‘the automobile turns into a structural prerequisite for the organisation of 
everyday life, while at the same time the variety of forms of everyday action becomes 
the structural prerequisite for the expansion of the automobile.’ In Foucauldian terms, it 
can be argued that automobility has been normalised.  
Looking at automobility as a system, it is possible to link the politics of oil to the act of 
driving children to school in a Western country; or to link such mundane parts of the 
urban environment as parking lots to planning politics (Henderson, 2009) and cultural 
history (Jakle and Sculle, 2004). Utilising the systems perspective, cars and other 
artefacts become more than passive entities shaped by humans to match their needs as in 
the complex assemblage of relations in which they are entangled, they are elements with 
effect. The systems approach could be criticised for not paying enough attention to 
concrete political decisions made in particular moments (Paterson, 2007) and for 
downplaying the role of powerful actors such as car manufacturers, oil and road 
construction companies that are involved in promoting automobility (Merriman, 2009). 
Similarly, there is the diversity of car cultures (Argenbright, 2008; Edensor, 2004; 
Freund and Martin, 1993, chapter 4; Miller, 2001; Siegelbaum, 2008) and road spaces 
(Edensor, 2004) which the systems approach considers to be all equally part of the 
automobility. However the key point to take away from a systems approach to 
automobility is its work towards noting the importance that apparently insignificant 
artefacts can have in society.  
Despite being technologically the same or at least similar wherever in the world they are 
used, automobiles are positioned in different networks depending on the social and 
cultural context, leading to diverge practices and meanings. Various chapters in Miller’s 
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edited collection Car Cultures (2001) explicate those differences: Young (2001) shows 
how aboriginal society has assimilated cars into their material culture; O’Dell (2001) 
discusses the ways in which cars are associated with what is to be American or modern 
in Swedish raggare culture and Verrips and Meyer (2001) consider how keeping a car 
running in the lack of spare parts and equipment in Ghana is a lot different business 
than a smooth technological maintenance done in the Western context. Similarly, the 
Soviet system placed cars in a diverging situation compared to that in the Western 
countries. While Soviet cars were in many ways based on those produced in the West—
Ladas, for instance, were even built on licence from an Italian auto-maker Fiat—they 
were situated in the particular condition of the Soviet system: such as the deficit of 
consumer goods and the restriction on car ownership. Keeping cars going in the 
economy of deficit was a complex matter often accompanied by a variety of state-
antagonistic practices (Siegelbaum, 2008). The Soviet car culture was thus a distinct 
culture with its own practices, many of which have not persisted to the post-Soviet 
years.  
In the network of relations wherein automobiles are entangled, the symbolic value they 
have gained for citizens differs depending on the cultural context they are within. On 
the one hand, this value comes down to the physical space assembled around cars, in 
which automobiles have become a necessity of a good life. ‘Where driving is 
ubiquitous,’ writes Rajan (1996, p. 9) ‘cars also tend to turn into essential, even 
prosthetic, machines for negotiating urban space.’ Being mobile using a car is then what 
a ‘normal’ person does while the lack of capacity to drive signifies a disability. The 
freedom that cars supposedly provide is one of the reasons why moving by a car has a 
high social status whereas the incapacity to drive has tended to be stigmatised (Litman, 
2009). On the other hand, cars themselves are valued as expensive consumer goods or 
elements of status. This is largely due to the investment that cars require (the second 
largest sum paid in person’s life) and the attraction of driving that advertisers have 
produced (McLean, 2009). Cars are not merely things that enable people to move from 
one place to another. Cars are also associated with ideas of modernity (Ladd, 2008; 
Rajan, 1996), superstitions and religions (Verrips and Meyer, 2001) and they gain a 
symbolic significance from the practices of care that they necessitate (Möser, 2011; 
Verrips and Meyer, 2001). 
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Freedom is arguably the main symbolic association—an ‘automotive emotion’ (Sheller, 
2004)—that cars have both in common perceptions and by academics (Dunn, 1998; 
Lomasky, 1997; Maxwell, 2001). The increasing use of automobiles throughout its 
history has been associated with its provision of freedom alonsgside with the 
signification of wealth and status (Sachs, 1992). The possibility to go wherever and 
whenever one wants to, the freedom not to depend on the schedules and limited 
coverage of space provided by the public transport have been major appeals of the 
individual car ownership throughout its history (Ladd, 2008). The liberating potential of 
cars is also manifested in movies, novels and artworks (see Wollen and Kerr, 2002). 
Cars are often not just background to the events but can give strength to certain 
meanings or emotions that a movie aims to convey; for instance, the meanings of liberty 
and freedom in road movies.   
Nevertheless, the freedom provided by cars has always been challenged. Firstly, the 
freedom itself leads to its curtailment via congestion and thus to the persistent but 
failing endeavours of the traffic engineering specialists to increase the road capacity. 
Cars and driving are both liberating and constraining at the same time (Conley and 
McLaren, 2009). Secondly, the freedom of cars has not been equally available to 
everyone as it has been subject to different social divisions in the society. Hence, being 
able to drive as a woman (Garvey, 2001) or driving while black (Gilroy, 2001) have 
been contentious issues over the course of the twentieth century. Gaining the right to 
drive has then been part of more general fights in relation to the feminist movement or 
the movement against racial discrimination. The freedom that cars are associated with is 
thus not only an individual property but a part of wider issues of politics; although the 
recent sustainability perspective has strongly limited the potential positive associations 
that driving cars could have.  
The affective dimension of car-driving is often overlooked in the transportation 
strategies. These strategies try to shift car-driving habits without due consideration of 
‘automotive emotions’ (Sheller, 2004) that are also part of the support or opposition to 
various political causes in car cultures: ‘We not only feel the car, but we feel through 
the car and with the car’ (ibid., p. 228). This leads Sheller (2004, p. 224) to conclude in 
regard of the transport policies that only when automotive emotions are considered can 
we understand ‘what will really be necessary to make the transition from today’s car 
cultures (and the automotive emotions that sustain them) to more socially and 
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environmentally responsible transportation cultures.’ The ‘automotive emotions’ also 
include patterns of kinship, sociability, habitation, work and political dispositions—all 
of which can make up different national kinaesthetic and sensory forms of mobility 
(Sheller, 2004). For instance, for young men cars are often essential for gaining status 
amongst peers while being also space for sexual rendezvous. For parents cars are tools 
to fit in various movements around the city: children to the kindergarten, then travel to 
the work, taking kids to their hobbies and so on. The internal architecture of cars, 
moreover, as Laurier et al. show (2008) could be beneficial for parental tasks with 
children belted to the backseat and thus more receptive to communication. In extended 
families cars could be used to take relatives to the summer house, have vacations or in 
other ways use the car as an element of social reciprocity. With car ownership levels 
low and cars hard to acquire commodities in the socialist societies, such collective role 
of the car was particularly important. Whilst the individualism and freedom prevail in 
the symbolic level, it should not be denied that cars are in many ways social.  
Taking the symbolic side of cars seriously leads Ladd (2008, p. 6) to draw attention to 
the attractions of cars that many car criticisers forget: ‘Whether cars are a wise choice, 
people love them, and cannot imagine life without them.’ This love of cars has, on the 
one hand, made contestation of car mobility difficult for governors: even ‘suicidal’ for a 
politician in postwar West Germany, as Ladd (2008) argues. Writing about the recent 
automobility critique in Western European countries, Ladd (2008, p. 129) futhermore 
notes how the ‘prospect of renouncing mobility is less likely to appeal to, for example, 
Chinese, who might see it as a return to the limits of the danwei work unit they only 
recently escaped’. A similar situation has characterised the post-socialist countries in 
which the move away from what was during socialist years is considered important and 
a tendency in moving back to the Soviet years is seen as a threat (discussed more in 
Section 4.4.1 and Chapter 6). Some of the state activities—such as taxing vehicles—are 
thus contested in Estonia on the grounds that they limit freedom and complicate lives of 
the post-socialist consumer-citizens who want fewer state directions compared to what 
used to be the case in the Soviet days. 
Yet, as Beckmann (2001) suggests in the quote at the beginning of this section, the 
domination of automobility as well as the freedom it provides for the car users have 
only become possible through governmental activities. The freedom of car use does not 
occur as something outside the state or in opposition to the state but is produced by 
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governmental activities. The freedom of automobility would not be possible without the 
physical environment and regulations making driving achievable. Driver licences, 
number plates, traffic rules, signs and road markings, and police activities all seek to 
keep traffic flowing without obstacles and without causing harm to oneself or others. 
Even the ultimate expression of freedom by cars—the free ‘citizen’ on a highway—was 
possible only because taxpayers’ money was invested by government to construct these 
roads (Seiler, 2008). The development of car mobility has even benefitted from the 
political regimes of the totalitarian states. In his historical treatment of automobility, 
Ladd (2008) shows how the governmental intervention by the nazi regime has actually 
supported the generation of cars as everyday mobility devices: such as by bringing the 
people’s car Volkswagen to the existence and by initiating the construction of 
Autobahns (see also Sachs, 1992). One should thus pay attention to the governing 
practices in order to understand the workings of automobility. 
If automobility is in many ways a governmental construct then the relationship between 
humans and cars is less one of car-driver hybrid/assemblage (Dant, 2004) and more of a 
car-citizenship, which is a point developed in the following section.  
3.3.2 Automobile subjects: from driver-car hybrid to car-citizen 
The hybridisation of drivers and cars into driver-car hybrids or assemblages manifests 
the extent to which cars change the capacities of humans: instead of a person we should 
talk about a person-thing (Dant, 2004). As Dant (2004, p. 74) explicates, ‘[t]he car does 
not simply afford the driver mobility or have independent agency as an actant; it enables 
a range of humanly embodied actions available only to the driver-car.’ According to an 
influential study by a sociologist Jack Katz (1999, p. 33) on how emotions work in 
particular moments of social life, the driver’s body and the car can be conceptualised as 
coupled together in a hybrid ‘person-thing’: ‘a humanized car or alternatively, an 
automobilized person.’ When one is ‘cut-off’ during driving, it is not just the car whose 
path of movement has been limited, but it is an act against the person who drives the 
car, inducing him or her to regain one’s posture through actions towards the other 
driver-cars. Thrift (2004) is supportive towards an assertion that the experience of 
driving is embodied and claims that driving has sunk into our ‘technological 
unconscious’: a car as an extension of a human body coupled with the increasing 
amount of technology in the car that mediates the feeling of the road for the driver 
suggests that the difference between the ‘human’ and the ‘machine’ or the ‘technical’ 
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becomes increasingly blurred. These approaches thus draw attention to the ways in 
which the capacities of humans and cars are co-generated.  
Such human-and-car analyses, however, are open to critique for their lack of attention to 
‘the political forces, discourses, meanings and imperatives which have brought the 
current situation about’ (Paterson, 2007, p. 27) and constrain possible changes to a more 
sustainable future. These political forces, as argued above, have maintained the car 
mobility system, doing so even in relation to what might at first sight appear as critical 
of car use. This has been the case for instance with safety issues. Even if factors such as 
safety have been considered as concerns for restricting freedom of drivers (Forstorp, 
2006; Packer, 2008), through numerous measures like the Motorway Code (with speed 
limits and other restrictions), government disseminated social advertisements and media 
coverage (see Merriman, 2007), the cause of decreased safety on roads has still often 
been attributed to an ‘other’ like drink drivers, youth or other ‘inexperienced’, 
‘irresponsible’ and ‘reckless’ users of roads, without seeing safety concerns as a 
challenge to the whole mode of movement by cars (Packer, 2008). Thus, we should not 
merely think about car-person(s) hybridity but a car-person-government assemblage 
wherein the ability to drive and the conditions in which cars are used are subject to 
governing.  
Car-citizen. Cars and humans are interlinked into an assemblage, where people are 
positioned differently in regard to the state and each other (Sheller and Urry, 2000). 
Obviously, the demands on the government from the position of a driver differ from the 
demands that a person who primarily uses public transport or cycles would make. 
Wanting to secure freedom of movement with a car means worrying about parking 
prices, potholes that can damage the car, and traffic jams. For a person who does not use 
a car these questions would not be the central ones, and demands could include rather 
more frequent and cheaper public transport service, or improvements of bicycle roads. 
Therefore, it matters what kind of ‘prosthetic device’ one uses (Cresswell, 2006). 
Citizens are ‘prosthetic citizens’ whose mobility is ‘a product of a multitude of 
human/environment interfaces’ (ibid., p. 167). Mobility is socially produced—people 
should be seen as ‘equally immobile’ and capable of moving only with the aid of 
‘prosthetic devices’. The mobility is afforded by devices like paths, cars, trains, buses, 
or wheelchairs, which are embroiled in the configuration of spatial and regulatory 
environment. The purpose of getting beyond automobility, then, is not simply to get 
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people out of cars or restrict car use. Rather, it is that ‘auto-mobility’—defined as 
autonomous and free subjects (Böhm et al., 2006)—needs to be associated through 
regulations, urban planning and economic processes with a ‘prosthetic device’ that has 
less collectively negative outcomes (to environment, for instance) than cars do. As the 
citation by Jane Jacobs in the beginning of this section notes, the way people move in 
the city influences the character of the urban environment (traffic jams are made by 
cars).  
By focusing on the governmental production of driving subjectivities, the possibility to 
construct other citizens, for instance, ‘cycling citizenship’, comes into view (Aldred, 
2010). Building new mobilities does not necessarily mean, then, completely new subject 
properties—as cycling is in many ways associated with freedom as well (Fincham, 
2006; Paterson, 2007; Sachs, 1992)—but could be made possible just by linking another 
device with the spatial practices of existing subjectivities. Still, as Lefebvre also noted 
(cited in the quote above) and as was discussed in the previous section, de-coupling a 
car from the individual perception of freedom and replacing it with another device is not 
easy to achieve. 
In addition to car-person-government assembling—that is, car citizenship—physical 
space has also to be considered. On the one hand, this applies to the ways in which 
space matters in terms of large scale processes in the urban environment. Graham and 
Marvin (2001) thus argue regarding ‘splintering urbanism’ that urban spaces configured 
for car-users are inward looking, leading to the fragmentation and privatisation of social 
relations. Henderson (2006), moreover, shows in line with ‘splintering urbanism’ how 
the production of automobility in the field of urban planning and transport regulation 
translated into anti-urban, low-density, anti-transit, individualist—and even racist—
manifestations of ‘secessionist automobility’ for white suburbanites. On the other hand, 
the politics of automobility (cf. Henderson, 2006; Walks, 2014, Early view) includes 
interaction of different vehicular mobilities in road space (see also Henderson, 2013). 
Using the case of post-2004 police practices against New York Critical Mass bicycle 
rides, Blickstein (2010) for instance shows how bicycles are defined as disorderly and 
inhibiting the ‘normal’ movement of ‘ordinary’ people, that is, people using their cars. 
The movement by automobiles as ‘normality’ is built into regulations, laws, court 
practices and policing, forming a prevalent discourse which asserts that ‘[a]nything that 
obstructs, slows, or impedes motorized traffic is disorderly’ (Blickstein, 2010, p. 894). 
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Prytherch (2012), moreover, reveals the socially unjust legal geography of road space 
whereby legal statutes reproduce the domination of automobiles over slower and weaker 
modes such as pedestrians and cyclists. The politics of automobility, thus, opens up the 
possibility for challenges to reconstruct existing metropolitan space into a more 
sustainable one, as well as to make cities more accessible for weaker groups (including 
cyclists, pedestrians and disabled people) by contesting the ways roads are ordered.  
A particular political challenge arising from the assemblage of car-citizens and physical 
space is the issue of car parking that opens onto significant questions concerning 
individual freedom, acceptable ways of regulating cities and the use and availability of 
urban space. I will unpack these questions below.  
3.4 The material and governmental politics of car parking 
Car parking is a crucial part of automobility. It makes automobility possible in the first 
place as vehicles are stopped and stored for more than 90 per cent of the time (Shoup, 
2005). In order to be able to use an automobile, then, parking spaces must be available. 
This is the point where automobiles become an urban problematic. The density of cities 
makes parking spaces a commodity in high demand. While the availability of parking 
spaces in the outskirts of cities has been one reason for (and an outcome of) urban 
sprawl, cities have also utilised a variety of regulatory technologies to keep parking 
spaces available in the city. Transport planning has thus problematised where one can 
park, for how long and how much has to be paid. Moreover, an alternative set of ideas 
in transport planning has emerged over the last decade, defining the problem of lack of 
parking spaces as an opportunity to re-shape urban mobility more broadly (Holden, 
2005; Litman, 2011). Instead of seeing the lack of parking opportunities as an indication 
of the requirement to construct new ones, by curtailing parking the conditions are 
produced to push people to use more sustainable modes of transport such as cycle, walk 
and take public transit. People’s behaviour is directed by limiting their choice (to use 
cars) and making alternative modes to appear more appealing.  
Alongside interest in parking regulations among transport planners, there has been a 
shift in thinking in sociological analyses whereby something as mundane as car parking 
was brought out from the oblivion. Most of the automobility research has been 
interested in the moving car and spaces for it, but a number of studies have emerged 
over recent years that bring car parking neatly into focus. These studies include the 
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pioneering 700-page transport and urban planning study The High Cost of Free Parking 
(Shoup, 2005), a cultural history of car parking entitled Lots of Parking: Land Use in a 
Car Culture (Jakle and Sculle, 2004), the design oriented study Rethinking A Lot: The 
Design and Culture of Parking (Ben-Joseph, 2012) and legal geographies of various car 
parking issues in Politics of Parking: Rights, Identity, and Property (Marusek, 2012), as 
well as a handful of urban studies papers (Barata et al., 2011; Barter, 2012; Guo and 
Ren, 2013; Henderson, 2009). In this section, I review this set of literature and combine 
its lessons with insights from the policy literature. I would like to unpack three themes: 
the importance of materiality in terms of urban space, the ways in which governing 
rationalities have elaborated on the possible solutions to the spatial problematic of 
parking and how those governing procedures have interacted with social sentiments of 
freedom. This section introduces the themes that will be further investigated in the 
course of empirical chapters 6 to 8. 
First, studies have drawn attention to the importance of the materiality of car parking, 
starting from the spatial extent of parking lots and ending with particular design issues. 
Each parking space is roughly 12 square metres (5 x 2.4 metres), which is the size of a 
bedroom. To this should be added the space for manoeuvring which increases the size 
of single parking lots to roughly 25 square metres (a number cited in various studies; 
see, e.g., Shoup, 2005). Considering that each car needs at least one parking space and 
that there is no perfect rotation of cars with many parking lots free for lengthy periods 
(such as at offices over night), the space required for parking cars amounts to a 
significant land use (see Ben-Joseph, 2012; Shoup, 2005). The size of parking lots and 
the scale of their provision also raises questions about the costs (especially if bundled 
into the building costs in cases of shopping malls or residential houses, often also for 
those who do not own or use cars) and the opportunity costs of other functions these 
spaces could have had (Shoup, 2005). One can think about functions such as 
playgrounds, parks and sporting facilities that these land plots could accommodate. In 
Chapter 8 we will see such a confrontation of land uses in a Soviet housing estate. The 
material reality that cars need to park somewhere translates into a significant extent of 
physical space devoted to cars in cities, with financial consequences to even those who 
do not drive cars, and missed opportunities of land uses.  
Secondly, there are multiple governmental tools that aim to find solutions to the spatial 
problem of car immobility. All these tools relate to questions of freedom and the 
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acceptable extent of state intervention in different ways (unpacked further below). There 
are three prominent sets of ideas: accommodating more cars in the same space, 
increasing the amount of space for cars and, finally, limiting the space for cars. The first 
is achieved by paid parking which is a way to regulate car parking on street space as 
well as on more frequently used parking lots (discussed in Chapter 6). Paid parking 
makes parking a priced commodity/service whereby one has a financial incentive to 
park for a shorter period thereby allowing more cars to have access to this place. The 
second idea—increasing the amount of space—is done, for instance, by prescribing 
minimum parking requirements for new developments (discussed in Chapter 7). Shoup 
(2005) offers an elaborate critique of this governmental technology as it has led to a 
situation in American cities where drivers almost never have to actually pay for parking. 
The third idea—limiting parking space—is opposite to the parking requirements. 
Parking caps exhibit progressive ideas of curtailing car use (Henderson, 2009) and are 
thus seen positively by critical transport scholars (Shoup, 2005). Yet, as in the Estonian 
case described in Chapter 7, a parking cap could be coupled with the minimum parking 
standards and might not work that differently. In addition to these three main 
governmental rationales and their coupled technologies, there are also many minor 
governmental tools to manage parking. The possible policy instruments include (see 
CIHT, 2005; Kodransky and Hermann, 2011; Litman, 2011): emission reduction 
through parking (CO2 based parking fees), bollards to limit cars entering certain areas, 
‘Park and Ride’ to encourage public transit use while reducing the number of cars in 
central areas and car-free developments with zero-provision of parking. There is, thus, a 
rich field of available governmental interventions to parking. Yet, the aims and 
rationales of the governmental tools are just one side of the story. The other concerns 
relate to how these regulations work in practice and what other rationales affect their 
working.  
Thirdly, then, car parking is not only a technical field for transport planners to deal with 
and develop governing tools for, but it is criss-crossed by multiple social, cultural and 
legal concerns such as freedom, property and rights (Marusek, 2012). Decisions on the 
provision of car parking are political whereby particular details of parking—such as 
where, how much, how expensive, how enforced—are sources of critical reflection and 
hence, matters of the politics of urban mobility (cf. Henderson, 2013). Parking can be a 
sensitive area for citizens and thus also for politicians (Ison and Rye, 2006). Parking is a 
political matter as it raises questions of the functioning and meaning of the law and the 
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role of the state in intervening to the matters of parking. The acceptability of state 
interventions rests on one’s political position, whether it be progressive, neo-liberal or 
neo-conservative (Henderson, 2009). However, parking rules are not simply applied, 
but are in many ways also redefined and contested in everyday practices. In these 
instances, governing activities are often seen as actions against individual freedom 
(Marusek, 2012). Parking regulations, thus, are open for reflection, neglect and 
contestation in the everyday practices while regulatory tools—even though they are first 
and foremost planning measures—are shaped by political positions of citizens and 
politicians as well as of engineers themselves. These points become more vivid through 
the empirical study of Tallinn presented in Chapter 6 to 8, where Chapter 6 deals with 
paid parking and its contestation on the grounds of private property, Chapter 7 shows 
the use of parking standards which despite being a character of the strong bureaucratic 
state is taken-for-granted by various parties involved and Chapter 8 highlights an 
example of parking governing where the freedom of citizens is harnessed to improve 
conditions of parking provisions. 
3.5 Chapter conclusion: the material governmentality of urban auto-
(im)mobility 
This chapter used the framework of material governmentality introduced in the previous 
chapter to reflect on the urban governing and the problematic of car (im)mobility in 
particular. The chapter showed how the material character of cities is made to matter in 
urban research by building on STS and assemblage/ANT. It was then argued that the 
materiality of the urban condition necessitates direct governmental involvement, 
meaning that such aspects of urban governing follow a ‘police’ logic more than liberal 
principles. The city with its density, diversity and needs of circulation invites 
regulations that do not simply let individuals act freely but dictate what should or 
should not be done. Such regulations are analysed by specialist fields such as transport 
planning that was encountered in this chapter in relation to the topic of car parking. 
After first introducing the literature about automobility that has started to pay more 
attention to cars than previous literature, the chapter moved on to reflect on the material, 
regulatory and socio-cultural nature of urban car parking drawing not only from 
geographical expertise but also from transport experts. Car parking is an urban concern 
that is usually regulated, but in which governing is often not hidden but invites various 
contestations by the citizens. An example of such contestation emerges vividly and 
explicitly in Chapter 6 where the local state is seen as unconstitutionally curtailing 
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freedom. In Chapter 7 and 8, however, the politics of car parking does not emerge in 
open public discussions and debates but in governmental processes that take place in a 
more hidden manner between businesses and regulators (Chapter 7) and in the 
governing procedures regarding parking lots in the courtyards of housing estates 
(Chapter 8). Such political processes are in different ways shaped by what has been 
before—in Estonia, socialist times.  
The thesis thus moves next to reflect on the notion of ‘post-socialism’ as it has been 
previously utilised in relation to cities. In order to use ‘post-socialism’ in the analysis, 
the next chapter aims to make the term into a concept that is capable of capturing local 
characteristics without succumbing to parochialism and descriptive account of ‘local 
conditions’. Post-socialism has previously been used to designate merely a region after 
certain temporal moment—post-1991 Central and Eastern Europe—or as a 
characteristic of a condition. While the latter is more elaborate than the former as it 
acknowledges hybrid and relational characteristics of cities and societies, it is still 
regionally bounded and has the danger of parochialism. This thesis, thus, offers a de-
territorialised concept of post-socialism which can be used to make sense of particular 
aspects of cities and societies. After introducing it in the next chapter, the concept will 
be more fully unpacked through empirical chapters 6 to 8 by noting how socialist 
history influences understandings of paid parking (Chapter 6), weak/strong state 
(Chapter 7) and forms of neo-liberal governing (Chapter 8).   
   
 
68 
4 Post-socialist cities 
This chapter discusses the notion of ‘post-socialism’ and its applications in relation to 
cities. Post-socialism is a dominant way in which Tallinn is understood for its history, 
regional location and form of urban development, which have linked Tallinn to the 
academic discourse of ‘post-socialist cities’ (see, e.g., Kährik and Tammaru, 2008; 
Leetmaa et al., 2006; Leetmaa and Tammaru, 2007; Leetmaa et al., 2012; Ruoppila and 
Kährik, 2003; Ruoppila, 2005, 2007). For nearly 50 years Tallinn was the capital of the 
Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic before becoming the capital of the Republic of 
Estonia when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Over this half century, the city was 
governed by the political, social and economic principles of the communist system that 
left imprints on the physical form and the social landscape. Nevertheless, while the 
adjective ‘post-socialist’ has a particular importance in the field of post-socialist urban 
studies (advanced by, e.g., Andrusz et al., 1996; Axenov et al., 2006; Borén and Gentile, 
2007; Gentile et al., 2012; Hirt, 2013; Kostinskiy, 2001; Sailer-Fliege, 1999; Stanilov, 
2007; Sykora, 1999; Sykora and Bouzarovski, 2012) and tells a lot about Tallinn, this 
chapter argues that the existing use of the term has been somewhat limited due to its 
aim to capture cities and societies as totalities. Rather than abandoning the term 
altogether, however, this chapter revises it and makes it more applicable for the 
forthcoming analysis regarding governing the socio-materiality of cities. I thus offer 
‘post-socialism’ as a notion for specific aspects in cities and societies—post-socialism 
as a de-territorialised concept. While often restricting analysis, the adjective ‘post-
socialist’ offers potential for taking wider thinking on cities further, in ways that 
nonetheless preserve particular local experiences. 
The chapter draws its inspiration from comparative urbanism in its aims to avoid three 
pitfalls: firstly, the division of the world into incommensurable regional containers; 
secondly, theory building from a limited number of—usually Euro-American—cases; 
and thirdly, the hierarchical ordering of cities into modernising/developing or global 
and other. Comparative urbanism argues that every city can be a source for (re)thinking 
urban theory, inviting scholars to move beyond the ‘usual suspects’ and challenge the 
Euro-American domination in urban studies (McFarlane, 2010; Robinson, 2006, 2011). 
Whereas the literature about cities in Central and Eastern Europe (hereafter abbreviated 
as CEE) is extensive, forming a field with a significant amount of edited collections, 
special issues and conferences, it is not possible to claim that it has assumed a 
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prominent position in urban studies, thereby still remaining ‘off the map’ (cf. Robinson, 
2002). However, the literature around ‘post-socialist cities’ has much to contribute to 
emerging debates around comparative urbanism, showing the limitations of some 
strategies for focusing on cities beyond the West as well as the potential that a more 
regionally inclusive urban theory would provide.  
The adjective ‘post-socialist’ functions in at least three different ways in urban studies: 
as container, condition and de-territorialised concept (see Table 4.1). It firstly refers to 
cities located in a particular region at a particular historical moment (post-socialism as a 
container). Secondly, it is applied as a marker of a particular condition with attention 
paid to the condition’s significance and specificity. Thirdly, the adjective marks 
particular processes or phenomena, such as distinctive patterns of suburbanisation in 
cities located in CEE, although this regional limitation is not a necessity (post-socialism 
as a de-territorialised concept). These three perspectives of post-socialism share some 
aspects whilst remaining distinct (portrayed in Table 4.1). A spatio-temporal container 
approach provides the most limited view in light of the three challenges that 
comparative urbanism has offered, and the critique of this approach has thus already 
been widespread over the last decade (Ferenčuhová, 2012; Grubbauer, 2012; Hirt, 2013; 
Jauhiainen, 2009; Stenning, 2005a, b; Stenning and Hörschelmann, 2008; Wiest, 2012). 
Both condition and de-territorialised concept, however, allow moving away from a 
regionally restrictive focus on these cities, while still acknowledging the importance of 
specific historical experiences of places that counter-balance the universalising 
narratives of global urban trends.  
The distancing from regionally bounded perspectives is particularly pertinent for the 
studies of cities in CEE, which forms a region in danger of a double-exclusion: being 
positioned outside mainstream urban studies but also playing an insignificant role in the 
recent post-colonial critiques of this field. While cities outside of the centre are often 
implicitly conceptualised as places that validate or invalidate theories, rarely being 
themselves sources for creating novel theory (McFarlane, 2010; Robinson, 2011), the 
analytical move ‘beyond the West’ (Edensor and Jayne, 2012) might still lead to ‘new 
hegemonies’ (McFarlane and Robinson, 2012) by, for example, writing mostly about 
large cities in South-East Asia, Latin America and Africa. A caution towards area-based 
imaginations of urban theorisation shall thus be levelled with an argument positioned in 
this thesis in favour of an approach that sees cities first and foremost as ordinary 
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(Robinson, 2006). By assuming the character of cities to be beyond the reach of 
adjectives such as ‘global’ or ‘developing’ as well as ‘Asian’ or ‘post-socialist’, 
‘ordinary cities’ allows urban places to be understood as multiple and complex with 
their own potentials and capacities. Seeing cities as ordinary, however, need not mean 
that the complexity of those cities would not contain those aspects that are indeed 
grasped by notions of ‘global’, ‘post-socialist’ or other adjectives. Thus, seeing post-
socialism as a de-territorialised concept has analytical potential in some or many 
ordinary cities (including those influenced by socialism outside CEE, such as Vietnam, 
Cuba, Tanzania, etc
6
 and, as I will discuss below, cities which have never been in a 
socialist political system). The concept of post-socialism, then, can be applied to 
particular aspects of cities rather than seen as something that encapsulates the entirety of 
an urban experience as post-socialism as a container and post-socialism as a condition 
approaches do.  
This chapter introduces the de-territorialised concept of post-socialism in three steps. 
Section 4.1 reviews the shift from seeing post-socialism as a ‘spatio-temporal container’ 
to that of a ‘condition’. Section 4.2 critically examines the utility of seeing post-
socialism as a condition, and in drawing from the debates in comparative urbanism, 
offers an argument away from area-based understandings, whether for CEE or 
elsewhere. Finally, Section 4.3 fleshes out the alternative notion of post-socialism—a 
de-territorialised concept—and illustrates it through some reflections on the case of 
Tallinn. These points will be more fully elaborated in the empirical chapters of the 
thesis.  
4.1 From seeing ‘post-socialism’ as a ‘spatio-temporal container’ to 
seeing it as a ‘condition’ 
Table 4.1 maps out the characteristics of three conceptualisations of post-socialism 
regarding three core parameters—spatiality, temporality and the understanding of 
change—as well as what the adjective ‘post-socialist’ applies to, and what questions this 
perspective raises for an analyst. In this section I offer an analysis of two perspectives: 
container and condition. 
                                                          
6
 The point about those cities, however, is not explored in this chapter with the focus here on cities that 
are mostly seen ‘post-socialist’ (that is, those located in CEE). The point, nevertheless, shall be explored 
further. The author is also involved in organising a conference which deals with this problematic.  
71 
Table 4.1. Three different understandings of post-socialism. The gray shading 
highlights the analytical similarities between perspectives. 
      Post-socialism 
as... 
Aspect 
... container ... condition ... de-
territorialised 
concept 
Spatiality Bounded regions Relational regions Relational regions 
Temporality After-1989/1991 Hybridity Hybridity 
Understanding of 
change 
Transition Transformation Transformation 
“Post-socialism” 
applies for... 
The country, city, 
regions 
The country, city, 
region 
Specific spatial 
forms, attitudes, 
processes legal 
documents, etc 
Examples of 
questions asked in 
the framework 
When is post-
socialism over? 
How processes 
compare to 
capitalist cities? 
What countries 
(and cities) belong 
to the post-socialist 
region? 
Is post-socialism 
still a valid term for 
cities in Eastern 
Europe? 
How post-socialism 
affects other 
processes (such as 
globalisation, 
neoliberalism)? 
What are 
international effects 
of post-socialist 
changes? 
How can post-
socialism help to 
make sense of 
particular 
phenomena? 
How do arguably 
post-socialist 
aspects affect the 
question under 
study? 
    
  
4.1.1 Post-socialism as a container 
The most common way to understand ‘post-socialism’ has been to define it as a spatio-
temporal container. This understanding offers straightforward answers to the three 
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parameters of ‘post-socialism’: the temporal dimension is seen to be ‘after 1989/1991’, 
the regional dimension is defined as CEE
7
 and the change is characterised by transition 
(such as the threefold change of privatisation, marketisation and democratisation but 
also shifts in the physical form of cities). The ‘container’ vision of post-socialism was 
particularly common for academic writings in the 1990s and is the most common public 
perception of the term, but it also underlies some contemporary analysis.  
Firstly, the spatio-temporal container perception stresses the sequential patterning of 
development for post-socialist cities. ‘Post-socialism’ is thus first and foremost seen as 
something that comes after the socialist city: it is constructed as a priori different from 
what used to be the condition of ‘socialism’. The question asked about post-socialism 
thus includes the end of this state, and concomitantly the end of the term ‘post-
socialism’. Secondly, the spatial trope defines post-socialist cities as cities located in the 
region of CEE and the former Soviet Union (FSU). Indeed, most of the books and 
edited collections in journals on post-socialist cities consider this region (Andrusz et al., 
1996; Pickles and Smith, 1998; Tsenkova and Nedović-Budić, 2006; Stanilov, 2007), 
only in some cases are other parts of the world like China or Vietnam considered (see 
Wu, 2003 on using ‘post-socialist city’ for Chinese cities). Spatially, the container 
understanding of post-socialism relies on the potential of clear-cut borders that can be 
drawn between groups of countries. 
Such a ‘spatio-temporal container’ narrative of post-socialist cities can then be filled 
with various studies. These studies, however, tend to take a one-directional perspective 
of situated change: transition in CEE. Post-1989/1991 CEE cities are thus seen as in 
transition (Harloe, 1996) or after transition
8
. Even recently a prominent scholar on the 
post-socialist city, Ludek Sykora (2009, p. 394), states in his entry on post-socialist 
cities in the International Encyclopedia of Human Geography that they ‘are cities in 
transition’. He then moves the point closer to the transitional narrative (ibid., p. 394): 
                                                          
7
 One new to the field will immediately recognise the number of parallel terms: ‘post’ + ‘Communist’ or 
communist or Soviet or socialist, with hyphen or without one. Each of the terms evokes a certain 
understanding of what is talked about: whether the ‘post-ing’ means the disappearance of the Soviet 
Union, or the end of communism/Communism as a prevailing Political Idea or the end of something 
vaguer, which is grasped in the term ‘socialism’. Still, in general these words do not designate specific 
conceptualizations but are rather short-hand for what the author wants to discuss. 
8
 Name of the network bringing together scholars doing research in this part of the world 
http://citiesaftertransition.webnode.cz/, last accessed 5 June 2013. 
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Post-socialist city is a temporarily existing phenomenon. Its transition from 
socialist to another type of city is deﬁnite in time. Post-socialism is the time 
period between the change in the rules of the game and the completion of 
corresponding transformations in built and social environments. When will such 
transformations be accomplished and cities will become one of the many 
variants of urban places under capitalism? This question cannot be answered yet. 
Post-socialist cities are still on the road of their transformations.  
‘Transition’—a widely rehearsed concept especially in economics and political 
sciences—suggests that both beginning and end points are broadly known (from 
socialism to capitalism) thus stressing a direction of change in formerly socialist cities 
towards more European or capitalist cities, where some cities are leading and others 
lagging behind (e.g., Åberg, 2005 on the hierarchical development of Baltic capital 
cities). The concern in terms of post-socialism would be more or less about ‘catching 
up’ with the Western world and becoming one with the ideological goals of Europe 
(critically reflected on by Pickles and Unwin, 2004; Stenning and Hörschelmann, 2008). 
Transition suggests the eventual disappearance of post-socialist differences and with 
that, the disappearance of the term itself, as we see in Sykora’s quote above (for 
critiques of ‘transition’, see Verdery, 1996; Stark and Bruszt, 1998; see overview in 
Pickles and Unwin, 2004).  
In the spatio-temporal container framework, Tallinn is a post-socialist city due to its 
history as part of the former Soviet Union. With the accession of Estonia to the 
European Union in 2004, questions have been raised by observers and the public about 
doing away with the framework of post-socialism. Nevertheless, Tallinn is still part of 
the academic discussion on ‘post-socialist cities’. Seeing post-socialism as a container 
leads researchers to attend to changes, whether these include the shift from state-led to 
market-led urban planning (Ruoppila, 2007), increasing socio-spatial differentiation 
(Ruoppila and Kährik, 2003), or suburban shifts in housing (Leetmaa and Tammaru, 
2007; Leetmaa et al., 2009; Leetmaa et al., 2012). Nevertheless, despite a focus on 
transitions, some of the literature has also noted the various continuities in the urban 
landscape. Leetmaa et al. (2009), for instance, note the effect of socialist urban planning 
in the ways in which movement beyond the city residential areas has taken place. 
Recently, the studies have thus morphed into looking at post-socialism as a condition, 
which is the next perspective discussed here.  
74 
4.2 Post-socialism as a condition 
Over the last several years, a new literature has developed that has more critically 
scrutinised the meaning of post-socialism and positioned it spatially, temporally and 
thematically within a more complex territory than the spatio-temporal container form of 
analysis (Grubbauer, 2012; Hirt, 2013; Wiest, 2012). Firstly, against the temporal 
demarcations of post-socialism as post-1989/1991, the literature has tended towards 
notions of hybridity (Burawoy and Verdery, 1999; Marciniak, 2009; Stenning and 
Hörschelmann, 2008). Crucial elements of one ‘era’ might be continuities from a 
previous order (Sassen, 2006). This applies to ‘post-socialism’ as well as to ‘socialism’, 
which should not be reduced ‘to a simplified, homogeneous, caricature’ (Stenning and 
Hörschelmann, 2008, p. 323). The ideology did not define all aspects of social life, 
whereas the previous times affected the unfolding of socialisms. The temporal 
demarcation of ‘post-socialism’—an epochal understanding—is thus challenged by the 
intermingling of elements from different time periods. Secondly, the spatially restricted 
imagination of post-socialism—as bounded regions—is challenged by more topological 
views of space that bring connections between places to the fore. According to Amin 
(2004, p. 33; see Stenning, 2005a on this view regarding ‘post-socialism’) regions 
should be seen as ‘topologies of actor networks’, in which places are produced through 
a number of networks and processes, from something as obvious as transport linkages to 
something more subtle like emotional attachment. In this understanding, some elements 
of post-socialism might be similar to, or taken from, other places in an interrelated field 
of cities, but interact with other entities that have continuities with the socialist era. 
Thirdly, to counter the notion of ‘transition’, the term ‘transformation’ is offered as a 
more nuanced way to capture processes of change (e.g., Stark and Bruszt, 1998; Sykora 
and Bouzarovski, 2012; Verdery, 1996). Indeed, capitalism does not simply emerge by 
creating certain political and economical institutions with the process of change 
characterised at the same time by a diversity of transitions (Pickles and Unwin, 2004). 
The ‘transformation’ shows the post-1989 condition as ‘rearrangements, 
reconfigurations, and recombinations that yield new interweavings of the multiple social 
logics’ (Stark and Bruszt, 1998, p. 7).  
Approaching post-socialism as a condition thus captures the character of a city as a 
hybridity of past and present, here and elsewhere in an incessant interaction (Stenning 
and Hörschelmann, 2008; Marciniak, 2009; Pickles, 2010; Golubchikov and Phelps, 
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2011; Grubbauer and Kusiak, 2012a). Such interpretation of post-socialism parallels the 
main discourses of comparative urbanism that have proclaimed the interconnectedness 
of space where flows of ideas, goods, finances and people traverse cities and constitute 
them. Cities would thus ‘already inhabit each other’ (Robinson, 2011, p. 16) as part of 
the processes of globalisation (Dick and Rimmer, 1998) or as a result of policy 
mobilities, whereby they draw on diverse sets of policy discourses from a range of 
places—both global North and South—to shape their urban processes (McCann, 2011; 
McFarlane, 2010, 2011c; Peck and Theodore, 2010). The ‘local’, therefore, emerges in 
connection to other places, rather than being singular and separated. Nevertheless, 
despite the relational understanding of time and space, which moves away from the 
perception of post-socialism as a bounded container, the ‘post-socialism as a condition’ 
perspective thinks in terms of particular ‘post-socialist characteristics’ that still hint at a 
meta-narrative for these cities and societies.  
From the perspective of condition, Tallinn is a post-socialist hybrid with socialist built 
heritage—such as the Soviet-era large-scale housing estates, now home for roughly half 
of the city’s 430,000 inhabitants—a prominent element of the city. In addition to that, 
the urban fabric of Tallinn also contains a medieval city centre
9
 and industrial quarters, 
as well as housing areas from the 19
th
 and the early 20
th
 century. In addition to those 
historical developments, the post-1991 period has added high-rises to the city centre 
(Ruoppila, 2007), shopping malls to the inner-city and low-rise residential 
developments to the outskirts. The city is thus temporally hybrid, with many important 
elements being socialist as well as pre-socialist. But the city is also spatially relational 
with city development influenced by the Hanseatic League, the Russian Empire and the 
Soviet Union, which all positioned Tallinn in different geopolitical relations: as a trade 
city, military port, ship construction city, and as part of industrialisation (Bruns, 1993). 
The post-1991 period is also characterised by the opening of the city to the international 
market and finance capital, which have played active roles in the real estate 
development. In line with examples portrayed by Stenning (2005a), an analyst might 
also look into the mobility of workers from Estonia to Finland and the counter-flow of 
remittances as well as ongoing discussions about an emerging Tallinn-Helsinki twin-
city ‘Talsinki’ (Grišakov, 2013; Pikner, 2008). Tallinn thus contains elements from 
multiple eras, and has been and is part of various geo-political framings, making it 
                                                          
9
 Which is under UNESCO protection since 1997. 
76 
impossible to note a clear-cut transition. The process can therefore be seen as a 
transformation characterised by faster and slower shifts with elements and processes 
from the past and from a spatial distance playing an important role in what the place is 
today. The particular melange of elements and processes in Tallinn would lead an 
analyst drawing from the ‘post-socialism as a condition’ framework to apply the label 
‘post-socialist’ to the city as a whole.  
Before I highlight limitations of the ‘condition’ perspective, it is worth noting that there 
are at least two lines of advancement for more globalised urban theorising that this line 
of thought opens up.  
Linking the ‘post-socialist transformation’ to broader concepts  
The approach of linking post-socialism to broader concepts has been taken up by 
various studies such as Bodnár (2001) in relation to globalisation, Stenning et al. (2010) 
with ‘neo-liberalisation’ and Hirt (2008, 2012) with postmodernism. Stenning et al. 
(2010), for instance, direct their attention to the ways in which people in Slovakia and 
Poland interact with—by promoting, negotiating and resisting—neo-liberalisation that 
works across different cities and societies all over the world. They note post-socialist 
effects on neo-liberalisation, which thus becomes a more nuanced process. However, 
seeing the post-socialist condition as merely a local effect on something that is a priori 
defined as more general than the notion of ‘post-socialism’ preserves the distinction 
between theorising and area studies. It should be kept in mind that every concept 
emanates from somewhere (Chakrabarty, 2000; Robinson, 2006) whereby the context in 
which a concept is developed affects what it is and, hence, how it can be used to 
understand other conditions. Drawing on this idea, researchers have suggested 
alternative configurations for the power relations that concepts possess. Sonia Hirt 
(2008, 2012), for instance, argues provocatively that postmodernism in Eastern Europe 
might be ‘purer’ than in cities usually described by these terms—highlighting Sofia then 
as postmodern at the expense of Los Angeles—while Bodnár (2001) makes a similar 
point about globalisation. Moreover, drawing on the strategies of theorising proposed by 
some approaches in comparative urbanism (for instance, Roy, 2009), the particular or 
distinctive experiences of post-socialism—such as ‘change’—can be seen as a principal 
reason for making a post-socialist city an ‘interesting object of research’ relevant for a 
wider range of urban experiences (Grubbauer and Kusiak, 2012b, p. 11) thus lifting it to 
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a more prominent academic position. In the case of Tallinn, the existence of two equally 
sized communities—one Estonian speaking and the other Russian speaking comprising 
mainly those who moved to the city during the Soviet era—with distinctive histories 
and socio-spatial relations characterised by (mainly hidden) tensions as well as a lack of 
connections might provide a basis to further develop understanding of ‘divided cities’. 
The notion of ‘divided city’ would not be a stereotypically post-socialist feature and 
allows drawing parallels with other cities such as Brussels or Johannesburg.  
Post-socialism is not just CEE experience but is a condition with global effects 
Seeing post-socialism as a condition makes it possible to imagine its effects outside of 
the usual spatio-temporal container (Chari and Verdery, 2009; Outhwaite and Ray, 
2005; Pickles and Unwin, 2004; Stenning, 2005a; Stenning and Hörschelmann, 2008). 
Post-socialist transformation is a global event—a ‘global 1989’ (Lawson et al., 2010) 
with wider global implications. This affects significant issues for cities (e.g., military 
towns) far from the places usually understood as ‘post-socialist’. Thus, the persistence 
of the term ‘leftism’ (Pickles and Unwin, 2004, p. 16), or questions of military alliances 
and spending priorities were affected far beyond the CEE or FSU. In the analysis of 
socio-spatial changes in Los Angeles, for example, Soja (2000, p. 143) notes how the 
Cold War and its end influenced the development of military technology complexes in 
the metropolitan region at a distance from the so-called post-socialist region:  
In the mid-to-late 1980s, manufacturing employment hit its peak in the region 
[of Los Angeles] and by 1990 it had begun to decline in all five counties during 
what some claim to be the worst regional recession of the century. The end of 
the Cold War and major cuts in prime Defense Department contracts threw the 
regional economy into a pronounced but brief tailspin.  
Even though Soja does not develop the point at all in terms of post-socialism, his 
observations do show that the end of the Cold War is a crucial moment in the Los 
Angeles urban landscape. It is unfortunate that elaborations on how post-socialism has 
shaped cities all over the world are largely missing and one hopes that more reflections 
on these lines are forthcoming.  
The literature on the condition of post-socialism has combined contemporary 
geographical thinking on socio-spatiality by drawing in relational notions of space as 
well as intermixing temporal periods through understandings of hybridity (thus getting 
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closer to the view of cities as ‘complexities’ discussed in Section 1.1). It has opened up 
new lines of thought such as the post-socialist condition beyond the region to which the 
term is usually applied. It has also suggested that we see ‘post-socialism as a conceptual 
rather than a descriptive category’ (Stenning, 2005b, p. 125). However, Stenning’s 
(2005b, p. 125) suggestion to explore this through ‘more studies which debate the 
contours and boundaries of post-socialism, exploring differences and commonalities 
within it whilst also interrogating its connections to other worlds’ still proposes ‘post-
socialism’ as a meta-narrative: a label applying to territorial categories, and most 
particularly to that of CEE. 
4.3 Moving away from the framework of regions 
It is argued here then that even though the conceptualisation of post-socialism as a 
condition allows for a more theoretically sound understanding of post-socialism it still 
retains some of the shortcomings of spatio-temporal container intact, notably the focus 
to transition and area studies.  
Firstly, by keeping the term post-socialism applicable primarily for the territorial entity, 
the perception of the condition as a temporary and transitional period persists. For 
instance, in her otherwise sophisticated elaboration, anthropologist Caroline Humphrey 
(2002, p. 13) suggests a possible path of demise for the category by arguing that ‘[i]f we 
see a growing gulf between two broad paths [that of CEE and those “further east”], if 
socialist values come to be rejected in several entirely different ways in different 
regions of the former socialist zone, and if “actually existing socialism” comes to be 
relegated into a largely forgotten past of yellowing newsprint, then it will be time to lay 
the category “postsocialist” finally to rest.’ Similarly, in a recent important intervention, 
Sykora and Bouzarovski (2012) criticise the simplistic view of transition but merely 
replace it with a longer-term transition where changes take place from one sphere to 
another, with institutional transitions having already happened but shifts in social 
practices and urban form still ongoing. Even Stenning and Hörschelmann’s (2008, p. 
312) intervention starts by stressing post-socialist difference against the calls for the end 
of post-socialism, which hence are portrayed as ‘premature and misplaced’ by them. I 
argue here that even if this is not their aim, both the container and condition visions of 
post-socialism have the disturbing effect that it remains easy to turn post-socialism into 
a point in historical development. In this sense, post-socialism continues to be portrayed 
as a phase between two pre-defined broader eras with the attendant problems of this 
79 
perspective, as discussed above (Section 4.1.1). The only way that post-socialism as a 
condition can both include spatial and temporal hybridity and dispute the transition 
narrative would be to perceive it as a permanent condition. Therefore unless we want to 
argue that some cities are forever in the post-socialist condition, an alternative 
understanding of post-socialism is needed. 
Secondly, although relying on relational conceptualisations of territorial entities
10
, the 
centrality of CEE is retained in the analysis and hence the area-based division of the 
world is sustained. The problem is not so much that researchers investigate a specific 
region; rather it is the persistent linkage that the region as a totality has to post-socialism 
in this approach. Thus, post-socialism still remains a master-narrative whereby the 
concern for analysis is often explaining internal differences across the region and 
highlighting its distinctiveness in relation to other parts of the world (examples include 
many recent interventions, such as Hirt, 2013; Stenning and Hörschelmann, 2008). The 
centrality of the territorial marker in the analysis of post-socialism is complicated, 
however, by the elusive nature of regions as they are socially produced (Paasi, 1991), 
meaning that a region cannot form a stable ground to which to attach any specific 
conceptual development. Furthermore, defining a region often leads to further 
exclusions. In the case of ‘post-socialism’ some countries, such as Russia, tend to be 
constructed as more ‘Eastern’ and the core-periphery relationship where Western 
Europe acts as a context for the ‘not-yet-fully European’ countries to learn from or copy 
is re-inscribed (Kuus, 2004). But the regional focus also raises concerns in terms of 
research strategies in relation to the global theorisation of cities. 
In order to refocus urban theory beyond Euro-American cities, one of the advocates for 
building on regional distinctiveness, Roy (2009), suggests ‘strategic essentialism’ to 
simultaneously dislocate and locate by centring on certain regions previously 
downplayed in the analysis. Indeed, comparative urbanism itself emanates largely from 
scholarship on Asian and African cities. Such scholarship therefore aims to draw other 
scholars’ attention to the forgotten parts of the world. On the one hand, this is achieved 
by highlighting what is remarkable or distinctive within that region. On the other hand, 
and in more advanced forms of regional distinctiveness, the region acts as a base from 
which to launch new concepts in urban studies. In this way, particular issues of cities in 
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 Even though the post-socialism outside the regional borders is suggested, it remains largely 
undeveloped in urban research as well as in sociological studies more generally.  
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the global South—such as informality (Bunnell and Harris, 2012; McFarlane, 2012; 
Roy, 2005)—can be developed into concepts that are valuable not only for the contexts 
from which they emanated, but applicable for urban theory and research more widely.  
Yet even though the argument for focussing on territories and regions ‘off the map’ 
forms the basis of a challenge to Euro-American centrality, it also raises some concerns. 
In particular, this approach reinforces or creates disparities amongst cities along 
regional lines, posing a danger of ‘new hegemonies’ (McFarlane and Robinson, 2012; 
Robinson, 2013). The Euro-American dominance in urban theory might thus be 
replaced with simply a different regional division of cities in the world. Indeed, some of 
the critique can be directed towards comparative urbanism at large, as it starts from and 
privileges the context of the global South which—although not clearly defined or 
definable—tends not to include some other ‘off the map’ regional imaginations, most 
notably the post-socialist regions (see also Stenning, 2005a; and Kuus, 2004 in relation 
to postcolonial theory). Ananya Roy (2009), for instance, in explaining her critique of 
Euro-American centrality with various regional examples from the ‘global South’ omits 
CEE
11. This region might be left out because she considers it as ‘properly Europe’. 
Nevertheless, as Kuus (2004, p. 482) argues, there is a ‘double framing of Eastern 
Europe’, meaning that it appears as ‘not quite European but in Europe’ which therefore 
poses a danger of generating a ‘double-exclusion’ in analysis, where post-socialist cities 
are neither centre nor periphery, neither mainstream nor part of the critique. Arguments 
based on the post-socialist condition therefore have the problem that the formerly 
Second World is often ignored in wider urban scholarship. The simple fact of difference 
that ‘post-socialism’ as a condition provides is not enough for raising interest in this 
area. Cities in the post-socialist condition would be competing analytically with cities in 
the Asian or Latin American condition. Lacking qualities such as economic significance 
or the size that characterises urban areas in South-East Asia and Latin America, as well 
as research capacities and interests of leading academic institutions that, moreover, are 
often remnants of the colonial past
12
, cities in the post-socialist condition find it difficult 
to compete. Any regional centralisation poses concerns for regions with less weight in 
the previous analysis, as well as potential limitations in generating new curiosity for 
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 Neglecting then that there are area studies centres focusing on the ‘post-socialist world’: for instance, in 
University of Oxford there is Russian and East European Studies, at University College London a School 
for Slavonic and Eastern European Studies. 
12
 The UK institutions, for instance, possess research interests and capacities towards India and Nigeria.  
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urban scholars whose interest might be directed elsewhere, given current trends in 
urbanisation and urban scholarship.  
Therefore, instead of trying to bring in certain regionally-based imaginations of 
urbanism, or to argue for the importance of particular territorialised urban experiences, 
urban theorists could achieve a more global imagination of cities by relying on 
frameworks less susceptible to area-based hegemonic conceptualisations. 
4.3.1 ‘Thinking beyond the West’ in urban studies without regions 
The other approach for globalising urban theory—conceptualising cities as distinctive 
and ordinary—might provide a more equal grounding for theorising cities. Such an 
approach suggests addressing each city on its own terms, without dividing them into 
regions, or assuming general end-points (like global city) or developmental paths: they 
are distinctive, diverse and contested, whilst existing within the world of diverse 
interactions and flows of different people, ideas and materials (Robinson, 2006). Cities 
should thus be seen as ordinary (Robinson, 2006, 2013, 2014), that is ‘unique 
assemblages of wider processes’ (Robinson, 2006, p. 109). Thinking about cities in this 
way would allow those seen as global or world cities to be ordinary, while cities that are 
small or other-wise do not stand out emerge on a more equal conceptual footing with 
cities considered important and/or are widely studied. As Robinson (2013, p. 668, 673) 
further argues, rather than focus on the ‘outstanding, extreme and novel experiences’, 
urban studies should look into the ‘urban now’ that ‘directs our attention to the multiple 
geographies and temporalities of the urban’. The city of Tallinn, which has rarely 
figured in urban studies literature, could therefore have a way to enter the analysis of 
urban studies as an ordinary city that is part of the diverse field of cities in the world.  
Nevertheless, for the analytical eye it will be difficult not to see patterns and processes 
in the city that imply the existence of ‘post-socialism’. Following this understanding, 
cities could be seen first and foremost as ‘ordinary’. However, depending on 
circumstances and relations, some aspects of their planning, urban fabric, economy, 
judicial and residential practices—though not the whole city as a totality—might be 
usefully understood through terms such as ‘post-socialist’. Thus, instead of seeing post-
socialism as a regional condition the point here is for an observer to make use of ‘post-
socialism’ in the condition of spatial relationality and temporal hybridity whenever and 
insofar as it offers analytical potential. In some instances it would be difficult to argue 
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for the relevance of the term ‘post-socialism’ whereas in others a complex web of 
continuities, changes and anti-continuities render ‘post-socialism’ a useful concept. The 
researcher should be attentive, then, as Stenning and Hörschelmann (2008, p. 313) 
propose, to asking ‘how and where we might identify the post-socialist and if and why 
we might want to do that.’ This thesis therefore still agrees with Stenning and 
Hörschelmann (2008) and others (e.g., Cook, 2010; Humphrey, 2002), that instead of 
avoiding the use of the term ‘post-socialism’, we reserve the term for use in carefully 
specified ways that can help to make sense of some aspects of various cities.  
4.4 Refining ‘post-socialism’: a de-territorialised concept 
This section opens up some ways in which post-socialism could be perceived as a de-
territorialised concept. This perspective observes cities in a parallel manner to that of 
the ‘condition’—as hybrid, relational and characterised by multiple transformations—
but departs from it in one important respect: post-socialism does not apply to a whole 
city, or in that matter to a society or a region, but to more specific aspects of social and 
urban worlds (see Table 4.1). This is not just a quibble over the use of the term but 
affects the ways in which we understand cities in CEE. Namely, post-socialism as a de-
territorialised concept allows these cities to be like any other as complex entities (see 
Section 1.1) and be analysed via a variety of tools, while at the same time paying 
attention to historical and regional specificities. Even though a logical step as a response 
to the critique of regionally-based imaginations, such as post-socialism, might be to 
dispense with the term altogether (which considering the negative meaning that post-
socialism has acquired among inhabitants of CEE would be supported by many), this 
approach would neglect the spatially relational and temporally hybrid conditions of 
societies and cities where post-socialism still has both descriptive and analytical value. 
In this sense, ‘post-socialism’ can be brought into analysis in various ways, two of 
which will be particularly relevant to the current study: continuity of governmental 
technologies and spaces; and a form of anti-continuity that, in a desire to be different is 
implicated through inscriptions of the past acting as a ‘constitutive outside’.  
Continuity. Examples of continuities of ‘socialist’ reality are to be found in the material 
environment (Soviet housing estates, factories), in social practices (some informal 
tactics), governing technologies (some legal documents) and sentiments (social 
conservatism, some understandings of social justice). It is indeed true that many of these 
will not be present forever—buildings are demolished and refurbished, sentiments 
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change—but as long as they are present they interact with other practices and spaces. 
Continuity is thus much more complex than the mere prolonging of a former reality. A 
particular form of continuity is nostalgia which might be a feeling towards something 
that existed in the Soviet time but has ceased to exist now—the examples include 
consumer products and often everyday reflections on the Soviet social safety nets (such 
as full employment and almost zero-cost housing)—or might involve attitudes towards 
something that has persisted and received high valuation among some of the public, 
examples of which include buildings and other built forms that might be loved by (some 
of) the community (see, e.g., Colomb, 2007). Continuity in this sense means a hybridity 
of the city in the same way as the understanding of post-socialism as a condition. 
However, for the perspective of post-socialism as a de-territorialised concept, post-
socialism does not account for the hybridity of a society or a city in its entirety, but 
rather it characterises merely one or other aspect or aspects of that context. As hybridity 
is a condition for every city and society, continuities of post-socialisms might be found 
anywhere, although not necessarily in the same form and intensity. Post-socialism as a 
concept would include post-socialisms anywhere in the world, similar to the perspective 
of ‘condition’. Compared to the ‘post-socialist condition’, however, the de-
territorialised concept does not focus on the ‘global-1989’ condition but rather on the 
particular aspects that have connections to ‘actually existing socialism’; such as the 
exported Soviet architecture (Stanek, 2012).  
Anti-continuity. Change with no reference to ‘socialism’ shall not be defined as ‘post-
socialism’. But if the change has direct connection to ‘socialism’ through processes of 
anti-continuity, then it can well be discussed in relation to the thematic of post-
socialism. One of the primary examples of such anti-continuities includes the economic 
and political changes whereby the Soviet practices were considered antagonistic to how 
a liberal and democratic society should function. Urban research has nevertheless been 
relatively silent in highlighting anti-continuity among many of the changes. Typically, 
change and the emergence of new practices is stressed; such as market-led urban 
planning away from the state-led planning (Axenov et al., 2006; Leetmaa et al., 2009). 
While she does not use the term ‘anti-continuity’ and is more focused on change, Hirt 
(2012) elaborates on the reactions towards socialist reality with her discussion on 
‘privatism’. Such discussions could be taken further in urban research with less 
importance attached to the break itself but on the calculations and motives to work 
towards the change. In the case of anti-continuity, ‘references to the socialist past 
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become an inherent part of the story of the city as it is told now’ (Ferenčuhová, 2009, p. 
291) and not merely as ‘nostalgia’. 
Moving away from post-socialism as a condition and thinking about it as a de-
territorialised concept allows researchers to avoid always discussing post-socialism in 
relation to multiple places in CEE, wherein there will always be some similarities but 
also crucial differences. While there are many similarities between places described as 
‘post-socialist’—such as the socialist era characteristics of high urban density, large-
scale presence of housing estates (Urban, 2012), industrialised development and 
prevalence of public transit, as well as post-1991 forms of suburbanisation, 
commercialisation and deindustrialisation—it cannot be argued that a singular post-
socialist city form exists. Post-socialism as a concept can be delimited in relation to 
local processes, which can then be linked up with how other researchers have discussed 
their cases, and what references to post-socialism they have managed to highlight. 
4.4.1 Continuities and anti-continuities of Tallinn 
Tallinn is hybrid as the ‘post-socialism as condition’ perspective drew out, but hybridity 
itself is not ‘post-socialist’. Rather Tallinn should be allowed to be ‘ordinary’ and not 
circumscribed by the regional category (of post-socialism) while still not being blind to 
its post-socialisms.  
There is a wide-variety of continuities visible in Tallinn, the most prominent of which 
are buildings, particularly the Soviet era housing estates on the edges of the city (see 
more Chapter 8). The architectural form of housing estates is moreover not only 
‘socialist’ but has multiple links all over the world, with ideas such as ‘neighbourhood 
unit’ and realised projects in Brasilia and elsewhere (discussed in Chapter 8). But the 
mere continuing presence of these physical forms after 1991 is also not enough to note 
their importance; the question is also how their past and present existence affects other 
aspects of the city. Pre-1991 Tallinn had a socio-spatial landscape of housing that was 
almost the reverse of the capitalist city model: in Tallinn, as well as other cities with 
similar history and development, the single-family houses at the outskirts of the city 
were places for people from lower social class, compared to the socially mixed housing 
estates that provided many living amenities missed in the single-family homes (Leetmaa 
et al., 2009). Such residential patterns have not changed overnight, with housing estates 
still home to people from mixed social backgrounds. The socialist summer-homes at the 
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outskirts of the city, moreover, have provided an opportunity for transformation to 
permanent homes and thus for suburbanisation (Leetmaa et al., 2009; Leetmaa et al., 
2012). We could therefore talk about post-socialist housing patterns, which refer both to 
the particular processes under socialism producing the built form and to their continuing 
presence today with associated effects on more recent processes.  
Similar but more hidden continuities can be delimited in the governmental practices, 
such as the persistence of building codes, which in many senses order the ways in which 
officials see urban space. Such continuities could be termed post-socialist governing 
practices and might provide particular strengths to the government, whereas in other 
similar situations in which the government has had to deal with new phenomena, such 
strength is missing. An example will be explored in Chapter 7 concerning the ways in 
which Tallinn governs car parking, whereby the city has strong socialist era governing 
techniques on hand to deal with parking provision in new constructions, whilst lacking 
those when the question regards most of the newly emerged privately owned publicly 
accessible parking lots. The former manifests something that was already seen as being 
in need of governing in the Soviet Union, with building codes delimiting the amount of 
parking that should be provided (of course, the numbers have since increased with the 
almost tripled individual car ownership); meanwhile the latter is a new situation in 
which the question of whether or not private activity should be governed at all is not yet 
resolved. ‘Post-socialism’ in these examples does not refer to continuity as something in 
need of change, but highlights a reality with some of its roots in the histories of 
‘actually existing socialism’.  
Nevertheless, in addition to continuities and changes that have linked Tallinn to 
processes all over the world, there are a variety of changes that are anti-continuities. In 
fact, I would argue that it is impossible to understand Tallinn without considering the 
relations that apparently entirely new developments have with what existed before. 
Some of the changes were made in order to depart from the past, showing the 
importance of considering what existed before in order to understand what takes place 
today. For instance, the rapid increase of car ownership took place as soon as barriers 
put forward by the Soviet state (such as requirement of permission to buy new car) were 
removed, thereby satisfying a desire that had long been denied in socialist consumer 
societies (Siegelbaum, 2008). Similar anti-continuities exist in urban planning where the 
rights of private owners to decide on the use of their land plots (instead of municipality 
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officials) is perceived to be a normal practice by several urban planning actors, who 
stress the significance of departing from the reality in the Soviet era. The most 
important legal document—the Constitution—that influences contemporary legal 
debates on private property rights was devised at the start of 1990s in a clear endeavour 
to depart from the Soviet system.  
The Constitution and the way it is deliberated upon in courts—both in Estonia and in 
other countries in CEE—shows a particular form of longing for freedom, as well as 
further curtailment of the state (Albi, 2010). The Constitution in Estonia was devised 
from 1991 to 1992 in an emotional atmosphere where citizens were looking for ways to 
distance themselves from the Soviet era (Estonian Constitutional Assembly, 
1991/1992). The Constitutional Assembly discussed individual rights thoroughly, 
placing the right to use property in a strong position in the Constitution. Over the 
following years, when the Constitution was put into practice, a leading constitutional 
review institution expressed its yearning to distance Estonia from the Soviet 
administrative state and move towards a more democratic legal state (Truuväli, 1994). 
In this thinking, the municipality’s deliberation—which Mariana Valverde (2012, p. 72) 
sees as ‘the strength of the municipal paternalist tradition’ in her treatise of 
Vancouver—was downplayed, and the need to properly interpret and follow laws was 
positioned in a prominent position, thus also curtailing the ways in which a local 
authority could and would govern compared to the situation in many other countries. 
Such legal protection by the Chancellor of Justice aimed to achieve rights for individual 
freedom contra state actions. In this context, we see that an anti-Soviet desire for 
freedom resulted in what Foucault (2008) described as ‘state-phobia’. Foucault notes 
‘state-phobia’ in post-WWII neo-liberal thinking. ‘State-phobia’ refers, then, to an 
intense negative feeling towards state action whereby in ‘general disqualification by the 
worst’ (ibid., p. 188) all sorts of state actions—even if only bureaucratic or welfare 
state—can result in comparisons with fascist state in Foucault’s example, and with 
Soviet state in the case of this thesis. These associations attract an indiscriminate 
critique of state involvement in governing people’s lives. Such sentiments in relation to 
individual car use are explored more thoroughly in Chapter 6. Changing practices of 
governing that favoured individual actors and market relations (Leetmaa et al., 2009; 
Ruoppila, 2007), was therefore not just a change but also a counter-continuity. Thus, 
while various changes can be discerned in the context of Tallinn, a line of connection to 
‘actually existing socialism’ also emerges, adding analytical potential for understanding 
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what takes place in the city and society through post-socialism as a de-territorialised 
concept.  
4.5 Chapter conclusion: seeing ‘post-socialism’ as a de-territorialised 
concept 
I have argued that despite the visible shortcoming the post-socialist cities framework 
does not need rejecting, but rather re-thinking and re-conceptualising. Instead of 
assigning a simplistic definition to the adjective ‘post-socialist’—understanding a post-
socialist city as simply ‘a city in post-1989/1991 CEE region’—this term should be 
more carefully and productively applied. Theoretical reflections on the 
conceptualisation of post-socialism would be clarified by making an observer ask what 
he or she is referring to when using the term. This questioning itself makes the term 
appear more tentative and open for debate than its use as a descriptive device would 
suggest.  
Drawing inspiration from the recent developments of urban theory towards comparative 
urbanism—which has searched for means to move away from the vision of a world 
divided into incommensurable territorial entities), along with examining ways to make 
cities ‘off the map’ relevant for theorising—the chapter introduced three ways in which 
post-socialism has and could be perceived: as a container, as a condition and as a de-
territorialised concept. The container framework observes ‘post-socialism’ as a term 
bounding developments in the post-1989/1991 CEE region. The framework termed here 
as condition, opens the container up analytically by observing various temporal and 
spatial relations which constitute post-socialism as a variety of hybridised 
characteristics of societies and cities. The de-territorialised concept framework draws 
on a similar analytical perception of temporal and spatial relations as the condition 
framework does, but defines post-socialism not as a characteristic of the totality of a 
city/society but as a characteristic of particular phenomena and processes. The key 
claim elaborated upon in the chapter was thus that even though much critique has been 
levelled towards the container vision, seeing post-socialism as a condition still takes the 
adjective ‘post-socialist’ as a meta-narrative with suggestions of a temporality fixed 
within a specific period and regional focus (a post-1991 CEE) maintained. There are, 
moreover, dangers for urban studies embedded in adapting regional imaginations. Even 
though they can form the basis of a challenge to the existing Euro-American approaches 
of urban theorising, they may still lead to new hegemonies, whereby large cities in Asia 
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or elsewhere in the global South are the prominent research sites, and cities in CEE 
would remain doubly-excluded: being neither part of the centre of urban studies nor the 
main sites of critique. Therefore, in order to move towards a more global urban studies, 
post-socialism ought rather to be transformed into a de-territorialised concept that 
applies to certain aspects in the city and to certain social processes, not to the city or 
society as a whole. All cities should be allowed to be ‘ordinary’ with only certain details 
or processes of them captured by the adjective ‘post-socialist’. Post-socialism seen as a 
concept to be put to work more generally in the thinking of ordinary cities would be less 
dominating for researchers working in the cities of CEE region, while still remaining 
present. In this way, cities usually seen as post-socialist would be liberated from their 
territorial trap but at the same time, with the reworked notion of post-socialism, their 
‘post-socialist’ particularities can still be analytically drawn out. 
In order to understand post-socialism conceptually, I would suggest four steps for 
researchers studying cities. Firstly, they should see every city as ‘ordinary’ complex 
entities (as elaborated in Section 1.1) without centring on certain regional or 
developmental imaginations. Secondly, they should identify or analyse only particular 
aspects of cities as post-socialist (or Asian, global, post-Apartheid, etc.)
13
. Thirdly, in 
order to see post-socialism as the characteristic feature of some aspect of urbanity, there 
should be possibilities to track a connection with ‘socialism’ which, fourthly, could 
emerge in various ways: in the form of continuity in practices, governmental 
technologies or spaces that include nostalgia; or, in a form of anti-continuity, which in a 
desire to be different is implicated through setting the past as a ‘constitutive outside’. 
The city of Tallinn would thus not be characterised through the meta-narrative of ‘post-
socialism’ simply because the city is in the region of post-1989/1991 CEE, or because it 
is under the condition of post-socialist hybridity and spatial relationality. Instead, 
Tallinn is an ordinary complex city composed of a multiplicity of social and material 
relations with some aspects—such as urban fabric, governmental practices and 
valuation of property rights—characterised as ‘post-socialist’ because they evidence 
continuities or anti-continuities. The specific relevance of the notion of ‘post-socialism’ 
for Tallinn will emerge more fully through the following empirical chapters. 
 
                                                          
13
 I would encourage similar critical reflections as that in this paper offered also towards other spatial 
and/or temporal demarcations. 
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5 Methodological considerations: the parking issues 
studied and methods used 
In this chapter, I will reflect on the decisions made for empirical analysis. I carried out 
fieldwork in Tallinn from January 2012 to July 2012 when I collected most of the 
material. I also had subsequent short field visits in September 2012, April 2013 and 
August 2013 when I gathered information on topics that emerged as important in the 
process of analysis and writing. In what follows, I will, firstly, discuss my own position 
in relation to the city studied in the dissertation as I have lived in the city prior to the 
research while being also born and raised in the country under study. Secondly, I will 
discuss what sources and procedures of analysis I used.  
5.1 Researcher positionality 
While Tallinn offers a case for reflecting on governing procedures due to its history as a 
city in the Soviet Union and its development processes afterwards (as outlined in 
Chapter 1), it is also a city with which I have previous experience. This somewhat eased 
my access to resources and people as well as helped in focusing on issues that were 
significant in the city. Nevertheless, as I had not worked on transport politics before, 
many new contacts had to be forged. For instance, I helped to form a network of 
transport researchers and activists that has been helpful in learning about issues dealt 
within the dissertation. Such networks allowed insights into previously unpublished 
investigations by researchers and activists in Tallinn. This was the case, for instance, 
with the study on parking business that I deal in Chapter 7. Similarly, the contacts in the 
network drew my attention to some of the documents that I use in Chapter 8. This 
dissertation could draw on those insights provided by others but, starting from a more 
theoretical perspective, had also to go deeper in the investigation. Thus, the previous 
experience certainly benefitted the empirical investigation. Nevertheless, it also leads to 
some concerns about my positionality, which I would like to reflect upon here.  
First of all, my close contact with the ‘field’ raises questions on whether my critical 
perspective could have been hindered by personal connections to those under 
investigation. However, the respondents with whom I carried out the expert interviews 
were mainly those I did not know before starting the doctorate and as I am not only an 
insider but also an outsider (Sultana, 2007), spending most of my time away from 
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Estonia, the contacts have remained somewhat limited. Secondly, as my activity in 
Tallinn was not only to collect data but also involved intervention through writing in 
media or engaging in debates with city officials, the roles of researcher and activist have 
become intermingled. I have increasingly taken up the role as a criticiser of car-centric 
planning of Tallinn and as an advocate for a more pedestrian-friendly urban 
environment. 
Partly, the doctoral research project has been driven by my interest in achieving a more 
sustainable and livable city environment in Tallinn. These targets have been furthered 
through my engagement with the Estonian Urban Lab—a non-profit and non-
governmental organisation that since 2006 has advocated for a more participatory, 
inclusive, just and livable urban space. Although my position within the group has been 
somewhat on the fringe and mainly as a researcher and a thinker, the active 
interventionist attitude has had an influence on the ways I approach cities. Thus, in 
2014, I was involved in the formation of an informal network of experts and activists 
interested in the pedestrian’s rights for urban mobility. This group—known as the 
Pedestrian Association—has started to function as a platform to raise public awareness 
about urban mobility issues, including those regarding space consumption by parked 
cars.  
Many transport researchers in Estonia and elsewhere tend to be advocators for more 
sustainable transport modes at the same time as they are researchers. So, for instance, a 
major book on car parking issues by Donald Shoup (2005), who is an influential 
professor on urban and transport planning, is written with a desire to change the ways in 
which car parking is understood by urban planners and wider audience alike. His book 
does not only work as an analysis but also as a vehicle for advocating decreased 
provision of parking or introducing market prices into car parking regulations. Although 
Estonian transport researchers are not so widely influential in their advocacy as Shoup 
has been, they often communicate their message to the country’s media or seek change 
on their regular course of work by convincing decision-makers. Working with media 
has been my main tool for making the message on why and how to achieve sustainable 
and livable cities heard. I have written newspaper opinion articles as well as been 
invited to comment on the radio and in television. Activist engagements are however 
not only for achieving change but can also support research acitivities. These activist 
engagements have helped me in developing more balanced and thought through 
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arguments as these arguments have to be convincing not only for the academic 
community—that already thinks in a broadly similar manner—but to the diverse and 
often car-supporting public. Moreover, seeking change in the ways things are done in 
Tallinn has also allowed me to access some of the information by researchers and 
activists, which otherwise would have hardly been accessible for a regular academic.  
However, such two roles as a researcher and activist can also lead to possible role-
conflicts. I encountered such an instance in May, 2014, when with a group of activists 
we met with the city officials, two of whom I had interviewed for my dissertation 
before, in order to criticise the city’s plan to redesign a pedestrian crossing14. 
Nevertheless, such situations are difficult to avoid as it is not easy to separate the roles 
of a citizen interested in improving the city he/she lives in and the role of a researcher 
who aims to understand the place as a case study area. Moreover, such separation also 
becomes arbitrary if the researcher aims to give something back to the site under study. 
Thus, my engagement in the city of Tallinn has been and is more than just that of 
carrying out fieldwork.  
During interviews respondents were often interested to hear back from the work carried 
out, sometimes also asking about the ways in which things are done in the UK. 
However, as some of my findings as well as the experience of other cities are not 
supportive for the actions that city officials in Tallinn are doing, not all of this feedback 
to respondents will end up being affirmative of their actions. The nature of interviews as 
well as the relationship with the respondents turns out to be different in expert 
interviews than in regular semi-structured interviews. While in regular interview 
situations, the researcher often appears in the power-position, in expert interviews the 
one with power is usually the respondent.   
5.2 Comments on the methods used 
Being interested in material governmentalities, the project focussed on the 
governmental rationales regarding various materialities. Such interest in rationales led 
me to the information contained in a range of governing documents and the ways in 
which this information was understood and rationalised by those who carry out 
                                                          
14
 The issue we were discussing in May, 2014 was also different from the topic of the dissertation but 
relevant for the future research interests as outlined in Section 9.3.  
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governing. While the voice of the public entered this research through resources such as 
media reports, interviews with heads of flat-owners’ associations and to a certain degree 
also court decisions discussed in Chapter 6, it did so to a lesser extent than that of 
governors. The focus on governing also meant a particular focus in terms of the kind of 
data used.  
In terms of data used, the research thus relied mainly on textual sources than 
observations. This includes court decisions, stenographs of the parliamentary 
(Riigikogu) and Constitutional Assembly meetings, media reports, archival materials 
(urban plans) and expert interviews (see the list of respondents in Appendix A). State 
institutions—at least in the so-called developed countries as Estonia—usually function 
through or with the help of policy and legal documents as well as other minor governing 
texts. Interviews that I carried out during the fieldwork are additional to that material 
and allow to complement and qualify information stated in these governing documents. 
Additionally, such textual accounts are in this dissertation accompanied by a series of 
photos in the urban environment and two walk/ride-along ethnographies with parking 
controllers which were helpful in framing the study but which formed less important 
sources for the analysis presented in the thesis. Photos and walks were the most 
important for Chapter 8 where they allowed a reflection on the ways in which the urban 
space in housing estates has been altered by cars.  
5.2.1 Studying material governmentality through texts 
Textual materials had different roles in the research. First, media reports and interviews 
allowed for a reconstruction of events that I could not possibly have attended (as they 
took place before my fieldwork). Newspaper reports, passages in interviews as well as 
the court cases provided a basis from which to construct a picture of what took place, 
including who were the actors involved and what decisions were made in what order. 
Second, texts provided an insight into the discourses of governors (the texts fulfilling 
this role included mainly media reports and interviews but also stenographs of 
parliamentary meetings and court decisions). In Chapter 6, for instance, the sentiments 
towards freedom and state emerged in the words of the Chancellor of Justice, MPs or 
journalists writing opinion pieces to newspapers. Thirdly, rather than only showing 
discourses, texts also act themselves. Some texts (legal documents, laws, government 
policies and plans) or parts of them are brought into being to do something in the 
regulatory framework (Prior, 2003). Thus, I attended to some of the texts as 
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performative devices. Fourthly, materialities are interpreted and discussed in texts such 
as governmental documents, laws or interview transcripts. Analysing those texts 
provides an insight into the agency of things. The latter point however needs more 
explanation as texts are regularly interpreted as discourses, while materialities seem to 
be antagonistic to discourses with their affective forces inviting research techniques 
such as observation and ethnographies. 
Although studying materiality through texts rather than direct observation might be an 
unexpected approach, it has in fact been commonly applied in research. The researches 
inspired by science and technology studies as well as by actor-network theory have 
looked at the historical development of technologies such as bicycles, bakelites and 
bulbs (Bijker, 1995), microbes in the scientific practice of Louis Pasteur (Latour, 1993 
[1984]) or a particular transport system (Latour, 1996 [1993]) whereby the research 
necessarily had to rely on other sources than direct observation or participatory 
ethnography, as aspects investigated happened before the researcher stepped in. Thus, 
the most prominent sources for such historical investigations are texts including those of 
archival recordings and media reports. Another inspiration here is the study by Bent 
Flyvbjerg (1998) who analysed the politics of the urban mobility plan in Aalborg, 
Denmark. Even though he was not directly interested in materiality and not explicitly 
drawing on ANT and STS, he was attentive to the multiple artefacts that he investigated 
by drawing research data from interviews and media reports. Thus, the argument here is 
that while texts might evoke the interest in discourse, they also provide a window into 
the world of artefacts. The materiality of the textual actor—such as the physical 
existence of the paper (Darling, 2014)—is itself an actor but texts also matter regarding 
the ways in which material actors are described and interpreted in the text. Texts in this 
thesis thus reveal the role of materiality by drawing attention to the complexity of 
regulating cars in urban environment and politics of wheel clamping in Chapter 6, the 
surface material that allows parking providers to escape the local state in Chapter 7 and 
the influence to governing procedures that the Soviet housing estate’s physical plan 
provided in Chapter 8.  
Being more reliant on the textual material than direct observations was thus in this 
research considered a reasonable way to learn about the rationales of governing 
considering the historical character of large parts of the investigation, the importance of 
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governing documents in Estonia and the actions (also in the material world) that 
documents not only describe but also prescribe.   
5.2.2 Notes on expert interviews 
The interviews in this thesis are ‘expert interviews’. In its main characteristics, an 
expert interview is like any other semi-structured interview involving conversation 
between an interviewer and an interviewee on the topic analysed in the research. But 
what differentiates expert interviews is that ‘the interviewees are of less interest as a 
(whole) person than their capacities as experts for a certain field of activity’ (Flick, 
2009, p. 165). Hence, Flick warns that questions of directing the interview arise in the 
case of expert interview more commonly than in the case of other types of interviews, 
resulting in the requirement that the interviewer is well informed on the topic under 
study. It is advisable, then, that the researcher has familiarised herself/himself with the 
relevant documents produced previously by the institutions the expert is working at to 
use these as guides for making questions and to also probe the interviewer to explain 
further if he/she says something diverging from what was put down in the document. 
Still, as it appeared in my fieldwork, experts are willing to give suggestions as to what 
documents the researcher should look at. Nevertheless, I agree, that good preparation on 
documents and also in media reports gave me a position to ask more focused and 
challenging questions from interviewees. Expert interviews, therefore, can on the one 
hand give information on a topic where the information is hard to acquire from other 
sources and this way they also complement other methods; on the other hand, they give 
a reflection on practices and knowledge of those involved in positions to make decisions 
or direct policies.  
In general, I approached each interviewee with a different aim and a different set of 
questions. Being experts, they were specialists in certain fields, whether it included 
traffic law, Tallinn’s parking policies or urban planning. There was thus no reason to 
expect all of them to answer the same questions even though there were also sets of 
interviews that followed a similar structure. For chapters 7 and 8, I interviewed multiple 
people with a similar set of questions, although the questions were still somewhat 
revised depending on the particular interview: three real estate developers and three 
parking business for Chapter 7 (interviews no. 42, 43, 45 and no. 41, 46, 47 In 
Appendix A) and six heads of flat-owners associations for Chapter 8 (interviews no. 
29–33, 35 and 39 in Appendix A). One respondent—an official whose job is to deal 
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with regulations of parking enforcement—I interviewed three times (interview no. 1, 13 
and 16) in relation to different questions emerging during the fieldwork. I also met 
informally with an official who coordinates parking policy in the city multiple times, 
but these conversations are not counted as interviews in Appendices even though I 
recorded the discussion afterwards in my fieldwork notebook. Some interviews also 
emerged in progress of others: for instance, the head of the city traffic department 
(interview no. 20) introduced me to other employees with whom I subsequently carried 
out interviews.  
All interviews (except interview no. 38) were carried out in Estonian. Interviews were 
recorded (apart from six interviews where respondents asked not to) and subsequently 
transcribed. Direct quotes from interviews in chapter 6 to 8 are my translations.  
5.2.3 Legal proceedings as research data 
I utilised data from legal specialists on various occasions. These included mainly the 
Supreme Court decisions but also some decisions made by the Chancellor of Justice. I 
would have also used the decisions made by courts in the first two levels (from three in 
total) but such material has a behaviour that even a researcher cannot tame. Namely, as 
those decisions do not have a value of legal precedent, they are deleted from the archive 
in a regular occurrence (7 years). Of course, nothing disappears just by itself, being 
instead deleted by someone in some time, which could make those documents still 
available for an adventurous researcher. Nevertheless, locating those documents was not 
the aim in itself for this dissertation. Unlike decisions by lower level courts, those by the 
Supreme Court are considered to matter forever and are hence stored permanently. As 
they offer an official interpretation of laws, the Constitution or some aspect of life, the 
Supreme Court decisions are themselves actors in the legal framework.  
For this reason I analysed the corpus of Supreme Court decisions on matters related to 
parking. With the decisions available in the internet database for everyone, I utilised its 
search engine to locate approximately thirty decisions where parking was mentioned (in 
Estonian ‘parkimine’). This corpus helped me to map the legal process of parking 
regulations in Chapter 6. The nature of court decisions is such that a certain passage of 
the lengthy decisions could become to matter in the legal apparatus. This was the case, 
for instance, with a decision regarding wheel clamping in 1994 (Supreme Court of 
Estonia, 1994b) discussed more thoroughly in Section 6.4. Some of the passages, 
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however, have merely shown the thinking of some of the judges without becoming 
influential for later decisions. Thus, the Supreme Court decisions had to be brought 
together with other discussions regarding parking regulations. This support was 
provided both by reading the deliberations of the Chancellor of Justice and the 
discussions and debates that were carried out in the parliamentary meetings. From 
stenographic records of parliamentary meetings, I mapped the whole corpus of 
discussions that concerned the Parking Act and its later amendments.  
5.2.4 Archival explorations 
Archives were important for the research in a number of instances. Firstly, they 
provided more detailed information on legal debates in Chapter 6. Secondly, I used 
archives to study urban plans from the socialist times in Chapter 8. Furthermore, some 
of the material I collected through personal sets of more or less organised archives of 
documents.  
For investigations on parking regulations (Chapter 6), I looked through not only the data 
already made available online, but also the archived notes on the Supreme Court 
meetings (from 1994) and notes on the process of law-making in the archive of 
Riigikogu (The Parliament of Estonia). The former gave a closer look into the court 
meetings that discussed the constitutionality of Tallinn’s practice of wheel clamping. 
These notes summarised the statements made during the court sessions. Nevertheless, 
such material was again only available in the case of most fundamental Supreme Court 
decisions and it was also relatively superficial as they were just notes made by a referent 
rather than full transcripts. The latter—law-making process in the archive of the 
Riigikogu—showed some of the pieces left out of the Parliament’s stenographs: 
amendments proposed by Members of the Parliament, results of the voting and drafts of 
the law. All in all, archival material in this chapter (Chapter 6) was only complementary 
to the laws and stenographic records stored in the internet database.  
In Chapter 8, I use the archival material to investigate the urban plans devised during 
the Soviet years. The plan of Mustamäe is divided between various archive documents 
with those questions I was interested—that is, street plans—only visible in the general 
plans for each of the micro-district separately (of which there are eleven) and not shown 
in the analysable way in the Mustamäe General Plan. I focused on the plans of 
Microrayon no. 4 that I picked because it is neither one of the oldest nor the newest, and 
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I also lived in the area for a short period. I investigated both the initial design from 1964 
and also subsequent revisions and additions (from 1985, for instance). In order to check 
the generalisibility of the data for Microrayon no. 4 to Mustamäe, I also consulted plans 
of Microrayon no. 2 and 5.  
There were also two instances during fieldwork when I was provided with ‘archives’ 
formed of more or less systematic collection of different documents by interviewees. 
The first of those was a collection of all sorts of different municipal parking 
regulations—including, for instance, the very first Tallinn’s parking regulations from 
1993—collected by a transport expert (Interview no. 15). Another such ‘archive’ was a 
collection of newspaper reports about parking matters gathered over the period of 15 
years from 1996 to 2010 and stored in a binder by a municipality official (Interview no. 
1). Even though this was not a complete set of newspaper articles and was done less 
meticulously in the later years, it provided a good source for learning about events of 
parking regulations which a municipal official found relevant for his work. In addition 
to this form of media archive, I formed my own one through database searches. 
5.2.5 The corpus of media reports 
Newspaper reports were an important source of information for the study. I started the 
search of newspaper stories from the year 1990. Until issues from mid-1994, that search 
had to be carried out by going through newspapers from cover to cover in libraries. 
From 1994 onwards I could use a web-based database
15
 and search using keywords. As 
car parking is hardly an issue that makes itself to the headlines—being mostly a subject 
for news stories that simply describe what governors are going to do—the web-based 
search engine significantly simplified locating relevant texts. Using the keyword of 
‘parking’ (parkimine, in Estonian16) the database showed 1224 responses from 1993 to 
2012. Rather than a full corpus of material to be worked through (by content analysis, 
for instance), the list of articles provided a point of reflection to make sure that I do not 
miss key moments and to locate articles around moments I was interested in. To have 
such a large list of articles dealing with parking gave me the reference point to assess 
the importance of the cases selected for the dissertation. While many of the articles in 
the list are not cited in the bibliography of the thesis (as it contains only those directly 
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 http://ise.elnet.ee/ (last accessed in 30 August 2014) 
16
 More precisely I used the word ‘parkim*’. 
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referred to in the chapters), reading articles from the list also provided some general 
information for the analysis. 
The analysed newspaper articles can be divided into four categories all of which were 
useful for the dissertation in one way or another. First, there are those that simply 
replicated what the city had forwarded to the news outlet. Second, there are those that 
were written by an actor in the field of parking (a city official, representative or parking 
business, etc). Interviews carried out with an expert are also in this category. Third, the 
analysed newspaper stories also included those written by journalists who had carried 
out original investigation or were responding to someone’s request. I also made an 
interview with one journalist who had written about parking (as well as other traffic 
issues) for many years and was particularly active in the early 1990s (Interview no. 14). 
Fourth, there are opinion pieces by newspapers themselves. These stories, even though 
they still were written by individual journalists, provided a general viewpoint of the 
newspaper. Such opinions of leading newspapers could be interpreted not only one 
person’s opinion but as a viewpoint symptomatic of the time (see, for instance, in 
Section 6.5).  
5.3 Chapter conclusion  
These various sources of information helped to put together the narrative in the three 
empirical chapters that I will turn to next. While this chapter outlined the material 
investigated in general, I refer to particular sources in each chapter separately. I see 
those references, rather than the discussion in this chapter, as the main hook for a reader 
to allow deconstructing and possibly reconstructing the narrative of the dissertation.  
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6 Law enforcement in paid parking: contradictions of 
legal, administrative and material in the urban 
governance 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter unpacks the complexity of what might seem to be a straightforward matter: 
law enforcement in the case of car parking. Drawing on the debates regarding the paid 
parking enforcement in Estonia taking place from 1993 till 2002, the chapter brings 
together concerns of material governmentality—the governing of urban materiality and 
legal deliberations of urban governance framed around freedom—in relation to post-
socialism elaborated as a de-territorialised concept. The chapter deals with the 
importance of the directive diagram (and police power) in governing at the local level 
that was unpacked in Section 3.2. However, while this chapter provides some support to 
these claims, it also tames the more radical claim of paternal local governing outside the 
liberal state logic proposed by Valverde (2012). As this chapter shows, local states are 
curtailed from deciding on their own how to solve local issues. Namely, their actions 
come against the legal logic possessed by constitutional institutions and the parliament 
(Riigikogu, as the Parliament of Estonia is called). The chapter shows how legal actors 
in Estonia eventually accepted that the material nature of the city necessitates the 
actions described by the directive diagram, but such acceptance came only after 
significant debates and has been framed in quite complex legal maneuvering. 
When the city of Tallinn introduced a paid parking system in 1993 in order to regulate 
the use of cars in the city centre and to earn money for the city budget, nobody knew it 
was going to be such a complex matter. By the time a stabilisation in the regulatory 
procedures was achieved in the beginning of 2003, there had been numerous Supreme 
Court decisions, interventions by the Chancellor of Justice, parliamentary meetings, law 
changes and even a whole new law made and subsequently considered unconstitutional. 
The investigation of court rulings and parliamentary meetings, coupled with media 
reports and interviews shows the contradictory character of urban government. Various 
rationalities are at play in the urban governing, including legal, administrative and 
material, with each pulling the particular issue of parking management in slightly 
different direction.  
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Due to particular historical processes in Estonia, the debates about governing deal with 
different concerns compared to, for instance, Valverde’s (2012) treatise of law in 
Canada. In Estonia, the Soviet past was a constant point of reflection. Thus, 
constructing a state apparatus that relates to its citizens in a different way than the 
Soviet system did was a particularly pertinent concern for law-makers and legal 
practitioners and a strong feature regarding the politics of ‘anti-continuity’. With the car 
defined legally as ‘property’ and property viewed a category with particular importance 
for a society shifting from state-ownership to the domination of private ownership, 
constitutional interpretations perceived automobiles as elements with such an 
importance that local state regulations had to be curtailed or re-conceptualised. For 
these reasons I start the discussion (Section 6.2) with the Constitution devised in a 
special Assembly brought together for only this task over a six months period in 1991 
and 1992. The new constitutional document became the basis for the construction and 
re-construction of the once again independent country. The Constitution formed the 
master document that legal texts as well as all sorts of state decisions subsequently have 
to be in accordance with. In many ways, the Constitution embodies the critical anxieties 
of the time when it was made and has helped to solidify the central importance of 
individual freedom contra state power. Once drafted, the Constitution is a powerful 
non-human actor in its own right carrying its ideas of anti-continuity through framings 
of property and other citizens’ rights into constitutional debates.  
Following the discussion on the Constitution, the chapter moves to introduce two 
principal methods of paid parking enforcement in Section 6.3: wheel clamping and 
parking fines. The following part of the chapter discusses two episodes in the process of 
constitutional debates regarding parking enforcement in Estonia. Section 6.4, thus, deals 
with the (un)constitutionality of wheel clamping bringing in questions regarding anti-
continuity in relation to the judicial sentiments towards governing by a local state (and 
the importance of property). Section 6.5 moves to the debates commencing wheel 
clamping discussions and reflects on the judicial reasoning that while critical of local 
state power still had to enforce municipal capacities to regulate. This eventual decision 
to endorse and support local state directive power was due to the material conditions of 
car parking. Section 6.6 is an epilogue to the two episodes studied in the previous 
sections and outlines the parking governing condition that emerged after the earlier 
debates were settled. Section 6.7 summarises the chapter.  
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6.2 The Constitution of Estonia and freedom 
[F]ree nation relies on free individual (Maruste, 1997, p. 60; my translation) 
The Constitution has to be the book of the books and the law of the laws (Rask, 2012; my 
translation) 
Legal frameworks are pervasive elements in modern liberal societies. However, as they 
often do not assume a prominent position in social and geographical studies, their 
effects are not considered significant, or alternatively, are regarded to belong to the field 
of competence singularly reserved for legal scholars and not other social scientists. 
Nevertheless, a body of scholarship exists which argues that the legal, social and spatial 
should be seen as enmeshed (Delaney et al., 2001) so that the law is understood as both 
constituting and constituted by the social: hence, thinking legally and thinking socially 
are not two different enterprises (Cotterrell, 1998). Both legal geographies developed by 
Nicholas Blomley and others (Blomley et al., 2001; Martin et al., 2010) and socio-legal 
studies (Cotterrell, 1998; Valverde, 2009; also Bourdieu, 1987) provide starting points 
to take jurisprudence seriously from a sociological point of view. Yet, considering the 
law from a sociological perspective does not—and should not—mean neglecting what 
lawyers and legal documents precisely prescribe (Bourdieu, 1987). Even though law is 
in various ways criss-crossed by other spheres of society, similarly to science (as ANT 
and STS argue) it cannot simply be translated to those fields. Law ‘constitutes’ aspects 
of social life, ‘shapes’ and ‘reinforces’ ways in which social reality is understood 
(Cotterrell, 1998, p. 182). The law and society hence constitute each other.  
The most important legal document in Estonia as well as in other constitutional 
countries is the Constitution. In the assemblage of multiple actors in the state apparatus, 
the Constitution is one of the most significant actors that is even capable of ‘restricting 
legislators’ freedom to rule in law-making’ (Maruste, 1997, p. 153). However, its power 
is not merely its own but has been programmed into it and supported by various other 
actors. That the Constitution was made to be powerful is shown by the practice of its 
construction. The decision to set up the Constitutional Assembly with the sole 
responsibility to devise the new Constitution was accomplished with the same 
parliamentary decision that declared the independence of Estonia on 20 August 1991 
(Supreme Soviet of Estonian SSR, 1991). After 30 general meetings and numerous 
meetings in committees over the period from September 1991 till April 1992, with some 
comments from international experts, the Constitution was finally voted for in the 
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national referendum thus forming the official basis for the legislative, executive and 
judiciary institutions of the nascent country.  
On the one hand, the Constitution is a technical document prescribing how the state 
apparatus should be formed and how it should function. On the other hand, its practical 
functioning cannot be perceived separately from the values that have been embedded 
into it. The head of the Estonian Parliament and later president Arnold Rüütel declared 
in the opening speech of the Constitutional Assembly (Estonian Constitutional 
Assembly, 1991; my translation) that ‘[t]he norms of the Constitution must grow out 
from the real life of Estonia and we cannot mechanically copy foreign experience or 
build merely on abstract scientific schemes.’ The Minister of Justice and later prominent 
lawyer Jüri Raidla expressed in the same assembly meeting (Estonian Constitutional 
Assembly, 1991; my translation) the need for ‘the order of society that has been centred 
on state institutions . . .  to be exchanged for an individual-centred order of society’ 
where ‘a citizen and a personality is positioned at the centre of social relations.’ He 
added that in order to move in that direction, the structure of the Constitution ‘is not a 
secondary question; it relates most directly to the content of the Constitution, also to 
those political choices and tendencies that are programmed into the Constitution.’ ‘The 
structure,’ as he continues 
must give preliminary guidelines to where the weights of freedom of every 
individual, citizen and the whole population are in the constitution. It directs a 
reader to search and find the principles of the separation of state powers and 
balances of the state power. It also demonstrates to the reader the constitutional 
aim of moving towards the legal state [õigusriik] where the citizen must be 
protected from everyone and everything, including the state. Thus, also the 
structure of the constitution must assure society’s ideals of freedom and offer 
firm protection to democracy in whatever situation.  
The section entitled ‘Fundamental Rights, Freedoms and Duties’ is indeed the bulkiest 
section of the Constitution. As legal scholars have argued, the document explicitly 
favours individual freedom referring to the rights and freedoms of citizens in most of 
the articles while explicitly hardly mentioning duties (Alexy, 2001). The only duties 
mentioned include those of being loyal to the constitutional order, observing the rights 
of other people, the duty to look after other family members and to not use private 
property against public interests. The array of freedoms, however, is extensive ranging 
from self-realisation to the more particular rights to freely use property, move inside the 
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country and to outside, express opinions and to congregate for that purpose. The Report 
by the Constitutional Expert Commission (1998; my translation) assessed that ‘[a]n 
individual has a limitless sphere of freedom assured by the Constitution’ which the 
‘[s]tate power is allowed to limit . . .  only when it is able to justify the measure.’ Thus, 
the state is positioned in a secondary position to the individual. According to Ernits 
(2011, p. 153), the Constitution is—and shall be interpreted as—asymmetric towards 
individual freedoms. As an Estonian legal scholar asserts, individual freedom can be 
defended by following only the Constitution whereas all state regulations need to be 
inscribed in laws and do not result directly from the Constitution (Ernits, 2011). In line 
with such preference given to individual freedom over state capacities most of the rights 
are, moreover, restrictions on the state rather than demands on the state to fulfil a social 
function; they are negative rights rather than positive rights (such as the positive right 
for housing that some constitutions include). The Constitution aims to keep the 
executive powers of the state at bay. It is thus a prominent source of legal logic 
positioned against the administrative logic of the directive diagram of cities.  
I will next reflect on the question of individual ‘rights’ and the problematisation of 
public interests in relation to constitutional debates concerning property. 
6.2.1 Property and constitutional rights 
Everyone has the right to freely possess, use, and dispose of his or her property. 
Restrictions shall be provided by law. Property shall not be used contrary to the public 
interest. (The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, n.d., Article 32) 
Article 32 of the Constitution, cited above, expresses the right for the enjoyment of 
property as well as referring to certain justifications of the restrictions on its use. 
Despite the limitations the article proclaims, the constitutional right to property has 
always been prominently framed both in the making of the Constitution and in its later 
utilisation in court cases. For instance, in the meetings of the Constitutional Assembly 
the head of the redaction committee, Liia Hänni, expressed how it would be necessary 
to ‘find a wording that much more strongly than the existing wording would make it 
possible to claim that the property right is protected in Estonia, that property is sacred 
and untouchable’ (Estonian Constitutional Assembly, 1992a; my translation) as ‘in the 
current situation property is a very fundamental question in the Estonian society’ 
(Estonian Constitutional Assembly, 1992b; my translation). 
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Property, moreover, was a prominent issue throughout the political and economic 
transformation of Estonia. Thus, even before the Constitutional Assembly had its first 
meeting in September 1991, the Principles of Ownership Reform Act were agreed on 
and ratified by the legislative council—the Supreme Soviet—of the Estonian Soviet 
Socialist Republic
17. The Act declared its fundamental purpose ‘to restructure 
ownership relations in order to ensure the inviolability of property and free enterprise, 
to undo the injustices caused by violation of the right of ownership and to create the 
preconditions for the transfer to a market economy’ (Riigikogu, 1991, Article 2). The 
property nationalised by the Soviet Union was to be returned, compensated for or 
transferred to the former owners or their descendants. Although the Act was concerned 
primarily with land and real estate—which will be discussed more in Chapter 8—it 
manifests the sentiment of the importance of private property that was rendered into a 
fundamental constitutional principle and enacted in various forms of property including 
that of the car.   
However, the question as to what is ‘property’ does not have a straightforward answer. 
Defining something as property, as will be discussed in what follows in the chapter, sets 
this entity in relation to constitutionally defended rights. According to the Commented 
Publication of the Constitution, property includes land, real estate and productive forces 
but also various assets and money such as pension (Madise et al., 2012). Most 
commonly though, the entities seen as property are ‘bodied artefact[s]’ which could be 
both immobile (such as buildings) and mobile (such as cars) (ibid.). Yet even in these 
cases, the question of how far the freedom to use said property stretches remains 
unanswered. Already in the Constitutional Assembly it was acknowledged that one 
should not ‘deviate to the other extreme’ and ‘fetishise private property’ (Liia Hänni in 
Estonian Constitutional Assembly, 1992b; my translation). For this reason, the third 
sentence of the Article 32 regarding the right to use property—‘Property shall not be 
used contrary to the public interest’—was added at the last minute. The Commented 
Publication of the Constitution acknowledges those questions also in relation to private 
owned automobiles (Madise et al., 2012, p. 393; my translation):  
If Article 32 would cover all uses of a thing then a very large number of 
restrictions on fundamental rights could be considered infringements on the 
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 Although then already named the Republic of Estonia, with the Constitution not yet ratified, the main 
institutions remained the same in the structure. 
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fundamental right to property. For instance, one could consider an infringement 
of the fundamental right to property the instance when traffic police stop a 
vehicle in the street because with that police restrict the use of a vehicle. Yet, the 
legality of stopping a vehicle is not controlled in relation to the fundamental 
rights to property. Enlarging the area of protection by the fundamental right to 
property that far is possible by linguistic interpretation but is dubious 
considering the relatively complex clauses of the Article 32.  
Although the limits of property use are pointed out in the Constitution and by legal 
specialists, whenever a particular entity is linked with the constitutional rights to 
property it becomes a matter of freedom. This means that even if state-introduced 
restrictions on property are eventually considered justified, the reasoning by the 
Supreme Court must take into account the freedom that individuals are presumed to 
have for the use of their belongings.  
To comprehend the workings of the Constitution, however, it is not enough to consider 
its own properties; other actors that give it power also need to be taken into account. 
This is despite the assertion by an influential legal thinker in Estonia that ‘the 
Consitution protects itself’ (Raidla, 2013; my translation), as the institutions and 
procedures for its operation need to be provided. Yet despite being not ‘textual actors’, 
the institutions that support the Constitution were coded into the Constitution itself. The 
Constitution comes equipped with the actors that should defend it. It says that certain 
actors have to exist and as characteristic to ‘speech acts’, when the Constitution (as a 
legal document) says something, this thing must happen (Bourdieu, 1987). Still, the 
actors need to be enacted and must start to perform. 
6.2.2 Actors protecting constitutional rights 
Even though everyone has to follow the Constitution in their actions and deliberations, 
its protection is explicitly ascribed to three institutions: the President, the Supreme 
Court and the Chancellor of Justice. The President acts as a continuous check on the 
legislative power controlling the constitutionality of the laws they have issued (and 
ratifies the ones that he/she accepts)
18
. The similar capacity is also in the hands of the 
Chancellor of Justice, but this person/institution can also make decisions on the already 
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 In the following I will discuss the two institutions that will play an important role in this chapter—the 
Supreme Court and the Chancellor of Justice—and leave the President out of the discussion. This is also 
done for the reason that President has many other functions than merely constitutional overview.  
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ratified laws. However, if these institutions want to make their words matter, they have 
to be given amplification though the Supreme Court.   
The first actor—and the most important one—in defending the Constitution, the 
Supreme Court, is not just the highest legal authority in the country but is also an 
institution whose decisions represent the most important interpretation of the country’s 
laws. These interpretations are not just thoughts or representations but set the meaning 
of a particular issue for future debates. The Supreme Court is the only level of the 
Estonian legal system whose decisions matter for a significant period (possibly forever) 
and are routinely referred to in lower courts. Therefore, if something is debated in the 
Supreme Court, it is possible to argue that the decision about this issue in Estonia is 
now achieved (at least what concerns its legal implications). Although law in practice is 
enacted in various ways that might not correspond to the official understandings 
(Marusek, 2012), the Supreme Court could not be simply ignored, especially by those in 
the state apparatus. It is thus highly significant that debates about parking have reached 
that court level. Parking a car in a place where it is not allowed or not paying for the 
parking might seem to be straightforward matters: if the vehicle has not followed the 
rules (and that is not difficult to ascertain) then a penalty is levied on the driver. 
However, parking regulations have not appeared as such simple matters and the 
questions of how to punish, who is allowed to do so, how to punish the right subject 
have been asked throughout the post-Soviet years in Tallinn. 
The second actor, the Chancellor of Justice, is an influential state institution
19
 that 
functions as a constitutional reviewer of the state’s decisions, being also an Estonian 
form of Ombudsman to whom an individual may turn when s/he feels that her/his rights 
are violated by some state authorities, as is the situation in the case discussed in what 
follows in the chapter. The state apparatus thus has an inbuilt friction between 
institutions, some of which—such as the Chancellor of Justice—could side with 
demands of particular citizens and initiate the ruling out of decisions by other state 
institutions. Even laws made in the Parliament could be considered unconstitutional by 
the Chancellor of Justice. However, the Chancellor becomes a powerful actor only 
through its alliance with the Supreme Court that in the case of contradiction with other 
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 The institution with such a name and function exists only in three countries (Estonia, Sweden and 
Finland). Nevertheless, similar functions are carried out by different institutions in most of the other 
democratic countries.  
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state authorities (for instance, a City Council or the Parliament) could support (or then 
not support) the Chancellor’s interpretation of constitutionality. It is not only the formal 
structure or the external actors that it assembles that matter, but the capacity of the 
Chancellor of Justice also depends on who acts as the person of the Chancellor. Even 
though the Chancellor of Justice is an institution with multiple employees just like the 
Supreme Court, its driving force is a person called ‘the Chancellor of Justice’ who is not 
merely reactive like courts in general but proactive in setting agendas to issues that in 
his/her opinion need to be solved. The Chancellor who will figure in this chapter (Eerik-
Juhan Truuväli), for instance, is known for having fought against the Soviet legacies in 
the state apparatus (Rask, 2012).  
These actors—the textual actor of the Constitution and two institutional actors (the 
Supreme Court and the Chancellor of Justice)—mainly exhibit the legal rationality that 
is set against the administrative rationale of the local government in the following 
treatise of parking regulations.  
6.3 Methods of enforcement in paid parking systems 
An urban life contains various particular concerns about how the city should be ordered 
(such as fire safety or waste management) amongst which are problems posed by the 
management of traffic. The Constitution cannot simply solve practical questions as it 
merely distributes rights and duties. Other institutions must then intervene to address 
these practical concerns of governing; active in the issues discussed in this chapter were 
particularly the national parliament (Riigikogu), the Government of the Republic of 
Estonia and the local government. The Parliament seeks to solve particular concerns of 
the society via laws, the Government by issuing policies and managing certain social 
areas in the ministries, and the local government—with the executive and legislative 
function more intermixed than at the state level—by managing particular questions of 
the social order. Those state authorities do not work smoothly together as they exhibit 
diverging understandings of what should be regulated and in what way. All of them, 
moreover, can contradict the primarily legal rationality exhibited by the two 
constitutional actors introduced in the previous section (the Supreme Court and the 
Chancellor of Justice) along with the non-human actor of the Constitution active in their 
deliberation.  
108 
As Tallinn city centre began to be gradually overtaken by the increased use of 
automobiles in the 1990s, local government, influenced by the lobbying work of 
environmentalist groups, introduced paid parking on public streets in March of 1993
20
. 
Paid parking is used all over the world to manage parking spaces in places with high 
demand but limited supply, that is, particularly in the city centre. The paid parking is 
also a revenue source for the city government, while the revenue might then be used to 
develop more sustainable mobilities. Paid parking thus became a prominent measure for 
traffic regulation and also a revenue stream for the city whose finances were curtailed in 
post-Soviet years. Nevertheless, compliance with the measure is not straightforward as 
many drivers might decline or fail to pay. Various principal actors who organised the 
paid parking did not expect that drivers would comply with the new rules but drivers did 
and duly started to pay for the service
21. The ‘working’ of the paid parking, however, 
was not only a factor of drivers’ willingness to pay but was supplemented with 
enforcement.  
In essence there exist two procedures (see Figure 6.1) for finding and penalising anyone 
who does not pay for parking (see Cullinane and Polak, 1992)
22
. The most common of 
them relies on parking wardens
23
 walking on the city streets, noting down cars that 
violate regulations, and fining the ‘aberrants’. The second system relies on locking the 
wheels of a car with a clamp until the driver (or owner or someone else) pays the 
penalty in order to open the clamp and reclaim the car. Invented and patented in Denver, 
Colorado USA
24
 in 1958 by a person named Frank Marugg, the wheel clamp offers a 
simple device for regulation to address the fact that a parking fine has to deal with a 
number of complications depicted in Figure 6.1. Specifically, a fine posted on a car is 
not sufficient to officially notify the transgressor of regulations (sometimes the fine 
indeed might fly away in wind or be ‘stolen’ by a hooligan): it needs to be sent to 
someone. However, the person it is sent to might not live at the official address. It is 
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 Interview no. 8 (16 February 2012) and Interview no. 10 (20 February 2012). 
21
 According to research interviews (Spring 2012). 
22
 The third one, towing, while it may be in some instances used in a paid parking system, it is still mainly 
restricted to cars blocking traffic. 
23
 Some cities (such as Amsterdam) also utilise scan-cars that drive around the streets scanning with 
cameras vehicle number plates making sure who has paid and who not. 
24
 Hence its American name: Denver Boot.  
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also not self-evident that sending the fine to the vehicle owner, as the only person 
whose name and address are available for the enforcement officer, would amount to a 
lawful presumption of liability as someone else might have been driving. Furthermore, 
what happens if the fine is not paid? Are there other procedures to secure the execution 
of the fine or can a person simply not pay it? A wheel clamp, indeed, sidesteps all these 
concerns by reducing the matter of fine and its payment to a concern solved on the city 
street.  
 
Figure 6.1. The comparison of two systems of parking enforcement (parking fine and 
wheel clamp). 
However, because of its effectiveness in assuring the working of the punishment
25
, the 
wheel clamp is highly restrictive for a driver. This has led to opposition in Estonia but 
has also caused outrage in other countries. In England and Wales
26
, for instance, 
although private parking operators have used wheel clamps for more than two decades, 
this has been made illegal under The Protection of Freedom Act since 2012. For state 
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 The effectiveness of wheel clamp was also suggested by Estonian transport experts in research 
interviews. 
26
 In Scotland, under different legal interpretations than England and Wales, the clamping on private land 
has been considered illegal for decades.  
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authorities, though, clamping still remains legal: a situation that is the reverse to the 
Estonian case as will be explained in Episode 1 below (see outline of episodes in Figure 
6.2). However, fines that are ‘durable’ can also be sources of protest. In England and 
Wales, in order for the wheel clamp to be illegalised, a revised system of parking 
charges was developed. The Automobile Association which lobbied for restrictions on 
clamping activity, for instance, notes (AA, 2012) that ‘[f]rom 1 October 2012 there is 
nothing to stop cowboy clampers turning into unscrupulous and heavy handed issuers of 
parking “tickets”.’ A parking ticket, hence, can be as much a source of objection as a 
wheel clamp. Moreover, the UK legislation gave private companies access to the Driver 
and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA) data and allowed them to charge the car keeper 
with paying for the Parking Charge Notice. This legalisation of charging the keeper of a 
vehicle has raised questions among some (activist) drivers (for instance, the National 
Motorists Action Group). Episode 2 described in this chapter will discuss concerns of 
making a parking fine work in Estonia. 
 
Figure 6.2. The timeline of important events in episodes one and two discussed in the 
chapter regarding legal debates of paid parking enforcement. (Riigikogu is the official 
name of the Estonian Parliament) 
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In what follows, I will discuss the evolution of parking penalties through two episodes 
(summarised in Figure 6.2). The first episode concerns the initial implementation of 
paid parking when wheel clamps were used as the principal way of enforcement—a 
measure that was eventually rendered unconstitutional. The second episode discusses 
Tallinn’s paid parking system mainly in the post-clamping context. Even though these 
episodes are structured temporally and thematically in the discussion that follows, the 
temporal and conceptual borders between them are somewhat arbitrary as the episodes 
overlap.   
6.4 Episode 1: The unconstitutionality of wheel clamping  
Before Tallinn’s parking regulations lengthened to become an extensive document with 
sixteen articles divided into a number of sub-articles and sub-sub-articles written in 
legally sophisticated language, they comprised only nine plainly stated requirements on 
one A4-sized page. This document prescribed merely one measure in case of non-
compliance—a wheel clamp. The wheel clamp, however, became contested in 1994 and 
was made completely illegal in 1999. In 1994, the Chancellor of Justice sent a critical 
letter to the Supreme Court to claim the unconstitutionality of wheel clamps. This led 
the Court to deliberate on the device resulting in a short but significant judgment with 
implications for later decisions (Ernits, 2008). The main conclusion of the Court order 
read that wheel clamping was in violation to the article 
§ 32(2) of the Constitution, which gives every person the right to freely possess, 
use and dispose of his or her property, whereas restrictions to this right should 
be established by law. § 154(1) of the Constitution prescribes that all local issues 
shall be resolved and managed by local governments, which shall operate 
independently pursuant to law. To allow for a wheel of a car, which has been 
parked improperly or without a valid ticket, to be locked, constitutes restriction 
of ownership but also means resolving local issues. At the same time there is no 
Act giving local governments the right to prescribe for the use of such means. 
The Tallinn City Council has, without any legal ground, established a possibility 
to lock a wheel of a car, which has been parked without a valid parking ticket or 
improperly, thus restricting the use of property (a car). (Supreme Court of 
Estonia, 1994b; official and original translation) 
In the court proceedings (Supreme Court of Estonia, 1994a; my translation) a city 
representative took a diverging view and pointed out the complications that freedom of 
drivers might cause. He claimed that ‘all rights and freedoms are interlinked. The City 
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Council has a duty to stand for all rights and freedoms. By protecting the rights of some, 
we inevitably restrain the rights of others.’ That is, by allowing some to violate parking 
regulations, others would not be able to find a space for car parking. The only way to 
ensure compliance in the time when the legal framework was still haphazard was a 
wheel clamp. As a city representative in 1994 explained (Supreme Court of Estonia, 
1994a; my translation): ‘In this society considering our specificities it is the only 
option.’ Even though the judges did rule out the use of such a governmental device in 
this particular court case this did not mean the outlawing of paid parking itself. The 
response of the city and the Riigikogu was to devise a new legal document that would 
authorise the governing of paid parking. The subsequent Parking Act was in force from 
1995 until 1999 and made wheel clamping legal; after 1999 it was entirely outlawed 
from the state apparatus in Estonia.  
6.4.1 The birth and demise of a textual actor: The Parking Act 
Making a law was a simple response by governors: wheel clamping appeared 
unconstitutional as there were no words in legal regulations allowing it, so the logic 
went, such words should be included in a new law. The logic assumed that it was not 
ideas or intents that were missing but the right words in the right places. It is not simply 
‘meaning’ or ‘representation’ that is of concern here but specific legal words that could 
invoke associations (that wheel clamping is legal) and allow actions to be carried out (to 
clamp a car). Here, I would like to discuss more this textual actor—the Parking Act 
(Riigikogu, 1995a)—which could alter the power relations in the state. I will first take a 
look at the process of its making by pointing out how tentative and weak even a 
potentially powerful actor is in the course of construction, followed by, then, a 
discussion of its working in practice which raised questions of its effectiveness.  
The Parking Act (Riigikogu, 1995a) was not made by involving widespread social 
debates but neither was it made as simply a backdoor political process by certain 
political forces. It was rather a technocratic law, made to solve a particular problem—
illegality of wheel clamping—although the idea that such a law would be necessary in 
general, was expressed already before. ‘There was a problem and a law was needed’, 
explained one of the Act’s authors to me27. The law entered into parliamentary 
discussions in early 1995 and was finally ratified in the second half of 1995, being 
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subject to heated debates in the number of discussions that it went through in the 
Parliament. The main line of questions that were raised regarded the treatment of car 
drivers by the law. Some of the MPs claimed this document to be too focused on 
punishment and not concerned enough with protecting citizens. In general, the law got a 
frosty reception in the parliament which, according to my interview with the Head of 
Transport Department during that time, was to be expected
28
: ‘In the Parliament, as 
everyone was a car driver, mostly, everybody knew exactly how the life looks from car. 
There was a lot of polemics but it passed. It was astonishing at that time but it passed.’ 
At one moment, the law escaped being rejected by the Parliament by just one vote.  
Several MPs raised concerns during the parliamentary meetings where the law was 
discussed that the Parking Act supports regulators (such as law enforcers and city 
officials) at the expense of drivers. The particular concern was the balance between the 
regulator’s rights and drivers’ rights. According to those MPs, laws should not merely 
be on the side of regulators but should also provide different rights to individuals. This 
claim is interesting considering that the Constitution itself protects individual rights and 
so should the institutions that interpret the Constitution. There is thus an inbuilt 
imbalance in the Constitution, and the imbalance favours the individual. The asymmetry 
could be shifted with the use of laws as, for instance, the Article 32 expresses in relation 
to property: ‘Restrictions shall be provided by law.’ According to the MPs debating the 
parking issues, however, the law should not be used to balance the imbalance. Even 
though the Parking Act was agreed upon at this stage, the fact that it aligned more with 
regulators and with the administrative logic (rather than the legal logic), continued to 
haunt it and contributed to its eventual demise. 
Whereas the Tallinn city ordinance suggested that the whole enforcement system should 
be based on clamping, referring to it as a way of exposing (and penalising) the car user 
or ‘owner’ (which was in brackets in the document, as if it has the same meaning), the 
Parking Act introduced a more complex system of fine making. There were only a very 
limited number of situations in which clamping was to be used: principally, it was 
conceived of as a tool in the cases whereby towing was too complicated. MPs showed 
their aversion towards wheel clamping throughout discussions in the Parliament seeing 
it as reflecting a ‘perverted understanding of justice in society’ or perceiving wheel 
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clamp as a ‘barbarian device’ (Riigikogu, 1995b). To make fines for parking violations 
viable, the system of owner responsibility was created. The Act expressed thus that 
when the actual user of a car is not caught, the fine needs to be paid by a car owner (§ 
3[1]): 
According to this law, the driver is prosecuted in case of parking rules 
violations. If the driver could not be ascertained, then the responsibility lies with 
the owner of the vehicle. (Riigikogu, 1995a; my translation) 
In this way, the aim was to make the control system work outside of the physical urban 
space and rely on the state apparatus of a car ownership register, municipality officials 
behind the desks, and court system (see Figure 6.1). This would be a modern and also 
liberal, that is to say a not-too-intrusive, enforcement system. If a car user failed to pay 
for fifteen days, then the owner received a written statement that required him/her to 
pay. And if s/he also failed to pay then, the ticket became subject to court procedures. 
Relying on court procedures for enforcing the regulation, however, meant slow process 
and as every fine was valid only up to three months, it meant an eventual ineffectiveness 
of the regulation. An MP who was responsible for making amendments to the Parking 
Act thus noted in the parliamentary proceeding:  
Those who know the law leave the fine unpaid. This is the reality at the moment 
because there is no mechanism that secures the functioning of the law. Half of 
those who are fined pay the fine, another half don’t. Several millions [of kroons] 
will not be received. (Riigikogu, 1997; my translation) 
Once a law is made, it itself might not be a stable document but can shift and morph. A 
period for ‘working in’ was considered necessary for the law to gain some ‘actual 
application’ (Riigikogu, 1996, MP Kalev Kukk). However, it appeared during the 
‘working in’ process that the Parking Act would still not be effective enough for 
parking regulations. Two changes were made to the Act in 1997 which, although 
making it more potent for the time being, initiated its complete abolition a year later. 
These changes were as follows: making parking fines valid for a person’s lifetime29 and 
restricting certain procedures in the Vehicle Registry, such as forbidding the change of 
the registered owner in the case of selling the car until the fine was paid. All these 
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 It is interesting that they picked lifetime, instead of a year or two years or something else. However, 
considering that person could just avoid paying fine at all, any period for the cancellation of it could be 
seen as problematic.  
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restrictions amounted to too harsh infringement on freedoms and a year later the 
Chancellor of Justice put together a highly critical assessment of the Parking Act.  
Here we arrive at another moment after the 1994 decision by the Supreme Court 
regarding wheel clamping (Supreme Court of Estonia, 1994b) when different state 
authorities come into contradiction. Whereas Local Council’s powers had been scrapped 
by the Constitution four years earlier during constitutional critique of wheel clamping, 
now parliamentary judgements were also assessed through the Constitution and found to 
have exceeded their possible strength in the Parking Act in seeking to enable the 
collection of fines. Despite being ratified by the Parliament and functioning alongside 
with other laws, The Parking Act, then, did not seem to be such a powerful textual 
actor. The power of another textual actor—the Constitution—was instead evident. In 
this way a text that was a perfectly normal ‘law’ for a certain time period suddenly 
appeared not to be a law at all. In a tautological assertion, the law became an illegal 
legal entity.  
The illegality of law 
The Chancellor of Justice’s argumentation is a good example of how legal logic does 
not understand administrative logic. In his argumentation against the Parking Act in 
1998 (Chancellor of Justice, 1998; my translations)
 
he does not pay attention to the 
actual practices of law enforcement but focuses squarely on abstract understandings of 
the law itself. The Chancellor of Justice started his advice by stating that laws which 
ascribe responsibilities and rights that are not explicitly stated in the Constitution must 
still be following the spirit of the Constitution and be ‘in accordance with the principles 
of human dignity and social and democratic õigusriik [which could be translated as 
‘legal state’ or alternatively also ‘rule of law’; the German concept of Rechtsstaat is 
closest in meaning]’. Even though the cited principles are nowhere defined in his 
document or any other legal document, it did not restrict him from making his 
judgements. The Chancellor of Justice, furthermore, substantiated his critique with 
Article 11 from the Constitution, which states that ‘rights and freedoms could be 
restricted only in accordance with the constitution.’ These ‘restrictions’, however, ‘must 
be necessary in a democratic society and must not distort the essence of restricted rights 
and freedoms.’ He then goes on to define more precisely which rights are restricted by 
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the Parking Act, leading him to eventually declare certain aspects of it to be 
unconstitutional.  
The Chancellor of Justice took principles from the Constitution—such as the right for 
free self-realisation (Constitution Article 19([1]), the right to freely choose an area of 
activity, profession and place of work (Article 29[1]), the protection of property rights 
(Article 32[2]) and the protection of dwelling, real or personal property to be forcibly 
entered or searched (Article 33)—as his starting points to dismantle the car parking 
regulations. As noted above, the Parking Act attempted to introduce owner liability for 
parking violations. The Chancellor of Justice, however, deliberated: 
According to the Parking Act § 3(1) the responsibility in case of parking 
violation relies on the vehicle owner if the driver could not be ascertained at the 
place where the violation occurred. This provision allows to hold the owner 
liable when the fault (intentionality, incautiousness) is missing, which is not in 
accordance with the principle of õigusriik [my italics] fixed in the Constitution 
Article 10. . . .  [A]dministrative liability in case of no-fault behaviour is an 
arbitrariness of state power. (Chancellor of Justice, 1998; my translation) 
The Chancellor further criticises that measures to determine the actual violator are not 
defined in the Act, which for him equated an unconstitutional situation. The Chancellor 
of Justice continues his critique: ‘With restrictions improper to democratic õigusriik the 
law-maker [the parliament] admits the incapability of executive powers [local 
government] to carry out its tasks in regulating parking, ascertaining the violators of 
parking rules and holding them responsible.’ The Chancellor of Justice seems to have 
forgotten here that the capabilities of executive powers rely on the legal framework. 
Laws cannot merely be yardsticks for deliberation but must also perform enabling 
options for governing actions. If the legal framework does not provide possibilities for a 
local government to regulate, then executive power is not able to organise parking, 
determine the violators and hold them responsible. The law, thus, contains in addition to 
the legal logic also elements of the administrative logic targeted to regulating matters.  
The Chancellor of Justice in his critique, however, has highlighted only the legal logic. 
While he is in this opinion critical of the incapacities of the local government, he has 
himself previously limited these capabilities and led to the situation whereby it is 
impossible to ascertain the responsible violator. Wheel clamps, for instance, that he 
strongly criticised four years earlier, would have allowed retaining the car on the spot 
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until a person (who most probably would be the driver) comes to free it. Thus, the 
violator could have been found out this way. However, the Chancellor of Justice again 
directed his critique towards wheel clamping by, first, claiming it to be a double 
punishment as a fine was made alongside the immobility of a vehicle and, second, by 
following a logic according to which the wheel clamp could not fit into Estonian society 
at all:  
[the Parking Act accords the] return of the vehicle and freeing of the wheels . . .  
only when the fine is paid. Therefore a person is punished in a situation where 
the possessing, using, and disposing of his/her property is possible only through 
serving the penalty. Such a situation distorts the essence of the right assured by 
the constitution’s Article 32(2) [right to use property] and is hence not in 
accordance with the constitution’s Article 11 [rights can be restricted only in 
accordance with the Constitution]. (Chancellor of Justice, 1998; my translation) 
It is impossible to imagine a wheel clamp that would allow using the car even if the fine 
is not paid. A wheel clamp is precisely meant to enforce a person to pay the fine, after 
which the device would be removed.  
After receiving the recommendations by the Chancellor of Justice, the Riigikogu had 
twenty days to edit the legal act in consideration so that it would become to be in 
accordance with the Constitution. A meeting was thus held about the Parking Act by a 
parliamentary commission on 24 September 1998. Instead of merely targeting particular 
articles in the Act, the whole Parking Act was disassembled with some of its articles 
moved to other acts and some—such as the wheel clamping—removed altogether from 
the corpus of the law.  
In the interviews I carried out in 2011 some of the respondents expressed criticism of 
this abolition of wheel clamping. A former head of Tallinn Transport Department (in 
1994), for instance, noted ironically
30
: ‘If the driver is not caught on the spot then it was 
thought that there is no need to fine at all.’ An established transport expert also 
expressed his support for wheel clamping devices
31
: ‘I think that wheel clamping is the 
simplest, most banal and effective measure actually.’ Indeed, in a draft Parking 
Development Plan for years 2006–14 transport experts even suggested to bring it back, 
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which nevertheless, did not materialise in the actual political process
32
. In an obscure, 
but telling twist, in recent years some private companies have started to experiment with 
wheel clamping on private land (Lamp and Neeme, 2012; Tamm, 2010). What was 
removed from the law was a right to clamp for state officials, but nobody has said 
anything about what can happen on private land and as we see in the next chapter 
(Chapter 7), private land is seen as a different space with a different set of rules. A car 
parking without paying on the private land reduces possibility for profit and could be 
interpreted as a violation of parking provider’s private interests33. The discussion here 
has thus shown how the target of the Constitutional critique is the state, while private 
actors are allowed to carry out similar activities on privately owned land. We now need 
to consider the meaning of ‘property’ and how this category functions in relation to cars 
in order to understand these contradictions of the legal logic exhibited by the Chancellor 
of Justice and the Supreme Court and the administrative logic primarily possessed by 
the local government.  
6.4.2 Powers in the state apparatus re-ordered by the category of 
‘property’: the argument for post-socialism 
Both the Supreme Court as well as the Chancellor of Justice attached a legal category of 
property to the car. The car thus entered into a different sphere of regulation than traffic 
engineers in Estonia could understand at the time or afterwards. In that way we can 
observe how various state institutions see things differently: where constitutional 
authorities deliberate through individual rights—such as the right to use property—
administrative authorities are more interested in solving particular problems. The 
invocation of private property mattered in two ways in the re-ordering of powers inside 
the state apparatus. 
First, by evoking property, the citizen in relation to a car—a car-citizen (see Section 
3.3)—became a state-level issue of citizen rights. Regulations of parking that took place 
on the local government level, hence, appeared as violations against the idea of the free 
citizen. By its definition the wheel clamp restricts the use of a car: it materially blocks 
wheels so that the car cannot leave unless the wheel clamp is unlocked. Such blocking 
of the use of an individual vehicle amounted in the court’s interpretation to an 
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unconstitutional situation. The court asserted that private property is a constitutionally 
defended ‘object’ which cannot be governed merely according to local government 
deliberation but needs a clear basis in state level documents—namely in Acts made in 
the Riigikogu. As the use of wheel clamps by either police or municipal employees was 
not prescribed by any such Act, the municipality violated the Constitution when they 
‘legalised’ clamping through their own ordinance (a by-law). In the US legal system, 
this logic would mean that due to being defined as property, cars do not fall under the 
capacity of ‘police power’ possessed by local states as discussed in Section 3.2. 
Second, attaching the category of private property to cars brings in the notion of 
freedom. Private property evokes freedom to use the object. Even though state actions 
are necessary to restrict other individuals from using the entity (that is, steal it), the use 
of property also entails limits to the state. In Estonia, the Article 32 of the Constitution 
provides everyone with ‘the right to freely possess, use, and dispose of his or her 
property.’ Even though the same article provides possibilities to limit this right pursuant 
to law and by following principles of the ‘public interest’, the limitations themselves 
must be in accordance with the Constitution (Ernits, 2011). The Constitution, however, 
is skewed towards individual rights as discussed in Section 6.2. Therefore, and as the 
Chancellor of Justice’s argumentation in the case study above particularly shows, 
constitutional reasoning provides rights to citizens in opposition to the regulatory 
actions of the state’s executive power. The rights of car-citizens were considered 
principal to the extent that some policies of the local government were rendered invalid. 
Even though the enforcement of the law in order to restrain other individuals to use or 
damage the property is expected from the state, reference to private property allows 
drivers and owners enjoy the capability to keep some of the unwanted state actions at 
bay. 
These inner contradictions in the state evoked by defining something as property links 
historical concerns of ‘freedom’, state power and ownership to the management of 
parking. In Chapter 4, I introduced the aspiration to re-consider post-socialism as a de-
territorialised concept. Post-socialism as a de-territorialised concept applies to specific 
details or aspects rather than the whole ‘condition’ of a society. In principle, a strong 
investment in freedom is not specific to a post-socialist area nor is it specific to a 
particular post-socialist condition. The same applies for various concerns about the use 
of excessive state powers. Moreover, not every country in the supposedly post-socialist 
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region has the same concerns as in Estonia: in Latvia and Czech Republic, for instance, 
wheel clamping takes place. With the use of post-socialism, however, the aim here is 
different than to argue for the internal commonality of a post-socialist region or its 
uniqueness in comparison to other parts of the world. Instead, I argue that there is a 
local and specific post-socialism in the sense that history and present conditions interact 
with each other. Here, the past comes to matter as a counter-past—a negation of 
previous practices which is defined in the thesis as a counter-continuity. As a legal 
scholar and a former head of the Supreme Court, Rait Maruste (1997, p. 4), expressed, 
‘the Soviet system was what it was, but ruler-friendly and [rule-]permissive it certainly 
was.’ The new and free Estonia had to be different—one where the individual enjoys 
more freedom and power and the state, thus, is limited. The danger for the free Estonia 
was to become again an administrative country instead of a legal one as the Chancellor 
of Justice claimed. He furthermore argued (Truuväli, 1994; my translation):  
A public servant does not know the law and because he does not know it, he 
starts to interpret it as he understands it. But this is not the law of the Republic of 
Estonia anymore but the official’s law. This is then followed by a procedure or 
rule by this official, which generally can only be against the law. There is clearly 
a tendency of deepening arbitrariness of officials. . . .  The worst is the situation 
where every public servant is like a small prince who decides the extent, subjects 
and the like of the use of the law.  
Administrative logic should not be the basis for governing according to the Chancellor 
of Justice (a thinking usually supported also by other actors who defend the 
Constitution). According to this thinking, governing should be based on the legal logic 
exhibited by laws and, in particular, the Constitution. By explicitly proclaiming the aim 
to be the avoidance of Soviet practices, various particular aspects—such as the 
prioritisation of law and the Constitution in front of administration—become post-
socialist in the sense that they are anti-continuity. The way in which the Chancellor of 
Justice opposed deliberation by an administrator, referring to his/her interpreting the 
law as a ‘small prince’ echoes a very different understanding of urban governing than 
Valverde’s (2012) discussion of paternal city authorities (see Section 3.2). In Estonia, 
the directive diagram of a local government is curtailed as it is not supported by a legal 
power that places freedom of individuals over their governing.  
However, that is not the end of the story. As this section showed, the Parking Act was 
introduced in order to govern parking violations when problems with previous ways of 
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regulations emerged. Furthermore, the paid parking in its entirety has not been 
challenged. There are thus also other rationalities at play in addition to the legal one, 
such as those which still find ways to argue for the regulations of car parking. The 
particular one here is the rationality emerging from the materiality of parked cars.  
6.5 Episode 2: Owner responsibility and the materiality of car 
Episode 2 pushes off from Latour’s (1992, p. 229) suggestion that to understand what 
non-humans do, one needs to think what humans or other non-humans have to do when 
a particular thing is not there. When the wheel clamp was out of the picture, the 
activation of paid parking necessitated a scheme that would be as durable as the wheel 
clamp, only more acceptable from the point of view of citizen rights. Considering that 
wheel clamps provided a strong incentive for payment as the car was effectively not 
usable, construction of the durability relying on the apparatus of the state (parking fine) 
rather than physical devices on the street (wheel clamp) could not be expected to be as 
simple (see Figure 6.1). Even though fines for parking violations were already 
introduced to the legal system with the Parking Act in 1995, their functioning had 
multiple problems within this law. However, when the law was abolished in 1999, a 
time of uncertainty in terms of regulatory procedures emerged—with the city often 
failing to receive what it planned from paid parking (Ammas and Peensoo, 2000; Ilves, 
1999; Kurm, 2000)—until the system stabilised at the end of 2002.  
The debate about parking fine legality was initiated by a legal case shortly after the 
wheel clamp was considered illegal and removed from the corpus of the law. On 19 July 
2000 a particular person J. K. parked her Ford in a paid parking zone in Tallinn without 
paying the fee. A parking controller caught the car and wrote out a parking ticket. 
Following laws at that time, the city directed the fine to the car owner: which in that 
case was Ühisliising AS—a company that specialised in offering cars on lease34. That 
company, however, decided not to accept the liability for the penalty and argued against 
the issued fine in court
35
. This case went through two lower level courts and ended up in 
the Supreme Court which overturned previous decisions and gave victory to the 
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 Even though the sum was small, winning in court allowed changing the governmental practice and, 
hence, benefitting the company in a number of other similar occasions. 
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company (Supreme Court of Estonia, 2002). In its decision, the Supreme Court argued 
that all possible efforts need to be made to find out the actual driver (and, hence, the 
violator of the law) and not presume the guilt of a vehicle owner (who in that case was a 
car-leasing company). The Court insisted that it is not enough to merely write the 
vehicle registration number or the name of the vehicle owner on the penalty notice. 
Instead, a parking fine should contain the name of the person who had wronged. This 
decision implied that the parking enforcement must work by knowing the actual driver. 
By the judges’ logic, the vehicle owner cannot be the target of the fine even when that 
person could easily reveal the actual aberrant.  
This decision of the Supreme Court was a basis for legal changes. In a parliamentary 
meeting where the Court decision was discussed after it was made, the Minister of 
Justice explains that without finding out the actual driver ‘it has not been possible to 
explain guilt, not possible to provide mitigating or aggravating circumstances’ 
(Riigikogu, 2002a; my translation). The governing procedure appeared hence as unjust 
for the minister. In celebration of the Riigikogu’s and the Supreme Court’s decision, an 
editorial piece (Postimees, 2002, my translation) in the biggest daily newspaper 
claimed: ‘A parking controller has to find out who has parked wrongly and to write the 
ticket to that person.’ In the final sentence of the article, the editors claim that ‘the 
acceptance of parking rules is a part of the traffic culture’ and that ‘the name of each 
improperly parked person should be added in red letters to the list of wrongdoers.’ 
However, the court, the Parliament and the newspaper all forgot that it was almost 
impossible for the law enforcement to know who was in the car when it was parked.  
As cities lost the opportunity to use anonymous procedures for finding out parking 
offenders due to the Supreme Court decision and the following actions of the Riigikogu, 
the Tallinn city government invented a detour for some months in 2002, disbanding it 
only when the eventual legal changes were made. The response by city officials was 
what Revell (1999) describes as an ‘institutional counterpunch’, in that case, city 
governors reacting to legal limitations using whatever tools legal frameworks allow. 
The measure invented could be conceptualised as a more complex form of wheel clamp. 
Even though it worked without locking the wheels of cars, cars were detained until the 
driver paid the fine. Namely, the city added a number of traffic signs allowing towing to 
be used not only in the case of cars blocking the traffic—which had been the previous 
use of the particular sign—but also when drivers had not paid for their parking. In this 
123 
way, the city followed an administrative logic—particular things needed to be solved, 
whatever the ideology represented by the legal framework—and caused strong critique 
from the public and some experts (Rooväli, 2002b). Such exceptional ways of 
regulating did not cause any sympathy from media or observers inclined towards the 
legal logic. According to the legal logic, parking offences should not be treated any 
differently from other car-related offences such as speeding or drink-driving. A police 
commissar and later a lawyer argued that police have accepted that it is not possible to 
punish all individuals who drink-drive or speed. In case of parking, then, parking 
attendants were expected to be like police catching only a limited number of offenders 
and hoping that this activity will deter people from law violations in general (ibid.).  
However, the analogy of driving violations cannot be transposed to the parking 
offences. Namely, car parking is configured in a way that would not allow the 
identification of any of the aberrants as policemen do when catching a lawbreaker. In 
the case of drink-driving or speeding
36
 there is a driver in the car when the police stop 
it; in the case of parking, there is nobody in the car when the controller turns up. The 
option could be that a controller waits until the driver arrives but that would mean 
putting each parking officer to wait at each car that violates parking rules in order to 
issue a parking fine. The waiting period might last hours if not more.  
This problematic is old, encountered already by American cities in 1930s (Norton, 
2008, p. 156) and was easily visible for the city of Tallinn officials who stated these 
concerns publicly (for instance, Delfi, 2002; EPL, 2002; Rooväli, 2002a). The 
Association of Estonian Cities drafted an official letter (Association of Estonian Cities, 
2002) to the Parliament pointing out the deficiencies of current regulations and urged 
for new legal remedies. The letter stated (my translation) that the ‘Finnish legal system 
allows holding a parking violation against the vehicle owner (leaving a parking ticket 
anonymously on the windshield). But in Estonia, under the flag of õigusriik the solution 
could not be found.’ This statement strongly condemned the legal rationality which was 
detached from the actual practice. One can presume a driver to be guilty in the legal 
regulation, but in practice there is no way to catch the driver on the scene of the parking 
offence.  
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 Speed cameras, of course, might seem to offer a counter-point here. Nevertheless, they often take a 
photo of the driver through the windscreen in order to avoid possible disagreement (especially when 
speeding tickets are criminal offences).  
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The only way fines for parking offences could work is by noting down the license plate 
number and instituting the governmental process following an assumption that the one 
responsible is the person whose details are in the registry—that is, the vehicle owner (it 
should be repeated here that this person might not be the same as the driver). So, as the 
driver cannot be caught on the spot by the warden, the only person officially connected 
to the car—a vehicle owner—should be considered the one responsible for facing 
consequences unless he/she provides details of the actual driver. The procedure should 
commence thus by assuming the responsibility of the fine payment by a vehicle owner. 
Such a system was, indeed, eventually developed in Estonia, albeit with significant legal 
manoeuvring.  
6.5.1 The ‘legal fix’: Re-defining parking fee 
The legal fix was ratified in the Parliament on 11 December 2002 and put into effect on 
30 December 2002. This change was filled with hopes for achieving stability in the 
parking regulations. The same Minister of Justice who appeared in the previous section, 
claimed: 
I stress that finally we may achieve that this old theme – parking regulations – 
will be regulated in consonance with the Constitution. (Minister of Justice in 
Riigikogu, 2002b; my translation) 
This set of changes introduced a whole selection of new features
37
 and has stabilised the 
parking regulations for now. The ‘legal fix’ relied on an important ontological but also 
practical change: the legal definition of parking fee as a ‘tax’. To understand the 
question of ‘tax’ versus ‘fee’ we, however, should go back to a Supreme Court decision 
from 2001 which assessed whether a parking fee is a service fee, a tax, or something 
else altogether. This decision was deliberated on and ultimately made by the 
involvement of the general colloquium of the court—16 Supreme Court judges in total. 
It was a spectacular display of legal brainpower in relation to an ordinary urban 
governing technique which thus did not appear very ‘ordinary’ at all.  
In its decision on 7 December 2001, The Supreme Court (see Supreme Court of Estonia, 
2001) reached the conclusion that a parking fee should be seen as a service fee. It could 
not be defined as a tax because it does not accord to all the characteristics that a tax 
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 Importantly, for instance, 15-minute free parking on all paid parking places 
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should have resulting from a legal problematic that there does not exist any legal ground 
(i.e., no words in law) that would give the municipality such a right. So, the court’s 
logic was: as the parking fee exists it could not be a tax because if it would be defined 
as a tax it could not exist. However, some reasons for seeing payment for parking as a 
tax are attributable to the fee’s features. The Court elaborates (point 32; my translation):  
This is a fee that is levied on the service provided by the city, a fee for the use of 
public good. The aim of imposing such a fee in the city centre is to reduce 
traffic, offering a parking service for those who need to drive in the city centre 
and directing collected fees to the city budget which revenues will be used to 
improve traffic regulation. 
Here, the Supreme Court agrees with the city of Tallinn’s elaboration of a ‘parking fee’ 
as a regulatory tool. This time the Court seemed to have followed the ‘administrative 
logic’, positioning the necessity to govern urban materiality above abstract rights 
between citizens and the state. There were, however, four dissenting opinions in The 
Supreme Court, with one of them being signed by three judges bringing the number of 
dissenting judges to a total of six (from 16). These dissents draw mainly from an 
understanding that the parking fee is a tax, as it does not offer a service in response to 
the fee payment. These opinions also criticised the Court’s ‘administrative logic’ 
accusing the Court of mixing up a legal and an administrative reasoning. One dissenting 
judge assesses (my translation): 
I cannot agree with the argumentation that the parking fee is not a tax just 
because it does not accord to all the prescription levied for taxes by the Tax 
Regulations Act. Extrapolating such thinking would allow levying on people 
hundreds of different tax duties that are tax from their content but where one of 
the tax attributes is omitted. 
The fourth dissenting opinion backed by three judges also elaborates on the meaning of 
paid parking (my translation): 
Of course the driver who has paid a parking fee receives from the city a certain 
benefit – the right to park. However, from the point of view of traffic 
regulations, this benefit is not dominant in the parking fee. Dominating are 
taxing elements. I think that [The Supreme Court] general colloquium has over-
emphasised the parking benefit given to the driver. I repeat here that more 
important is that the parking fee enforces driver to avoid parking in the city 
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centre and to weigh for how long he would leave his vehicle in the priced 
parking zone. 
The logic of this dissenting opinion clearly separates parking from the sphere of traffic; 
it positions paid parking as a separate domain from governmental technologies 
regulating traffic. Paid parking is defined by these judges as a tax that the city 
government levies and while they see the potential effect on shaping drivers’ behaviour, 
they do not define paid parking as regulating car use in general and thus not as an aspect 
of traffic (see Section 3.4).  
Although they were dissenters in this court case, their logic of parking fee as a tax won 
over other interpretations in 2002 and ‘parking fee’ became the eighth local tax in 
Estonia. In the legal practice, the court’s decision did not settle the ontological position 
of ‘parking fee’ and with subsequent debates in the Parliament it was still framed as a 
tax. However, rather than being interested in the meaning of ‘parking fee’, as the 16 
judges were, such decision by the Parliament rested on the necessity of regulation—
possessing, thus, a fair degree of administrative logic—with the legal re-framing then a 
legal fix rather than a principle legal perception.  
The solution—a ‘legal fix’—became successful because of its ability to re-translate 
what a parking fee is. According to what Annemarie Mol (1999) called ‘ontological 
politics’, there are multiple alternative realities where entities are differently defined, 
represented and enacted, depending on the relations within which they are located. In 
the context of paid parking, what used to be a parking ‘fee’ was re-ordered in the legal 
apparatus into an object defined as a ‘tax’. What used to be a ‘fine’, then, became a 
‘delayed payment for tax’. This opened up the capacity of local government to hold 
vehicle owners liable for fine payment. The Minister of Justice ascertained (Riigikogu, 
2002b; my translation)
 that this legal change might raise concerns about ‘what is the 
difference for a person, whether it is a fine or a tax. The effect on the purse is the same.’ 
However, he draws out the crucial difference: 
[A] fine has a punitive character. In case of a fine the causal connection between 
action and consequence needs to be ascertained, in other words, the offender 
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needs to be identified. In the case of the tax we use a different regulation, which 
means that we can use it also towards the owner, transport device user
38
.  
With this reordering of the law, the government has identified someone who pays the 
fine, and if that person is not guilty it is up to the individual to seek reimbursement of 
the fine from whomever s/he deems responsible for the violation. After the re-
translation of governmental objects (fees and fines) the owner liability was transformed 
from an unconstitutional to a constitutional measure. With that retranslation, the 
capacity to act to catch those who avoid paying for the paid parking increased 
tremendously. For instance, procedures by bailiffs who have multiple options—up to 
arresting personal bank accounts—to receive the ‘fine’ from the parking violator 
became possible. Thus, these legal changes have increased the administrative power of 
cities which the legal actors had challenged before.  
6.5.2 Car as a material problem: the argument for ‘materialised’ 
governmentality 
The governing scene in Estonia shifted from legal curtailing of city’s administrative 
power with restrictions on clamping in 1995 and 1999, and abolition of anonymous 
enforcement in earlier parts of 2002, to providing significant capacities—such as 
arresting violator’s assets—by the end of the 2002. These shifts in the governmental 
power bring the car with its materiality to the fore of the analysis. Namely, the legal 
deliberation cannot neglect the material relations between things in practice. The 
parking enforcement has to find ways for attaching a guilty driver to the parked car for 
which, in actual practice, mediation through an owner is the most viable option. Thus, 
the impossibility of catching the driver on the spot of a rule violation makes it necessary 
to connect an owner to the car-citizenship, therefore bypassing the normal 
understanding of a due process of law. It is significant that despite there being many 
legal challenges to the city’s power, paid parking as a system in general was accepted 
and not challenged. Instead, it was eventually even fortified by lawyers and the 
Riigikogu.  
To understand this process, we should attend to the reasoning provided for the use of 
paid parking. Following these interpretations it is reasonable to claim that ‘the tragedy 
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 In that case we see again how easy it is to conflate owner and driver in the language. The minister 
meant the owner here.  
128 
of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968) resulting from car parking was acknowledged by legal 
actors, even though they questioned the ways that the governing procedures restricted 
freedoms. The reason why the challenge to parking enforcement did not end up as an 
overall challenge to paid parking was due largely to the support for car use that paid 
parking provides. Even if the jurists had significant concerns with challenges to 
property rights and rights of due process, the capacity to increase turnover of parkers 
which also makes parking available for more drivers appeared to rationalise the use of 
this device. In 2001, the Supreme Court (2001; my translation) en banc—cited also 
above—reasoned that ‘parking spaces on public roads, particularly in the city centre, are 
limited public resources the use of which should be regulated between different vehicle 
keepers in a reasonable way.’ ‘The introduction of parking fees’, the court asserted, 
would ‘support the optimal use of the limited resource.’  
The academic literature has indeed noted that car parking in the city is a classical 
‘commons problem’ that is traditionally addressed through paid parking (see, e.g., Jakle 
and Sculle, 2004; Litman, 2011; Marsden, 2006; Shoup, 2005). According to the well-
known urban planning and parking management scholar Donald Shoup, in case of free 
kerbside parking ‘[d]rivers waste time and fuel, congest traffic, and pollute the air while 
cruising for curbside parking, and after finding a space they have no incentive to 
economize on how long they park.’ Through the use of a paid parking system, the 
longer the driver parks, the more money he or she needs to pay, which gives an 
economic incentive to free up the space as soon as possible. This increases the turnover 
rate, hence making the space available for other drivers. Shoup (2005), furthermore, 
cites additional benefits of paid parking as it increases revenue streams to the local 
government. Paid parking, thus, offers a tool to govern car-citizens who without 
regulation would create administrative problems by clogging up streets and parking 
spaces. Restricting behaviour of some drivers benefits the community of drivers as a 
whole. 
The car-citizen who is capable of driving (and parking), hence, needs also to subscribe 
to regulation by government, even if some of the regulations might cause dislike. The 
fact that no two cars can take the same physical spot at the same time means that if 
access for cars is to be provided, it also needs to be managed somehow. This often 
means the increase of the number of parking spaces—which is shown in Chapter 7 
regarding the use of minimum parking standards—but could also entail an 
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administration of existing ones via limiting the time of parking or discouraging parking 
for longer periods by making it more expensive. It is the necessity to maintain access to 
the limited number of parking spaces to a large number of drivers that has led to the 
paid parking system to be defended by the legal actors.  
6.6 The Epilogue: Parking regulations split into two 
Since 2002, parking offences became divided into two. Whatever the perception in 
practice, paid parking was legally seen not as a transport rule but an obligation from the 
state/local government towards its citizens and subject to management by monetary 
methods (tax). Failing to pay in case of paid parking became thus not the same type of 
law violation as, for instance, parking on the grass or on the pavement. The latter type 
of violations form infringement of traffic laws which required different procedures of 
enforcement; namely, making sure who the driver was. However, no anonymous 
procedures were initially allowed in this case. A city transport official complained in the 
media (Kuuse, 2003; my translation) that whereas it became possible to ascertain those 
who did not pay for parking, the ‘[a]ctual violators of traffic rules who have parked their 
car for instance at the bus stop or some other place where it disturbs traffic or is 
dangerous cannot be fined anonymously.’ The only way to punish those drivers was by 
towing their cars, which was still a slow and complicated procedure. Looking back at 
the ongoing problems of dealing with parking delinquents, the transport official pointed 
out that city officials foresaw the problems with the abolition of anonymous procedures 
when they gave comments in a parliamentary committee in 2002 described in the 
beginning of Section 6.5: ‘it was a collective opinion of public servants from various 
cities but we were nullified there and even made fun of’ (Rooväli, 2005; my 
translation). In 2008, however, new changes in legal regulations made fines possible 
once again for all sorts of violations that parked cars caused.  
In that year, it became mandatory for each car owner to record the list of names and 
addresses of those who had used the car and store the list for at least six months. 
Whether one actually did that or not but in case of a parking fine, one had to either pay 
the fine or pay the equal amount to parking fines for not having kept the list of car users. 
That is, such legal changes sanctioned it to be de jure certain who the driver was. When 
a fine was issued based on the vehicle registration number, the owner—when not guilty 
herself—was legally bound to know the details of the actual driver. In that way, lawyers 
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managed to keep the legal principles intact—as the procedure is not de jure 
anonymous—while again making car parking offences governable.  
With all the legal manoeuvring, there are now two different procedures in place to deal 
with parking violations, with two different institutions and sets of inspectors responsible 
for the tasks. One institution and its officials—namely a private company (at the 
moment) working together with the city transport department—controls whether the 
parking fee is paid. The other institution and its officials—a municipality police—
determines if cars are parking where they are allowed to by law. In the central city, two 
sets of different officials control the same physical territory in terms of parking, just 
looking at different types of infringements. Some of the drivers, moreover, have found 
ways to outplay the system by parking their cars in a way that they should receive a 
different fine
39
. The enforcement of car parking, thus, has been a much more 
complicated matter than simply punishing violations as the public, media and even legal 
actors tend to see it. 
The parking situation in Tallinn has become generally more organised with all the legal 
adaptations, but at the same time more complex and with certain inconsistencies that 
although visible for the practitioners of regulations, are difficult to solve in the current 
legal landscape of Estonia.  
6.7 Chapter conclusions 
This chapter brought out the legal, administrative and material complexities of parking 
regulations. Paid parking is on the one hand a minor governmental device and in use all 
over the world
40
. On the other hand, as the case of Tallinn, Estonia revealed, it can also 
be a very complex matter involving various state institutions in frictional relationship 
with each other. 
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 Namely, they park their car in a slightly wrong manner while not paying for parking in the central city. 
Whereas an official employed by the private company writes then a parking ticket out to them, the city is 
obliged to cancel it as the ticket is issued for the wrong cause. The official who introduced me to this case 
claimed there to be a group of such ‘offenders’ who apparently know each other and have coordinated, 
but legal regulations do not offer him any way to actually punish them. 
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 Since 2013, for instance, in Moscow. 
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The investigation of paid parking enforcement in Tallinn highlighted the importance of 
the materiality of cars in the urban environment. There was at least two ways in which it 
occurred in the analysis. First, the materiality of cars is important for how it needs to be 
regulated. As objects with a significant size, cars cause problems for accommodation in 
the city, especially in the zones with high demand such as the city centre. Paid parking 
has offered a way to govern the demand and supply, which accelerated its introduction 
in Tallinn after the end of the Soviet time when the car ownership level was in fast 
increase. Second, the episodes of parking enforcement in this chapter demonstrated the 
way in which materiality entered into the field of governing by shaping possible tools of 
paid parking enforcement. Namely, the identification of the driver is complicated due to 
the fact that the object the parking enforcement officer deals with is a parked car, with 
the driver not being in the car but potentially hundreds of meters away. The principles 
utilised in cases of traffic enforcement, when the driver is physically in the car, would 
therefore not apply. Governmental procedures, hence, must also work when the driver’s 
identity is not known, by using the vehicle registration number to identify a responsible 
individual. That ‘responsible individual’, however, is not necessarily the actual driver. 
Holding this person liable for payment of the fine is therefore a departure from legal 
principles of not holding an individual responsible for something they have not done. 
Such derogation, nevertheless, as legal actors faced in the chapter, is necessitated by the 
materiality involved in the governing procedures. 
Despite the enforcement procedures being shaped by the materiality of cars, the legal 
logic played a continuously important role in influencing who can govern, in what ways 
and how much. Thus, the police power of the city—via the directive diagram—was 
persistently restricted by the legal logic that was drawing on the principles of freedom 
and individual rights. The problematisations that posed questions of excessive state 
power against which the individuals were considered to be in need of protecting were in 
many ways influenced by the historical narratives. These historical narratives shaped the 
making of the Constitution in the early 1990s with the value of private property strongly 
reinforced. The freedom of the individual contra the state appeared thus to be a 
characteristically post-socialist—as anti-continuity—feature. The case in this chapter 
therefore offered a particular instance for the use of post-socialism as a de-territorialised 
concept: post-socialism applied to the ways in which legal power sought to depart from 
Soviet practices. 
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This chapter therefore showed the tentative capacities of the directive diagram, which 
was challenged constitutionally but still achieved the capacity to regulate that the legal 
actors provided over the course of events in ten years. The next chapter offers a case 
whereby the limits of governing are even further tested. While the city necessitates a 
police type of detailed regulations (as was argued in the section 3.2) there are still 
questions about what should be governed and what not. That is, there are not only 
questions regarding procedures of regulation but also questions regarding whether some 
things would better be omitted from the governing by state authorities—especially that 
of the city government—altogether or not.  
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7 ‘The will to govern’ and the ‘legal void’: governing 
parking on private land 
7.1 Introduction 
The city actually has for quite a long time wasted the opportunity to influence or direct 
parking policy. Because the leading role today, let’s be honest, is in the hands of private 
parking lots.
41
 
There is no legal basis but [the municipality] really wants [to regulate]
42
 
This chapter builds on the previous one by dealing with the contradictions of legal and 
administrative logic in relation to the ‘materiality of governing’/‘governing of 
materiality’ and post-socialism. Departing from the latter chapter, the discussion here 
concerns private land. This chapter argues that attention to materialities and post-
socialism allows us to make sense of the ways in which legal acceptance does not 
necessarily equate regulations, or at least acceptance of the regulations to the extent 
governmental authorities—such as a local state—consider necessary. The chapter thus 
introduces a term ‘legal void’ which describes the porosity of legal framework with 
some activities left out from the tools of governing, to which other similar activities are 
subject. The term ‘legal void’ is developed from the term ‘urban void’ that Jakle and 
Sculle (2004), as well as various architectural studies, use to describe gaps in urban 
space. Such gaps are empty of buildings, but it does not mean that they are nothing: 
they are often in some kind of temporary use or provide habitat for various urban life-
forms. Similarly, the ‘legal void’ does not mean the absence of laws. The ‘legal void’ 
also does not equal with ‘illegal’. It just means the lack of regulations thought necessary 
by (some of the) state authorities (see also Lindahl, 2008, 2010; , 2013 on 'a-legality')
43
.  
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 Interview no. 40 (25 September 2012)  
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 Interview no. 41 (2 April 2013) 
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 The legal void as utilised here is close to a-legality elaborated by Lindahl (2008, 2010, 2013). The legal 
void is similarly outside the strict legal/illegal dichotomy as the actions are complicating the distinction 
between those polar positions. However, departing from a-legality, the actions that legal void discusses 
are defined as legal but just not regulated while a-legality considers also those that might be defined as 
illegal but not enforced. The legal void, more than a-legality, assumes the filling of voids in the legal 
framework, yet the simple filling of gaps by law is assumed less than is done by another notion—(fixing 
a) ‘loophole’.   
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Table 7.1. The matrix depicting the relationship between legality and state regulations 
of social activities or phenomena. 
 Legal Illegal 
R
eg
u
la
te
d
 b
y
 t
h
e 
st
a
te
 
The state regulations match with the legal 
apparatus. The social activity or phenomena is 
legally recognised, categorised and there are 
governmental tools to regulate it (e.g., shop 
licensing, vehicle registry, parking provision in 
new urban development regulated with parking 
standards) 
1) Even though the activity would 
be strictly speaking illegal, it is 
not enforced, or 
2) it is accepted as the normal 
condition by the state 
authorities (see, e.g, the case in 
Chapter 8). That means the 
‘illegal’ activity is in practice 
not illegal (the term ‘a-legality’ 
is more apt here).  
U
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1) A sphere where governing bodies 
want to influence but have currently 
failed for whatever reason (e.g., off-
street paid parking; see the case in this 
chapter) 
2) The lack of regulations is considered 
normal by many actors in the society 
(examples would be many aspects of 
everyday life). There is thus an 
overarching legality but no particular 
parameters subscribed by the state 
about how the activity should be done. 
1) The activity is illegal but law 
enforcement is unwilling or 
unable to deal with it. 
2) The phenomenon/activity is 
illegal and unregulated by the 
state but regulated by non-state 
actors (Borraz and Le Galès, 
2010). This includes also 
activities by organised crime.  
3) The activity has not entered the 
sight of governing who thus 
cannot regulate it. Such activity 
is actually neither legal nor 
illegal; it just does not exist for 
the government.  
 
The Table 7.1 depicts the interplay of the legal and the regulatory and the place of ‘legal 
void’ (the lower left hand cell). The mismatch of the ‘will to govern’ and the law is the 
reason for me to consider legality and regulations as two distinct spheres (the distinction 
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was also already set out in the previous chapter), although none of the distinctions 
between legality/illegality and regulated/unregulated should be seen as strict (hence the 
dotted line in the Table 7.1). Here the distinction between legal and illegal aims to 
capture whether an activity or phenomena is legally recognised and accepted in this 
society at this moment. The distinction between regulated and unregulated considers the 
extent of governmental technologies in regulating the particular activity in discussion. 
The ‘legal void’ is an expression of the failures in materialising the ‘will to govern’ 
(Miller and Rose, 1990; Rose, 1999; Rose and Miller, 1992).  
Whereas it is common to see the local state as a potent actor capable of directing matters 
in its territory (e.g., Blomley, 2011; Jones et al., 2010; Valverde, 2012), this perspective 
exaggerates the capacity of the state. Miller and Rose (1990, p. 11), for instance, already 
argued that ‘the “will to govern” needs to be understood less in terms of its success than 
in terms of the difficulties of operationalizing it.’ Rather than a monologue of governors 
there is ‘heterogeneity, complexity and contradictoriness of state institutions’ (Painter, 
2006, p. 764) where the governing itself is not a coherent process but rather ‘a 
genuinely heterogeneous dimension of thought and actions’ (Rose, 1999, p. 4). The 
various ‘legal voids’, thus, could not simply be filled continuously but rather evoke a 
terrain of complex processes and deliberation between various state and non-state 
actors, whereby it is not certain what should be governed by the state and what should 
remain outside of direct governing by state authorities.  
The cases selected for this chapter highlight the complex relationship between the ‘will 
to govern’ and the legally accepted and normalised. While both of the cases deal with 
the provision of parking on privately owned land plots, they are almost diametrically 
opposite in terms of local government capacities. If a developer in Tallinn would want 
to build 25 or 75 parking lots in a new residential area, the local government can require 
the number to be 50. However, when a land owner wants to provide a public parking 
service as a business on its unused plot, then it can possibly make available 25, 50 or 75 
spaces without any local government intervention. Moreover, the city authorities cannot 
determine which of the privately owned land parcels may be used as parking lots and 
which ones not. The city authorities of Tallinn would not be able to follow transport 
policies in the case of private parking lots. The local state also is not able to ensure 
basic quality of land surface that would avoid oil spills to leak into ground or evade 
gravel and mud to be carried to the public streets by cars. Thus, the situation in Tallinn 
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is that parking on privately owned land is both highly regulated (in the case of new 
developments) and almost not regulated at all (in the case of the use of undeveloped 
land as parking lots). This chapter shows how such situations rely on both materiality, 
with its relation to governmentality, and to historical factors encapsulated by the term 
‘post-socialism’ as a de-territorialised concept (see Chapter 4).  
In terms of materiality, the surface material is a crucial factor in dividing formal from 
informal in the cases reflected here. The selection of paving—paved with stones or 
tarmac or merely with gravel (see examples of the latter in Figure 7.2)—affects what 
governmental technologies state authorities can utilise. In addition to materiality, we 
also need to attend to the historical processes at work. Some of the phenomena that 
governors encountered after 1991 in the process of state building are new (such as 
private provision of parking), whereas some of them have histories in the Soviet time 
(such as the construction of new buildings). The ways in which those processes can be 
dealt with, thus, differ as well. With the old phenomenon it is probable not only that the 
acceptance of regulation exists, but also that the particular technology of governing is 
available. With the new phenomenon, it first needs to be determined in what ways and 
by whom such activity could be governed.  
The chapter is divided into two parts with Section 7.2 discussing parking standards: 
their post-socialist continuity and governmental strength. The second part—Section 
7.3—introduces the off-street parking business and brings out the conditions under 
which they exist in a legal void.  
7.2 Continuity of the technology of government: parking standards 
I start the chapter by discussing the example of strong local government seen through 
the governmental technology of parking standards. I will first set out the nature of this 
expertise and governing tool in general, moving on to discuss its history and 
deployment in Tallinn, and elaborating on why such a strong capacity has emerged.  
7.2.1 Parking standards as a way to govern car use 
The parking standard is a governmental device for urban planners to regulate the 
number of parking spots to be provided in new developments. The standard links the 
number of parking spots with the possible number of cars depending on the type of 
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building planned (for example, one or a set of residential buildings, offices, malls, 
kindergartens). Nevertheless, despite its simple form, it is very difficult to ascertain the 
right relationship between parking lots and cars. For instance, how would anyone know 
the number of cars new residents of a planned apartment building are going to use? 
How many of the residents do not have any car, and how many have one or more? How 
many of those who do not have a car might buy one once they have moved to their new 
residence? Planners, however, from the time when parking standards were taken into 
use in 1935, have not considered those questions to be unanswerable.  
The solution that planners provided does not use sophisticated calculations but is rather 
intuitive (Shoup, 2005). Planners have used different proxies to determine how many 
cars the parking lots and buildings should service. Even though the closest proxy is the 
number of people living, working or visiting the building, such a number is not the 
principal measurement used in the planning process. Instead, the planning process 
operates with physical parameters, such as the number of apartments, floor space size or 
number of chairs in stadiums and concert halls. Even though these proxies suggest how 
many people would use the building, the equivalence between these proxies and the 
number of people actually living, working or visiting the building is still uncertain. 
The main rationale for the existence of parking standards since they were introduced in 
the USA in 1935 has been the concern with the lack of parking spaces resulting in spill-
over to adjacent parking lots and double parking on streets (Shoup, 2005). Parking 
standards, thus, set out the minimum number of parking lots to be provided in new 
developments—these standards are termed ‘parking requirements’. The parking 
requirements were initially relatively unpopular (Ferguson, 2004) and also contested. 
However, they were considered part of zoning and thus a police power (see Section 3.2) 
that local states could use to demand land owners to provide more parking lots on their 
land plots
44
. Since the 1960s almost all of the larger US cities are using this 
governmental device (Ferguson, 2004). The parking standard might have been a 
reasonable measure to deal with problems in the automobile’s earlier years, but its 
continuation to this day has resulted in multiple negative outcomes pointed out by 
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Shoup (2005). By defining the parking problem as a lack of available parking spaces 
whereas the way to solve it was considered to be enlarging the number of spaces 
provided, parking standards have led to a situation wherein drivers park for free for 
most of the time and forget the price of parking, which is bundled into building costs 
paid by everyone (even those who do not use cars) effectively supporting extensive car 
use (Shoup, 2005).  
Even though the main use of parking standards has been for setting parking 
requirements and supporting car use they can contain different rationales. Namely, some 
cities have started to define the maximum number of parking spaces to be provided. 
Such technology—named ‘parking cap’ (Shoup, 2005)—aims to curtail the designation 
of space for parking and thus to limit the use of cars. The form of parking cap is the 
same as that of parking requirement—designating a number of parking lots per various 
proxies—but the difference is in the semantic device in front of the number: maximum 
instead of minimum.  
Both of those rationales can be seen as examples of a directive state. The state—a local 
government in this case—intervenes to the matters of private land and designates what 
can be done and what not. However, the parking requirement and the parking cap differ 
in the ways they govern: while the parking requirement levies a duty on land owner, the 
parking cap designates a limit to the practices of private actors with no demands for 
action in itself. In Estonia, to which I turn next, they have nevertheless merged into one 
governing device and often used the same way. 
7.2.2 Parking standards in Estonia 
The structure of parking standards 
In Estonia, parking standards are in wide use and are especially significant in the 
biggest city of the country—Tallinn. Parking standards in Tallinn are regulated through 
two main documents: the Estonian Standard for Streets (EVS 843, 2003) and the 
Development Plan for Parking in Tallinn 2006–14 (Stratum, 2005). The first is a semi-
legal document applying to the whole country. It is itself unenforced (thus voluntary) 
but could become obligatory if attached with correct words to the planning document. 
The latter document—the Development Plan for Parking—is ratified by the Tallinn City 
Council and is compulsory for all new developments in the territory of the city.  
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Interviews in the city departments responsible for the use and enforcement of the 
document always involved direct references to the ‘table’ (which is also in its form a 
table) designating the proposed number of parking lots in the Development Plan for 
Parking in Tallinn. The informants often put the ‘table’ on the desk in front of me as if it 
were the table itself that should speak, rather than a governor. Indeed, according to 
interviews in the local government, but also with real estate developers, the ‘table’ is 
considered to be a strong tool of local governance, difficult to escape from even if they 
wanted to.  
The ‘table’ is similar wherever in the world such a governing device is used, although it 
still exhibits some differences. The parking standards in Tallinn are regular ones in the 
way in which they divide functions of buildings and the way in which the number of 
parking lots are related to characteristics of the development. The parking standards of 
Tallinn divide building functions into 32 categories which form 15 major categories that 
designate, then, a certain number of parking lots per floor area of buildings. However, 
apart from the universal features described, Tallinn parking standards have variations 
that not every parking standard has. The most visible of those is the designation of the 
city into three zones: the city centre, the intermediate zone and the edge city. The city 
centre is defined exactly along particular streets. The zone named ‘edge city’, however, 
is defined more loosely as ‘an area at the bordering zone of the city designated for 
private dwellings in the Comprehensive Plan’ (Stratum, 2005). The intermediate zone is 
defined as everything that remains between the two.  
With the city divided into three zones, the zones can have different values and even 
different rationales, as is the case in Tallinn. In the city centre, the standard sets the 
maximum number above which parking places should not be constructed. While the 
intermediate zone designates the same number as the city centre it is a ‘minimum’. In 
the edge city, however, the ‘minimum’ requirement is set even higher than in the other 
two zones. In the city centre, thus, the Tallinn parking standard is a ‘parking cap’ while 
in the intermediate and the edge city it is a ‘parking requirement’. Even though Shoup 
(2005) saw those two as diametrically opposed, they exist alongside each other in the 
case of Tallinn. However, as I argue below, one should not exaggerate the rationale of 
the parking cap in Tallinn, since the way that it is incorporated into governing practices 
is not entirely as a limit to parking provision. The city of Tallinn has made the parking 
cap into a more directive governing tool than its form actually suggests.  
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The city is concerned with the provision of parking 
Most of the city of Tallinn is covered by the minimum parking standards where the 
principal rationale has been the provision of parking lots. In principle, a developer is 
asked to provide as much parking as possible and no less than, for instance, one per 
apartment or one per 80 square metres of space in office buildings.  
Cars brought to a standstill in streets impede the flow of motor vehicles, and the 
unimpeded flow of traffic has been an important concern in Tallinn as in many other 
cities for centuries. The aim to sustain circulation in cities has been a concern for police 
power of city government as discussed in Section 3.2. The very first post-Soviet 
transport development document for Tallinn already expressed (Stratum, 1992, p. 58; 
my translation) that ‘[p]arking restrictions on artery roads in the centre [are aimed] to 
increase their capacity which presumes reconstruction of junctions and construction of 
new off-street parking lots.’ This idea was then carried through to future documents in 
both urban and transport planning. Of the five main problems of transport that the 
Comprehensive Plan of Tallinn (Tallinn City Council, 2001) points out, one concerns 
‘extensive parking on the city centre main streets [that] limits their capacity and traffic 
safety’ (my translation). The same idea is reflected in Parking Development Plans. In 
the most recent Parking Development Plan in Tallinn, the aim of the transport policy is 
the ‘reduction of parking on public traffic areas, especially in the city centre’ (Stratum, 
2005; my translation). Car parking in the streets is considered the impediment to the 
flow of traffic while the provision of parking lots outside the street space is seen as an 
option to allow traffic to flow effectively. This is the reason to use minimum parking 
standards demanding off-street parking spaces in Tallinn as well as in many other cities 
in the world. 
Furthermore, over time the city has increased parking requirements. The parking 
requirement for a two-bedroom apartment has shifted from 0.9 in the 1990s and early 
2000s to 1.4 since 2010, whereas the requirement for a three-bedroom and larger 
apartment has changed from 1.1 to 1.6. This is an increase of almost fifty per cent. If 
before 2006 one could designate about 250 square metres of parking for a building with 
10 flats, then nowadays the parking requirement is already 375 square metres. The 
difference—125 square metres—could be either two mid-sized apartments in the 
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building or a large children’s playground on the property. Aggregated in that way, the 
changes in parking standards are enlarged into more significant effects.  
With the critique of minimum parking standards common in transport planning (in 
particular, Shoup, 2005) one might indeed expect the same in Tallinn. Nevertheless, 
while the questioning of such minimum standards exists in Tallinn—drawing mainly 
from the concern for the quality of space (as well as the principles of liberalism; see 
below in this section)—it is primarily a concern amongst some of the transport 
researchers and activists, and its effect remains limited. Furthermore, whereas the 
alternative parking standard—the parking cap which in principle is a governmental 
technology seeking to limit parking as a way to shape transport choices—exists in 
Tallinn as well, its true function is not put into practice. The maximum standard, 
although clearly expressed in the document, is not really used as a ‘maximum’ but 
rather as an ‘exact number’. Instead of leaving it for developers to decide in accordance 
with the maximum limit, the city states exactly how much parking should be provided 
in a new development. In answers to my question about how city authorities decide on 
the amount of parking a new development should have, two officials responsible for 
parking standards had discarded the words ‘minimum’ and ‘maximum’ and expressed 
that ‘based on the table it is said how much’45. The table, however, does not in fact 
indicate ‘how much’ but just ‘no more than...’ and ‘no less than...’.  
What is more, the ‘no more than...’ inscribed into the parking standards does not act as a 
tool out of the desire to limit the general car use in Tallinn, but rather it is utilised when 
other factors already complicate the provision of car parking. The most important of 
such factors—especially in the city centre where the maximum standard is in use in 
Tallinn—is the size of the land plot. In my hope to learn about sustainable mobility and 
the desire to limit car use from the urban planning department I was disappointed. The 
Head of the department
46
 rationalised the maximum standards simply: ‘because the city 
centre is dense with only some gaps . . .  and often the lots are small’. Thus, while it is 
true that the restrictions of car use with the aim of changing people’s mobility choices is 
given some attention in the policy documents, as well as in public appearances of 
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politicians and officials
47
, these ideas have not yet been translated into practice. The 
parking cap, which is the principal parking regulation for restricting car use, has not 
really become part of the active policy of those who govern, being itself more ordered 
by other concerns such as the material reality of urban environment that simply does not 
allow providing more spaces than are designated by the ‘cap’. 
Parking standards as characteristics of a strong state 
The local government of Tallinn, according to interviewed real estate developers, has 
been persistent and strict in following parking standards. Even when developers have 
wanted to provide less than the minimum requirement dictates, the city has tended to 
decline to offer such relaxation of their own standards. Such a strong state has caused 
some critique and not just by transport experts as referred to above but by developers as 
well. 
The principal line for the critical comments is that of liberalism. This perspective poses 
the question about the extent to which government should be allowed to direct the 
actions of private individuals (which also includes companies). As one of the 
interviewed planners
48
 explained: ‘It is a question that a person is not an idiot: she can 
decide on her own, not that an official from the city decided that “No, you have to have 
a car”.’ Her viewpoint saw the decision regarding parking provision in new 
developments as belonging to the developers’ business capabilities. It would be up to 
them to figure out whether they are able to sell apartments without parking spaces or 
not. The availability of a parking space for an apartment would then be just another 
character of the property, like availability of whirlpool bathtubs (to use the architect’s 
example) or other amenities, and a buyer can then select whether he/she wants that 
apartment or chooses a different one. In the end, developers act within the limits of 
financial possibilities measured according to the cost of buildings and the price they can 
ask for the apartments. This would put a tight limit on, for example, simply hiding a 
large number of parking spots in multiple floors underground. In an interview, a 
developer with several years of experience as a member of executive board in one of the 
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biggest real estate companies explained
49
 how underground parking—especially of 
multiple floors—‘is not realistic’. He pointed out a case where his company calculated 
the costs and found out that just the cost of construction would become already the same 
as the price of nearby properties. This would essentially mean that they had done ‘three 
years of unpaid work in the development’. According to him, this is not the way 
markets work. The built things need also to be sold. The city can think of different kinds 
of policies but they would not ‘be realistic’ (to use the expression of this developer).  
Despite such critiques, which arise from the prominent logic of liberalism, parking 
standards exist and are in constant use by municipal authorities. Parking standards are 
one of the ‘directive hands’ of the city, as one of the interviewed developer asserted50. It 
is one of the three key issues alongside landscaping and the building itself that the city 
considers in regard to the new developments
51
. Essentially, the city treats the minimum 
parking standard as a way of solving parking problems that otherwise would become 
problems of public policy using the finances of private actors. In effect, requiring 
parking to be provided is a form of taxing private land owners and developers.  
Governmental rationale, however, sees parking as a need that cars will have wherever 
they are, leading the city to be concerned with problems that emanate when there are not 
enough parking spaces provided. During interviews, officials pointed out examples in 
which parking was left unconstructed in new developments, resulting in cars parking on 
public streets nearby and thus reducing the driving space. Parking, to use an example 
from an interview with a parking operation business
52
, appears like a need to go to the 
bathroom. It is, hence, not like a whirlpool tub—as one architect suggested53— the 
presence of which one could enjoy, but whose absence would not be a problem. Rather, 
regulated parking is something without which the practice would be carried out in other 
locations, hence, causing problems. The city prefers to have more parking spaces even 
in the city centre where the ‘table’ otherwise proclaims to cap parking.  
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In the case of parking standards, the local government in Estonia is active and strong in 
succeeding in implementing their regulations. While it is significant that the city 
manages to require private land owners and developers to put their money into 
constructing parking lots via parking requirements, an even more significant sign of the 
capacity of the municipal directive diagram is its use of parking cap as a tool for 
requiring parking spaces. Both parking requirement and parking cap are thus instances 
of the directive diagram possessed by the city of Tallinn.  
7.2.3 Parking standards as ‘post-socialist’ 
To assume a straightforward causal homology between liberalism and capitalism 
overlooks the fact that governing practices embody their own histories and develop their 
own rationalities which may or may not link up with the dictates of capital. (Isin, 1998, p. 
171) 
Despite shifts in the state role whereby it is less powerful in directing urban 
development than it was in the Soviet era (Ruoppila, 2007), parking standards 
demonstrate the significant capacities of the state. Such capacities, however, are not 
newly formed but rely on the continuities of practices with former socialist times. 
Therefore, even though one can reasonably argue for a significant rupture in the ways 
the state functions there are still significant continuities if one pays attention to 
particular technologies. As I argue here, the capacity to regulate car parking by a local 
government rests significantly on the history of this governmental technology. This 
does not mean that they are conditioned by the past or that they are merely continuities. 
Rather, there is an interplay of hybrid connections wherein multiple changes as well as 
foreign inspirations are important. As I drew out in Chapter 4, ‘post-socialism’ can be 
put to work here to show connections between contemporary and previously existing 
phenomena in terms of particular aspects of cities or societies rather than describing 
them as a totality. Here, these links emerge as continuities embedded in the parking 
standards.   
The construction codes and regulations that span the Soviet Union (called SNiP which 
is an abbreviation of Stroitelnye Normy i Pravila – Construction Codes and 
Regulations), addressed parking standards already in a document dating back to 1966
54
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(SNiP II-K.2-62, 1966). The main logic of parking standards set in this edition of the 
document remained principally the same until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, 
while the exact numbers have been adapted to the increasing levels of car use. The 
standard set the number of parking spaces to be provided during the time of 
construction and projected 20 years into the future based on the level of motorisation 
and anticipated motorisation (SNiP II-K.2-62, 1966; SNiP II-60-75, 1976). The Soviet 
parking standards differentiated a number of functions: such as residential buildings, 
administrative buildings and factories, theatres, cinemas, sport stadiums and larger 
shops. The categories used as well as the general logic of linking parking lots to certain 
proxies are common practices of parking standards all over the world. Thus, I do not 
argue here that the parking standards are ‘Soviet’ in the sense of being unique compared 
to parking standards in other places as such a claim would be wrong due to the multiple 
similarities that parking standards all over the world share. What I claim here, 
nevertheless, is that they are ‘socialist’ due to their particular history in the context 
under study (Tallinn, Estonia in this thesis). They exhibit ‘continuity’ which was 
discussed as part of post-socialism as a de-territorialised concept in Chapter 4.  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, ‘new’ building standards were devised 
in Estonia, including those for parking provisions. These standards, indeed, draw much 
inspiration from other countries. According to their author, Swedish and Finnish 
parking standards were studied for ideas. As he claimed in the document prepared in 
1994 (Pihlak, 1994; my translations), even though Soviet standards ‘were not in general 
bad’ (p. 10), they had aged because they were calculated with car ownership of 180 – 
220 individual vehicles per 1000 inhabitants that was already achieved by 1994. By the 
year 2010 (p. 8; my translation), ‘the motorisation of Estonia is expected to catch up 
with the level in Finland and for that reason it is suitable to use [year] 1985 Finnish 
standards for the compilation of Estonian standards.’ Not only was the increase of car 
ownership taken to influence the parking standard, but some aspects of a more general 
logic were also borrowed. First, calculating parking spaces in relation to the Gross Floor 
Area (GFA) of buildings was drawn from the Finnish standard. This disentangled 
parking provision from the number of individuals—whether workers, residents or 
restaurant clients that the Soviet standard suggested—and linked parking with the only 
character that planning can clearly and relatively unambiguously settle: the size of the 
new construction and its number of floors (which gives GFA). The second important 
innovation taken from Finnish standards was the use of ‘zoning’ (Tallinn was divided 
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into three zones: the city centre, the intermediate zone and the edge city) introduced in 
the previous section. The third innovation was the application of ‘minimum’ and 
‘maximum’ which was also inspired by the Finnish standards. Whereas the Soviet 
standards set lower and upper limits to what has to be provided (setting a range), the 
new wording allowed whatever is either smaller or larger than the number set in the 
table. This signifies a more liberal logic in principle: anything could be done but it must 
follow certain principles. Despite that being the case, the application of the parking 
standards has still mainly followed the Soviet logic of setting the exact number as I 
argued previously (in Section 7.2.2).  
Parking standards are thus a mixture of change and continuity. It is obvious that with 
the changes in the political and economic arrangements of the society, the basic 
principles of parking standards altered as well. The parking standard changed from 
being a guiding principle for the Soviet urban planners into a legal tool for state 
intervention in the post-1991 situation; instead of guiding the actions of urban planners 
employed by the state institutions the ones regulated now are real estate developers. But 
continuity exhibited in their form and function is even more visible. Indeed, the task of 
revising and updating standards—even if you describe them as ‘new’—rested on 
something that already existed: an idea that in case of a new development, the number 
of parking spaces should be linked to the number of cars which differs according to the 
land use. Even more than an idea, it included a set of fundamental assumptions, for 
instance that car parking is a problem which could be controlled through urban planning 
tools, or that parking norms as a number in the table could be increased or decreased 
with time considering changes in the levels of motorisation or planning ideas. In the 
introduction of the Estonian Standard on urban road design (EVS 843, 2003) the authors 
highlight this by pointing out that in addition to the previous post-1991 Estonian 
standards and standards from Finland, Sweden, Germany and Denmark, the standards of 
the former Soviet Union have also been used as a ‘basis’ (p. 1). There was, hence, 
continuity in the ideas, assumptions and even elements of the precise form of the 
technique.  
The ‘local rootedness’ of parking standards, though, needs some more discussion as 
they were not ‘local’ in Estonia being devised in Moscow for the whole of the Soviet 
Union, while the Soviet standards themselves were constituted in a wider network of 
places. Similar numbers in parking standards were applied to cities across this enormous 
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country, only later being differentiated between various Soviet republics
55
. Furthermore, 
although the Soviet standards were Union-wide, this does not mean that Tallinn lacked 
local competencies. The primary person behind ‘new’ standards in 1990s has worked 
for decades at a university in Tallinn, while being involved in carrying out parking 
studies and attending conferences that drew together experts in the field from different 
parts of the Soviet Union. He received his Candidate of Sciences (which is equal to a 
doctoral degree) from Moscow in 1968 with a thesis on the use of private automobiles 
in cities with some attention to parking issues as well. After 1991, then, Tallinn 
embodied competencies that were generated in the Soviet time, and not just as a 
totalitarian imposition by the Soviet Union but as an active engagement with concerns 
that were important locally in these times.  
The parking standards, to conclude, were in many ways constituted by practices outside 
the country but at the same time were implicated locally. Even though an observer 
might want to stress the learning from other contexts in the 1990s—which was certainly 
happening here—one cannot neglect that parking standards were already in place in 
Estonia. They were as much learnt as they were already established. It was not difficult 
to change some aspects of the standard without needing to introduce a whole new logic: 
this is what ‘the need to devise new standards’ (my italics) means. This situation is a 
continuity and change at the same time. While the ‘new’ suggests change, the 
formulation of the problem as a need to devise a governing device that already exists 
embeds the continuity. This is the case also with their application: an exact number 
rather than minimum or maximum used to be the Soviet practice. Whereas the 
continuity is not widely acknowledged in Estonia, it is highly likely that without the 
historical application of parking standards it would not have taken hold so seamlessly in 
the post-1991 urban planning.  
The case of private parking lots on derelict land plots that offers the next example in 
this chapter highlights the importance of the naturalisation of governing (that Valverde, 
2011 discusses) in the case of parking standards. The lack of regulations on private 
parking exposes the missing regulatory capacity of the government on this issue even 
though the ‘will to govern’ exists whereas the parking standards discussed previously 
put the ‘will to govern’ into practice to a considerable extent. The naturalisation of 
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governing, as this section argued, does not emerge simply from the will of the state but 
is a ‘contingent historical event’ (Valverde, 2011, p. 285) where the exact history of the 
governmental device is no longer clearly visible in the practice. In that instance, it can 
be concluded with the sentence from Ben-Joseph (2005, p. xiii): ‘accumulated rules 
now have the force of universal acceptance’. 
7.3 The limits to materialise the ‘will to govern’: regulating private off-
street parking lots 
The strong foundation of parking standards contradicts the near-comical situation of 
numerous private parking lots that have arisen in the city of Tallinn. Even though there 
are private parking lots that are governed by the local government (such as multi-storey 
and underground parking garages) many of the surface parking lots have escaped 
governmental intervention. I am interested here only in the latter phenomena in order to 
show the connection between the capacity of the state, liberalism and materiality. 
Moreover, in the case of surface parking lots we are not talking about a rare 
phenomenon but a significant amount of parking space
56
. Their importance for an 
analysis rests precisely on the concomitant existence of their scale and unregulated 
character. They exemplify a ‘legal void’ as they occupy space between legal 
comprehension (that designates what is legal and what is not, and is able to govern the 
divide) and the undefined sphere of governing where the legal apparatus and regulations 
do not penetrate. The ‘legal void’ sits more towards the former as it designates activities 
that are seen as at least basically legal (just not regulated), while Lindahl’s (2008, 2010, 
2013) concept of a-legality falls more towards the latter as it includes activities that are 
both legal and illegal offering a challenge towards the way in which legality is defined. 
Therefore legal void is a narrower concept than a-legality but hopefully also more 
clearly designated. Yet, legal void should not be equalised with ‘loophole’ which 
assumes the need for regulation: legal void is about a ‘void’ but leaves the question 
about the need for regulation (filling the void) open for debate. Before moving to the 
conceptual analysis, I will briefly introduce the case under study. 
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7.3.1 The legality of off-street privately owned parking lots 
The off-street private parking business under discussion here operates mainly on land 
plots left empty by demolition of a building or a group of buildings while the land plot 
still remains in wait for a new development (see Figure 7.1). It is in this sense that these 
plots are both legal and urban voids. Such land plots emerged particularly as an 
aftermath to the 2008 real estate crises but there are both older and later instances. After 
clearing the land of buildings, the owner rents the plot to one of the three companies 
operating in this business: Europark, Ühisteenused or CityPark. Once a deal is signed 
with the land owner, the parking operator levels the ground adding perhaps a layer of 
gravel, signs at the entrance, some signs inside the area, and ticket machines (see Figure 
7.2). In that way, a parking lot is established and operates until the land owner can find 
an alternative use for the land. Even though the parking lot is expected to be only for a 
short period with the contracts between the parking business and land owner made in a 
way that they could easily be discontinued, such parking lots often remain in place for 
five, ten or even more years.  
 
Figure 7.1. The development of a parking lot site. Photo on the left depicts demolition 
of old buildings (Source: Author’s photo from 2006) and photo on the right is a today’s 
parking lot (Source: Google Earth) 
Despite dealing here with the lack of regulations, there are still many aspects of this 
business which are not only legal but also regulated. First of all, the companies are legal 
entities registered in the business registry and pay taxes. The business in general has 
been profitable even if the sums are not enormous: The biggest company in the private 
parking business—Europark—earned 0.3 million EUR profit with 2.5 million EUR 
turnover in 2009 (Hankewitz, 2010) while two years later—in 2011—the profit was 
already more than half a million EUR from 3.8 million EUR turnover. Second, the 
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renting out of parking spaces to customers follows legal rules set up in Estonia. Namely, 
the businesses operate according to laws on renting: in this case, renting out a piece of 
land for parking a car for a relatively short period
57
. Third, two of the three companies 
are linked with big international companies. Europark uses the name of the recognised 
international company operating in different countries whereas it is now owned by a 
Norwegian company. Ühisteenused is a subsidiary of the world’s largest security firm 
G4S.  
 
Figure 7.2. Private parking lots in Tallinn. Source: Author’s photos. 
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Considering the reliance on the formal system it is striking that these parking businesses 
also rely on the lack of government intervention. Such informality is both an unplanned 
result of the frictions in the governmental apparatus trying to deal with something new, 
and the active carving out of the space for their profitable parking businesses with the 
inventive use of legal semantics and materialities. Even though being defined ‘illegal’ 
does not necessarily lead to the removal of an activity and the illegal condition can last 
for a significant period depending on the law enforcement (see Table 7.1 top right), 
being categorised as illegal can also be avoided. The key for parking businesses in 
Talinn has been to avoid having the land categorised as ‘retail’ or as ‘construction’—
both of which are subject to interventions by the local authority. While in everyday 
language one easily describes parking business as a service (which is part of retail) or 
sees them as constructed entities, in legal apparatus the way things are categorised can 
be different from everyday and colloquial definitions (see also Bourdieu, 1987) with 
effects on governing.  
7.3.2 The legal dimensions of the ‘legal void’ 
As I said earlier, legally everything is there. We have had legal analysis done by 
different law bureaus and they all say that it is ok. In our opinion as well. [We expect] 
that parking could be organised that way and the conception could work.
58
  
There appears to be few restrictions on private companies undertaking parking 
operations under any land use or licensing provisions. (Maher, 1998, p. 9) 
The ‘legal void’—that is legal and unregulated while scrutinised for the possibility of 
regulation—is a concept that itself reflects the historical process. Activities falling into 
the legal void are those that have not been captured by regulators, usually because they 
are either novel or have remained unproblematised. The ‘legal void’ captures a tension 
where, on the one hand, an activity might be recognised as a problem to be dealt with 
or, on the other hand, it could be considered a perfectly normal situation. Regarding the 
latter, nobody would blame legislators and administrators for the lack of governing how 
people position their furniture at home. The lack of regulation in this context is 
considered normality. But in cases such as hacking or smuggling or the off-street 
parking business presented here, the idea that the existence and prevalence of those 
activities in a particular context are in need of regulations can be more easily made. 
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Even though these parking lots are private activities they are visible and offered for the 
public. The way in which their land plots are planned and managed raises interests for 
state intervention in terms of health and safety (to avoid oil spills to the ground) but also 
considering general quality of service offered for the public of car users (see discussion 
of police powers in Chapter 3.2).   
The city government’s opinion is indeed that these parking lots require registration and 
detailed regulation by the city
59
. Four years ago in 2010, city officials offered a strong 
opinion about the private parking business in the local media. In a newspaper article 
(Õunmaa, 2010), the Head of Road and Infrastructure Division at the Department of 
Urban Planning Jüri Kurba explained how ‘before constructing a parking lot that offers 
paid parking service the land owner has to submit an application for project conditions’. 
The article explains more (my translation):  
In addition, the Department of Transport has to look through traffic safety 
conditions because not everywhere can cars freely drive in and out. Issues of 
surface coating, vertical planning, rainwater drainage and cleaning (oil 
separators) etc must also be solved. The project that has been prepared in 
accordance with the requirements and coordinated [with different departments – 
T.T.] is submitted for formalisation of building permit. Only after receiving the 
building permit can the construction of a parking lot take place.  
In an instance where the land has a non-business function (which is often the case on 
the land plots where parking businesses operates), Kurba explains, ‘one has to apply to 
a city for a change of land use into a business land. A committee at the Department of 
Urban Planning weighs every case separately as to whether the change of land use is 
justified or not. Then it will be submitted to a City Government session where the land 
use change is decided.’ The Head of City Transport Division at the Department of 
Transport Ruth Pärn claimed ‘It is not this way, that in case there is a lack of money I 
turn a construction site into a parking lot.’ 
Even though the city government had held such a position for a long time, this 
perspective had turned out to be a dysfunctional one in practice. It is indeed the case 
that an ordinance of the City Council from 1999 stipulates that ‘the parking of vehicles 
in paid parking lots takes place only in accordance with both the traffic scheme ratified 
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by the Department of Sustainable Development and Planning and the trade permit 
issued by a City District administration’ (Tallinn City Council, 1999, Article 3.1; my 
translation). Despite existing in words in the regulatory apparatus of Tallinn, this 
stipulation, nevertheless, did not matter in practice and was eventually abolished. I 
tracked the history of the by-law and it emerged that it was abolished as late as in 2013 
alongside other 128 ordinances from 1993 to 2011 as they ‘are aged by their content, 
form or norm for delegation’ (Tallinn City Council, 2013; my translation). It is worth 
noting that despite the ordinance being actually pertinent as the ‘will to govern’ 
existed—unregulated private parking lots, indeed, were (and are) considered a 
problem—the logic of law, however, had excluded this article of ordinance (including 
the whole section of five clauses) for more than a decade before it was officially 
discarded. None of the city officials who I interviewed in the first half of 2012 
mentioned this ordinance. When I cited the article, one official even could not believe 
that such stipulations existed in the municipal code
60
. In Estonia, municipal code must 
accord with state-level laws that override what municipality intends to do—which was 
shown in Chapter 6—making the city of Tallinn interpretation of laws and its use of by-
laws potentially unworkable. It was for this reason I also asked questions from some 
central state actors. 
In the fieldwork I was interested in what central state authorities think about the ‘legal’ 
situation of these parking lots, especially those that operate their business on residential 
land. Do state authorities perceive them to be legal and why? I wrote official letters to 
three ministries—the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Communications—who bounced them between each other, as 
well as to Tallinn municipality (who bounced the letter back) and in the end only the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications answered
61
. In a nutshell, their 
explanation admitted that no regulations are necessary whatever the official land use is 
(see Section 7.3.3 about the urban planning tools) and law does not give municipality 
any right to intervene. In their words
62
:  
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According to the Traffic Act article 186, clause 5 an owner of a road or a person 
responsible for organising road maintenance can institute a paid parking. For 
instituting paid parking, the Traffic Act does not have any additional 
requirements (such as coordination, applying for a permit etc) . . . .  [T]o the 
knowledge of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications there is no 
legal regulation giving local government the right to restrict the establishment of 
parking lots on private land or to regulate the number of parking spaces there.  
The Ministry in their answer admits, then, the extra-regulatory but legal position of 
private parking lots. The law, thus, has not allowed local government to intervene in the 
way city officials imagined. The law does not say explicitly that they cannot intervene 
but it does not provide explicit levers for action. The regulatory toolbox of local 
government to act on those parking lots has remained empty. More precisely, the 
toolbox exists in the form of registration of business activities, planning regulations and 
building permits, but these cannot be attached to the private parking lots. In what 
follows I will unpack this toolbox of regulations and the reasons why none of the tools 
could be attached to off-street parking business. I hold the view that the parking 
business discussed here is in ‘void’ not just because there is a ‘gap’ in the law but 
because such a ‘void’ makes legal sense. Depending on the perspective, the void is not 
simply a gap but normality as well. I will first discuss registration moving then to 
planning tools in Section 7.3.3. 
Registration – a technique to make activities governable 
Registration of activities subject to certain criteria is a common governmental 
technology used in many instances around the world. Asking an activity to be registered 
makes it possible to differentiate legal performances from illegal ones. The registration 
is used in many instances such as the list of businesses who are allowed to operate in a 
certain area of activity and who are subject to monitoring by state authorities, or 
registration of various professions such as doctors or lawyers (in order to assure the 
quality of their service). In some cases, the registration and the list is not done by state 
authorities but non-governmental organisations such as the Bar Association of lawyers. 
Nevertheless, even in that case the legal framework affects the system of registration in 
many ways (e.g., legislating what activities those who are registered can carry out as 
compared with those who are not included in the registry).   
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With registration, an activity would officially be entered into the framework of 
governmental intervention. Registration itself can be a simple one without any 
requirements (that is, everyone who applies can be registered) or one that is subject to 
simple or more stringent conditions. The conditional registration that sets rules to be 
followed is known as a licence. The registration of an activity opens governmental 
space for shaping the conditions for the activity, even allowing possible withdrawal or 
refusal to renew. Even if the requirements do not initially exist, they can be introduced 
later. In the case of retail (to which the parking business was likened in Tallinn—
unsuccessfully as it turned out—in the city ordinance from 1999), for instance, the 
registration could be subject to scrutinising one’s previous business activity. Failure to 
comply with local government rules could mean that the business’s retail licence is not 
renewed.  
The registration of economic activities in Estonia, subject to by laws, include retail, 
various repair services (of watches, cars, home appliances), installation and 
maintenance (of furniture, windows), funeral services, photography services and so 
forth. The list contains also storage services of various movables, which, as an article in 
the manual notes, includes parking services.
63
 Indeed, Tallinn Airport, for instance, has 
registered its operation of car parks. Under Statistical Classification of Economic 
Activities in the European Community (abbreviated from French as NACE) code 52211 
(defined in Estonia as ‘activities of parking’) a total of 69 companies have registered 
parking as their business activity. This list, though, does not include the three businesses 
under discussion here. Despite this, the three businesses characterise themselves using 
NACE code 52211 in their Annual Reports, which suggests that they are not different 
businesses in their substance but only in terms of the way in which they have managed 
to locate themselves in relation to the law. So under this logic, not every parking lot 
operating as a business is the same phenomena: some need regulations and others do 
not. This perspective is supported by government actors. An explanatory note to the 
Commercial Activities Act (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications, 2008, 
p. 2; my translation), for instance, explains that ‘if a person gives a land plot to rent for 
car parking, then this is not a service activity in the sense of commercial activities law 
because services related to real estate activities are not regulated by commercial 
activities law.’ This law defines the difference between parking businesses not based on 
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the physical characteristics of the parking activity but merely in relation to the legal 
framework: parking garages and parking lots discussed here operate under different 
legal understandings. Thus, the law quite explicitly positions parking lots on derelict 
land outside the levers of municipal regulations. 
The city does not have an official database of parking lots operated by off-street parking 
businesses nor does it store information on the number of parking spaces and other of 
their characteristics. Although a city department formed a database itself by mapping 
the parking lots through direct observation
64, this is not a ‘database’ as a ‘registry’. A 
registry would need to be regularly updated and revised whereas the data produced by 
the city is a one-time activity for getting an overview of the extent of the phenomenon. 
Such a database is merely a monitoring device and if not linked to the need of 
registration and certain requirements that businesses must follow, then it is not itself 
capable of governing the behaviour of the parking businesses.  
To conclude this discussion, it appears that whereas in the case of parking standards, 
history provided the state with capabilities to intervene, in the case of private parking 
lots, historical development has not offered solutions for municipal regulations. Such 
private businesses did not exist in the Soviet time, and were also relatively inactive in 
1990s while becoming a significant business as late as 2008 when the real estate 
development encountered a major downturn and projects were halted leaving land plots 
available for parking business. Even though the city has tried to apply the governing 
tool of registration to order these activities, this action was contested on the grounds that 
the business operates under a different legal framework (rental agreements) and was 
thus ultimately unsuccessful. Two respondents—a representative of a business and a 
city official
65—referred to a court decision in 2004 that stabilised the definition of 
parking business as non-retail activity and the situation whereby parking businesses on 
derelict land remain outside the state regulation has thus remained. Unfortunately I was 
unable to obtain the court decision, as first level courts do not store decisions that were 
made more than seven years ago (only all of the Supreme Court decisions are stored; 
see Section 5.2.3). Before moving to the discussion about the ways in which off-street 
parking business is slowly becoming subject to regulations, the following section 
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discusses an important element of materiality at work in defining the existence of the 
‘legal void’. While in this section I discussed the governing tool of registration, the 
following section offers an insight into urban planning in relation to materiality of 
private parking businesses.  
7.3.3 The material conditions of the legal void 
The legal void described in this chapter rests not only on the legal system being unable 
to comprehend a phenomenon (showed in the previous section) but also on certain 
material dispositions supporting incapacities to regulate. In the case here, the choice of 
materials used for parking lots equals the choice of being regulated or not. This section 
therefore aims to consider a specific way in which materiality matters for governing. 
The tools of governing appear to be related to the ways of materialisation. The 
comprehension of off-street parking business by the legal apparatus can be summarised 
in the following two statements (a and b) which lead to the situation whereby they are 
not part of urban planning regulatory tools (statement c): 
(a) Parking businesses can exist on a land plot without a permanent cover.  
(b) The land plot without a permanent cover cannot be comprehended as an 
object for urban planning.  
 (c) If (a) AND (b) then (c): if both conditions (a and b) are fulfilled then 
some of the parking businesses are not subject for urban planning. 
The statement (a) suggests that a parking business could be operated on land plots 
without pavement or any form of permanent cover. Such parking lots could exist in 
many circumstances. One of the respondents gave an example of temporary parking lots 
for out of town festivals or concerts when a patch of field is sealed off and offered for 
car parking
66
. Such parking lots are not officially planned in Estonia and can be created 
merely by a decision of the land owner. According to laws in the country, parking on 
green areas is allowed with the permission of the land owner (see also Chapter 8). In 
cases of the parking lots discussed in this section—whereby, moreover, the plots are 
often not ‘green’ anymore (or have never been)—the permission of the landowner is 
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part of the business deal. The statement (a) thus formulates that parking in Estonia is not 
an activity that would require a specially prepared surface and could legally take place 
anywhere being only subject to the opinion of the landowner.  
Statement (b) points out the way in which urban planning’s task in Estonia is 
conceptualised: urban planning is about permanent structures that are constructed. Even 
though a parcel of land is subject to urban planning in many ways all the time—for 
instance, every point of the city is inscribed with a certain function (that is zoned) by the 
Comprehensive Plan and many of the land parcels have a function designated by the 
Detailed Plan—such urban planning is merely an act of words rather than reflecting 
action on the ground. That is, if a land plot has, for instance, a residential function but 
stays empty with construction process delayed then it could be used for other functions. 
A thing that is described as a ‘construction’ according to the law is something that is 
more substantial in the ways they are constructed than parking lots are. A land plot 
covered with gravel is not seen as a ‘construction’ in Estonia and not subject to urban 
planning tools.  
The statement (c), therefore, captures the interplay of how car parking is comprehended 
and what the conceptualisation of urban planning is in the country. The parking 
business has managed to generate a profitable activity inside this gap. The gap is not 
merely a legal void in the sense of missing words and semantic constructions in the 
legal apparatus but is also an urban void (as discussed in Jakle and Sculle, 2004) 
whereby the ‘void’ between buildings, streets and green spaces leads to the incapacity to 
use existing governmental devices. The head of the Planning Department summarised 
this conundrum about those parking lots
67
:  
There are probably some regulations missing in Estonia, gaps in legal 
documents. In my opinion they are completely illegal, because, well, they don’t 
have any building permit. Reportedly they don’t need one even. . . .  But we 
don’t deal with them because nothing is planned there. Covered with gravel 
simply. 
In that statement, the lack of regulations and the nature of the surface materiality 
become the same thing. Governmental action is thus linked to the materiality of the 
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surface here, whereby tarmac equals the right for governmental capability and gravel 
not.  
Such links between the activities in physical space and the governmental framework 
constitute the apparatuses of governing and manifest themselves in other instances of 
urban planning in Estonia. For instance, urban planning in Estonia uses two key textual 
actors: the building permit and the detailed plan. In principle, the logic for 
differentiating between those two is simple: every new development needs a detailed 
plan that has to be agreed upon by the city government while the building permit is 
given out in accordance with this document when the actual construction starts. 
Nevertheless, the real world is diverse and there are instances where the order of 
procedure is diverted. For instance, whereas construction of a smaller summer house 
would require a detailed plan, constructing a motorway junction does not and could not 
be limited by public voice in the process of detailed planning—it requires merely a 
building permission
68
. Building permission is given via a closed procedure inside the 
state apparatus, whereas the Detailed Plan requires at least some amount of public 
engagement with the affected community although the construction of roads tends to 
cause more worries among the public than the building of a summer house. But the 
question here is not so much the difference between these two procedures as such, but 
more the fact that the parking business under scrutiny falls outside of any of the 
available planning tools, even the most basic of these, that is, building permission. 
Thus, while new buildings and constructions, even the smallest of those (e.g., parking 
lots built by flat-owner associations, see Chapter 8), require building permission, 
parking lots in this chapter are one of the exceptional spaces falling outside the purview 
of any of the urban planning tools.   
In addition to the logical process for the way in which the state apparatus comprehends 
parking, the physical parameters of parking lots are important for the parking businesses 
to keep their capacity to manoeuvre. For the landowner the plot is in limbo awaiting 
development. Thus, owners do not want to acquire permission from the local 
government or the central state authorities, as that would delay the process of opening 
and closing a parking lot. The use must be temporary and quickly adaptable. Keeping 
the plots unpaved—covered merely with gravel—has a financial logic, as paving the 
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surface would increase the delay for getting a business opened (and closed) and would 
raise the costs of its opening in a situation when it is not known for how long the land 
plot would be a parking lot. The surface material, then, manifests (im)permanence. 
However, the (im)permanence does not result so much from the difference in the 
physical parameters of diverse materialities, but rather from the way in which the 
financial rationale in relation to the workings of the legal and administrative framework 
depends on the characteristics of the physical environment. Both the cost and legal 
complications render tarmac too permanent for this business that hence relies on the 
gravel as sufficiently impermanent. 
To conclude, this parking business exists in the ‘legal void’ whereby the existing 
regulations of the legal apparatus designate them outside the need for registration and 
do not subject them to the tools of urban planning. The legal void relies on the structure 
of the legal framework where parking businesses identified a manoeuvre that posited 
them outside the need to register. But the existence of a legal void in this case is also 
conditioned by the materiality of the urban fabric. If the parking lots’ surface would 
have had or would have needed to be materialised in a more permanent form, the legal 
void would not have existed. The discussion of materiality, thus, showed here that 
different materialities in the process of governing are not merely physical ‘nuts-and-
bolts’ (see the critical comments of such analysis of materiality in Latham and 
McCormack, 2004) but also gain their character from their comprehension by the legal 
system. Namely, planning law in Estonia has omitted surfaces covered with gravel from 
its regulatory scope.  
Yet, despite the ongoing incapacity to regulate these spaces, there are some ways in 
which governmental authorities can regulate those spaces and some ways in which they 
have been able to draw those parking spaces into a more stringent regulatory 
framework. 
7.3.4 The state trying to make a currently legal but unregulated activity 
governable 
In order for activity to become part of governing, it must first be comprehended in the 
dichotomy of legal/illegal with certain ways of carrying out the activity being defined as 
‘illegal’. However, nothing is ‘illegal’ naturally. Becoming illegal occurs in a process 
whereby the question is not just about technical procedures of law but includes concerns 
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as to what is normal practice. Defining this private parking business as illegal would 
thus mean changing the interpretation of certain aspects of activity. That is, as in this 
case, the for-profit parking business could be conceptualised as needing permission 
from the local state subject to certain conditions such as requiring particular surface 
material (and concomitantly making activities without the permission ‘illegal’). Also, 
the contract between the parker and the business could be required to be settled in a 
different way than merely by the act of driving by a traffic sign, thus making previous 
ways of operating problematic. Before discussing the process of re-defining the parking 
business, I offer some comments on the border between privately owned land and state 
action, as this is more porous than it might have appeared in the preceding discussion of 
the Section 7.3. 
Even though the parking business remains largely outside urban planning tools, the 
local government still has access to regulate the property, albeit in a limited way. 
Namely, the Road Act (Riigikogu, 1999) accords a buffer of up to 10 metres around 
streets which in the case of Tallinn are still mostly owned by the city. The city has at 
least the capacity to direct what can be done in this buffer zone. For instance, the city 
has some right to prescribe what signs at the entrance to the parking lot should look like 
and, at least in some cases, to limit the ways in which parking lots are advertised. The 
unification of entrance signage of private parking lots among the three big companies—
making them ‘look like children in kindergarten’ as one private company noted 
ironically
69—was reported as a major success by a municipality official70. Still, even 
though it is a regulation showing the possibility for intervention by the local 
government, it is a slight intervention. It does not change significantly how the business 
operates or say which plots they can use or how many parking lots they can provide. 
The ten metres buffer is the currently accepted legal limit of municipal intervention to 
how those private parking businesses can operate and in what ways their physical 
elements are planned. 
The city, however, would like to extend its influence. The desire to gain more power in 
regulating the private parking business in order to improve the physical appearance and 
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condition of the parking lots (such as adding oil collectors) has led the municipality to 
initiate efforts that would re-define the nature of the surface on those land plots.  
Trying to re-define the surface 
The re-definition of surface is dealing with the ‘statement a’ outlined in Section 7.3.3. 
By claiming the existing surface material—gravel—to be problematic as a basis for a 
publicly operated business, the city would gain the capacity to direct such parking 
operations via urban planning tools (‘statement c’ in Section 7.3.3).  
The city of Tallinn has sought to remake the type of surface that a public parking lot can 
have by inserting a clause (no. 13 in article 5) to the city’s Rules for the Maintenance of 
Good Order (Heakorra Eeskiri) stating (Tallinn City Council, 2011; my translation): 
‘[Property and building owner’s responsibilities for assuring good order is to] avoid the 
dispersal of mud and debris to pavement and road as well as to the neighbouring lot 
from the land plot, including one where a parking service is offered.’ This clause was 
introduced in 2011 with the aim to achieve regulatory capabilities over unregulated 
private parking lots. A critical observer could see this action by the local state as an 
informal practice itself, disregarding the currently legal situation of private parking lots 
by defining them as illegal and making them subject to regulation. It seems as though 
the city enacts a miniature form of the ‘state of exception’ (Agamben, 2005). This 
additional clause was indeed added in order to give municipality a governing tool in a 
particular matter. However, merely adding words to a by-law has not been enough to 
make unorganised private parking lots governed. The ‘void’ results from the ways in 
which regulations are set in the more general legal framework. The wider legal 
apparatus delineates which activities may be governed by local government (not these 
parking lots) and what material conditions would justify such regulations (not plots 
covered with gravel). The logic of ‘if (a) and (b) then (c)’ as described in Chapter 7.3.3 
has thus still remained present. 
The attempt to re-define what the city government can regulate 
The most recent attempt to achieve regulatory capabilities has been to remake the legal 
definition of a ‘road’. This is something that a local government cannot do on its own 
but that needs to be done within the system of law. It is a more classical instance of 
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loophole fixing. Apparently, or at least so the logic went, the problem was caused by the 
different treatment of ‘road’ in the law. While on the one hand, privately owned roads 
act as ‘public roads’ in the sense that the Traffic Act operates there to the same extent as 
on a road in local or state authorities’ ownership, on the other hand, there have been no 
regulations in the Construction Act designating what kind of quality they should have. 
Furthermore, it has been significant that private parking lots were explicitly brought out 
in an explanatory note justifying this law change. The explanatory note
71
 states: ‘For 
instance, it is not possible to give private parking lots permission for road construction 
or project conditions because there is no such requirement.’ Even though the legal 
change is visibly driven by the aim to regulate private parking lots it aims to make 
governable a wider field of activities that includes not only private parking lots but also 
privately owned roads. For this reason it appears more like ‘fixing a loophole’ than the 
regulation that the local government sought. In principle, it allows local government the 
use of technologies of governance that it already possesses but was legally curtailed 
from using in certain circumstances. This increased power of local governments in 
Estonia could result in the removal of some of the parking lots
72
.  
One can criticise such efforts to fix the loophole in laws as excessive state power that 
once again tries to work its way around the legally accepted situation, as pointed out 
above in relation to the municipal ordinance. It must be reminded that even though the 
local government does not regulate them, private parking lots are legal. However, if 
such things as ‘loopholes’ exist, then one has to admit that every effort to fix a loophole 
is also to a certain extent about dodging the existing legality: the formality exists but is 
seen by some state authorities as informality which necessitates state action.  
Even though there is no proper match to the English word ‘informal’ in Estonian, the 
informality of these parking lots is what the governors seem to be concerned about. The 
head of a planning department defined these parking lots as outright ‘illegal’73 and other 
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legal change to make the private parking business governable has not succeeded.   
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 Interview no. 36 (18 September 2012) 
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municipality officials have referred to the problem emanating from the disorderly and 
unregulated character of the parking lots. However, the precise definition of ‘informal’ 
depends on what is seen as a normal ‘state of affairs’. For instance, regulating the 
number of parking lots in new developments has been normalised as was shown in the 
first half of the chapter in relation to the parking standards and the same applies for both 
overground and underground parking garages whether opened for public or not. The 
city expected regulation to be normal also in the case of the provision of public parking 
lots on whatever form of land and has been actively searching ways to ‘normalise’ the 
regulatory framework.  
However, the ‘normal’ is a slightly more complicated condition. The failure to regulate 
those private parking lots has provided citizens more parking spaces that are, at least 
partly, seen as desirable by the city authorities. In an interview, the Head of Transport 
Department
74
even admitted:  
Well, actually, our aims are achieved; we want that on the city land there would 
be as short term parking as possible and outside of that would be long term 
parking whether it is in parking garages or elsewhere. That aim is achieved 
because parking operators offer remarkably cheaper service than parking on the 
city areas. 
He admitted the desire to reduce parking on city streets in order to give space for the 
flow of moving vehicles but also supported the increased provision by rationalising the 
way in which private operators have offered more and cheaper parking spaces. The city 
has indeed not been vigorous in achieving the reduction in parking lots to discourage 
car use in the centre as was highlighted by the pragmatic use of parking caps in Section 
7.2.2. In the case of private parking lots the primary concern by the city government has 
been the visually blighting character of the sites and simply the fact that there is some 
transport-related business in the city centre outside the city’s governing capacities. In 
the statements made by the city government regarding private parking lots, sustainable 
mobility has not been positioned as a dominant concern. The existence of such 
unorganised parking spaces appears for officials, then, as a failure to regulate how 
things should be done in the city—that is, what should be the ‘character’ of parking 
lots—rather than the failure to direct the choice of transport mode, which is the starting 
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point for the critique of those parking spaces by most transport experts in the city. 
Nonetheless, the city aims to gain the capacity to regulate them. 
The local government might not gain the capacity to regulate through lobbying with 
other executive and legislative state authorities; rather, the way in which the parking 
business relates to the freedom of individuals has raised concerns that encourage the 
city to become more involved in governing private parking lots.  
7.3.5 The illegality emerging from the preferred ways of governing 
automobility 
As private parking operators are not only those who are governed but are also 
themselves institutions who govern, their governmental procedures can come under 
question from the perspective of the subjects of governing. In this case, there is an 
interaction between the state and an individual where the state could act as the one who 
protects an individual against the unacceptable governing practices of another private 
actor. The state, thus, is not only the one that restricts freedom but some of the 
institutions—such as those protecting the Constitution—are also the main entities 
ensuring that the freedom is provided. Such a role for the state has emerged in relation 
to the private parking business.  
However, even in this case, the critique by drivers has not exhausted its full potential 
and has still been largely favourable towards the private parking business. For instance, 
privately operated parking businesses are following different principles than municipal 
ones, and disregard some of the state-wide regulations favouring car drivers and 
applying for parking spaces owned by the local government. Firstly, even though the 
law requires the first 15 minutes of parking to be free in the state-owned parking areas 
since 2002—in order to give car drivers time to search for the ticket machine and pay 
for the parking—such a principle does not apply for private parking lots where every 
second of parking is paid for. Secondly, whereas blue badge holders—that is, disabled 
people—do not have to pay for parking and can even park on the pavement if they leave 
1.5 metres free for pedestrians on city or central government owned land plots, they do 
not hold such rights on private parking lots. In fact, they are exactly the same as any 
other car driver there. Although many drivers consider these governmental practices of 
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private businesses negatively
75
 this has still not led to a wider public critique of the 
private parking business. Whereas the city has easily become a target, the private 
business has managed to escape the strongest critique. In January 2011, for instance, I 
observed how the city was the subject of public outcry—and an avalanche of opinion 
pieces in media—because it started to charge for every 15 minutes with mobile 
payments rather than for every minute it used to do before. However, nobody made 
critical comments towards private businesses that also had this practice of charging 
(with one hour the minimum unit of payment). Nevertheless, some critique towards 
private businesses has emerged from the point of view of those who have failed to pay 
for parking.  
In general, the system of catching those who do not pay or fail to do so in private 
parking lots is built on a penalty fine (leppetrahv) whereby businesses presume a 
contract to be signed between themselves and car users by which non-compliance can 
be penalised. However, private parking businesses have to deal with the same problem 
that the municipality had to as was described in the Chapter 6: how to link a car to its 
driver. Nevertheless, they have to deal with an even more basic problem than a local 
government. Namely, they have faced problems of acquiring information about whose 
name is behind the number written on vehicle number plate. While initially they 
achieved the task through the Vehicle Registry, which is held and governed by a state 
authority, individual data protection that restricts releasing the car owner’s name and 
address to a third party led to problems for the parking business. At first, the Vehicle 
Registry invented a way around this. In an ad hoc procedure, a parking operator sent an 
envelope with the fine enclosed and with the vehicle number printed on the envelope to 
the Vehicle Registry, who then simply pasted an address from its database on the 
envelope and forwarded it to the vehicle owner. In 2010, however, this procedures was 
considered ‘against principal rights and freedoms’ by the Chancellor of Justice (2010) 
leading eventually to parking operators failing to have any possible link between the 
vehicle plate number and the owner’s contact address. One of the companies decided to 
start a court proceeding to demand access to the data but failed in the first level court 
with the court ruling that there are other ways in which the parking can be regulated 
                                                          
75
 Interactions with drivers in the fieldwork. Also comments in the web-based newspaper stories. 
167 
without the need to send a fine to the vehicle owner, for instance, by using a boom 
barrier (Tallinn Circuit Court, 2012)
76
.  
Following such court deliberation, there are two possible outcomes. The businesses can 
resort to wheel clamps which even though they were unconstitutional for state 
authorities (see Chapter 6), are legal for parking businesses. The use of another 
governing method—such as an informal database of those who have paid for parking, 
their mobile phone numbers and, if available, data about car owners gathered from 
internet (from car sale websites, for instance)—to send penalty charges is already close 
to bullying. First of all, such penalty charges are often sent to those not liable for 
payment (for instance, the previous owner of a car bought second hand). But also, as 
companies do not usually know the name behind the phone number from which the 
payment was made, their use of texting tactics to demand payment of the fine is a 
threatening strategy: if the person pays, it is successful; if not, they cannot do much 
about it.  
Such practices by private businesses, nevertheless, have not led to similar resentment 
and legal challenge as the state practices elaborated in Chapter 6. While it is true that 
many car drivers hold negative feelings towards companies, there has not been a 
sustained legal challenge against their practices. Currently there is a limited amount of 
disobedience by drivers to the rules imposed by parking operators: two companies cited 
about a 95 per cent rate of payment. Additionally, the companies want to be client 
oriented: as one of the executives of a business declared, ‘we want to be a client centred 
company and sell the service, we don’t want to go and harass’77. Thus, restrictive 
measures such as wheel clamps have been used only on those who are recurrent 
violators, rather than making this device the primary way in which companies deal with 
violators
78
.  
Nevertheless, the legal questioning of the business has opened the door to a more 
general challenge towards such public parking services. The business has a right to 
govern parkers only when there is a contract between a driver/car owner and the 
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 The case is still in process as the company appealed. 
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 Interview no. 41 (2 April 2013) 
78
 Which became the case in England and Wales before legal change in 2012 (see Section 6.3). 
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business.
79
 The current legal conception by the parking business functions through a 
contract which is considered to be signed between a car driver and a parking operator 
automatically when the car drives past signs at the entrance. Those signs set out a list of 
conditions that a parker must follow and measures that the parking company can take in 
case the rules are broken. If it is accepted that the contract has been signed, parking 
businesses can easily take the measures they have listed in the contract (that is, on the 
sign). As this is currently the case, businesses utilise penalty fines, wheel clamps and 
even towing. However, if the contract is considered not to have been signed, then the 
land owner may only resort to calling the police or going to court to remove an 
‘intruder’ from the land plot. In this case, the business would not be able to effectively 
operate.  
In summary, if the legal basis on which the businesses perceived their companies to be 
run—which, as they claimed in interviews, had been discussed with law firms—is not 
actually existing and there is no way that non-payers could or perhaps even should be 
punished, it means that this business would occupy a space on the border between 
legality and illegality. At the moment, the legal assessment is sustained and the 
businesses have not crossed the fragile and porous, yet definitive border separating legal 
from illegal. If they do cross it, then the only way to leave a land plot in limbo for 
development is either to simply fence it off and restrict access to everyone or to 
configure the land plot into a parking lot in a manner fully complicit with the 
municipality’s regulations. Such a complicit way of organising would most likely mean 
using entrance barriers—as the court case I referred to above suggested80—and 
providing a proper surface covering. As stated above, this would significantly change 
the business environment for parking and make some of the parking lots unprofitable. 
But with these legal deliberations, the city would emerge as an important actor in 
directing where and in what conditions parking business can operate. By mid-2014, 
however, nothing is yet settled in the issue of the private parking business.   
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 Court case and supported also by the country’s leading traffic lawyer (Interview no. 19; 14 April 2012). 
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7.4 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter discussed regulations of car parking on privately owned land in Tallinn. 
The chapter showed local government in Estonia to be at the same time powerful and 
weak in relation to regulating urban land use. In the instance of parking standards, the 
municipality possessed a significant strength while the governmental technologies 
possessed by the local government turned out to be of no use at all in relation to the 
parking business operating on empty land plots. The directive diagram possessed by the 
city (as discussed in Section 3.2) was both extensive and legally muddled. This situation 
resulted, as was shown in the chapter, from two factors: post-socialism and materiality.  
In terms of post-socialism, the continuity of parking standards from the socialist times 
to the contemporary urban planning in Estonia (with some change shaped by 
international norms) has made this governing technique natural and normal. Regarding 
new developments, then, the Soviet practice of designating certain number of parking 
spaces to certain building parameters has remained an accepted governmental practice 
and despite some critique, a strong technology of the local state. The private parking 
business, however, has become a concern for government only in the last years and its 
subjection to regulations has not been so easily taken for granted. Whereas the local 
state wants to govern private parking lots, the way that they are framed in relation to the 
law currently positions them outside the levers—such as urban planning tools—
available for a municipality in Estonia and raises even questions whether these spaces 
should be regulated by cities at all.  
Materiality has also been a factor influencing the ways in which the strong and weak 
state has panned out in relation to parking governing on private land. In particular the 
surface material has an importance. Not having and not needing a ‘proper’ surface 
coating made private parking lots on empty plots ungovernable by the local state. With 
surface merely gravel and no more substantial construction carried out, these land plots 
were not ‘construction’ in terms of law. It was thus impossible for the Tallinn 
municipality to regulate them despite their ‘will to govern’. These parking businesses 
have carved out a ‘legal void’ from the form of their material presence in the city. 
Materiality, thus, has participated in governing frameworks being a factor that is 
capable in changing the ways in which activities are comprehended by the state 
apparatus.  
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This chapter showed that instead of the continuous success of the ‘will to govern’ of 
urban governing that is assumed by some scholars (e.g., Blomley, 2011; Jones et al., 
2010, 2013; Valverde, 2012), we should attend to the multiple factors that influence the 
effectiveness of governing procedures. While some of the parking activities are tightly 
regulated, others fall into a ‘legal void’. ‘Legal void’ captures the situation whereby an 
activity is at the same time both legal and unregulated whereby the non-regulation is to 
a certain extent conceptualised as ‘normality’. To become regulated, the activity must 
be internally differentiated in such a way that certain aspects of the activity are illegal. 
This, then, allows conditions to be set up which have to be followed in order for the 
activity to be legal and thus to exist. These conditions include registration, licensing, the 
need to follow standards, consultation with authorities, etc. At the moment, in the case 
of the private parking lots that were discussed in Section 7.3, such conditions do not 
exist and the business remains outside local government influence.  
The following chapter extends the discussions of the law and regulation of parking from 
the point of view of material governmentality and post-socialism by looking at the 
interaction between the continuity of the socialist architectural forms; the changes of 
urban mobility from collective modes to individual cars; and emerging forms of 
governing that favour individualised responsibility. While this chapter dealt with the 
‘legal void’ (legal but unregulated) emerging from material conditions and historical 
changes and continuities, then the next chapter deals with phenomenon that is strictly 
speaking illegal but not fully enforced by the local government and is even legalised 
and regulated in order to deal with the problem of lacking parking space in areas 
planned for socialist concepts of mobility. Thus, the case in the next chapter is closer to 
a-legality (Lindahl, 2008, 2010, 2013) suggesting a different order of legal/illegal with 
new rationales directing the border between the two polar categories. 
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8 The material governmentality of the ‘parking 
problem’ in the Soviet housing estates 
Parking problems [in housing estates] are a direct consequence of the growth of car 
ownership in combination with too few parking spaces, although the large green public 
spaces provide a solution that cannot be found in inner city areas. (Dekker and van 
Kempen, 2005, p. 39)  
8.1 Introduction 
Both of the previous chapters focused primarily on parking in the central areas of the 
city. This chapter, however, discusses districts built in the outskirts of the city from the 
1960s until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. These areas—even though they do 
not form a location for travel from all over the city as the central districts—have been 
unable to accommodate the increase of car ownership that has taken place as early as 
the Soviet times but that increased rapidly from 1991 onwards. What makes the case in 
this chapter noteworthy is the way in which residents have found their own solutions to 
the so-called ‘parking problem’ which reportedly is one of the main issues for 
Mustamäe residents; it is only slightly superseded by the living expenses (Heidmets and 
Liik, 2012). But the local state is also in many ways active and directing solutions to the 
‘parking problem’ even if only with the active involvement of citizens.  
The case investigated in this chapter is as follows. Residents have parked their cars on 
(what used to be) grass, thereby collectively transforming it into parking lots. Such 
gradual and informal adaptation of space has nevertheless been supported by the city, 
which instead of enforcing legal norms that restrict parking on green areas, has instead 
accepted such a situation as well as legalised and in other ways formalised it. Thus, the 
adaptation of the neighbourhood by cars and the city’s support for it has generated a 
new vision of space in the housing estates, whereby instead of the automobility 
restrictions devised in the Soviet years, cars now hold a more prominent position. On 
the one hand, then, the change is a physical alteration of space from a car-restricted to a 
car-dominated urban environment. On the other hand, the change has also been 
institutional from centralised to more individualised governing approaches. I analyse 
these changes here through two key notions of this thesis—material governmentality 
and post-socialism—to unpack the complex process of physical and institutional change 
in the housing estates and to show how materiality as well as ‘history’ matters for the 
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choices of governmental techniques which here exhibit characteristics of ‘neo-
liberalism’.  
In Estonia as elsewhere in the CEE the shift has been towards less centralised governing 
with increasing importance of individual responsibility and market forces. Chapter 6, 
thus, showed the dislike towards strong state on the grounds of property and individual 
rights, and Chapter 7 highlighted the complexities for a local government to regulate 
private parking business on privately owned land. Both of these chapters dealt with 
governing tools that were mainly exhibiting the directive diagram of the local 
government as drawn out in Section 3.2. Such a diagram was most visible and 
successful in the case of parking standards (Section 7.2), but was often in contradiction 
with legal logic (as shown in Chapter 6 and Section 7.3). In this chapter, the 
administrative logic applies the liberal diagram utilising the freedom of individuals and, 
in particular, communities, as a way of governing (Cruikshank, 1999; Rose, 1999; 
Tally, 1999). Such ‘government through community’ (Cheshire et al., 2009; Lanz, 
2013; Raco and Imrie, 2000; Rose, 1999) involves ‘the building of responsible 
communities, prepared to invest in themselves’ (Rose, 1999, p. 136). Nevertheless, the 
freedom of communities was still directed in many ways by the local state that 
intervened through policy and funding, aiming to achieve certain ends (the 
formalisation of parking lots). The existence of such direction of the city owes much to 
the materiality of housing estates.  
Previously, Collier (2011) has brought together material environment, neo-liberal ideas 
and governmentality in the post-Soviet context, and this provides a useful starting point 
for the analysis here. According to Collier, the materiality of the Soviet urban space (a 
residential space in a Russian industrial town in his example) is an obstacle to neo-
liberal ideas of individualising governing and management. This chapter highlights the 
point by attending to the physical environment of a Soviet housing estate. The physical 
layout of housing estates—with roads, trees, playgrounds and parking lots in shared use 
between various buildings and borders complicated by the superblock urban plan—has 
favoured centralised control. However, rather than arguing for the continuation of 
Soviet state practices as a result of the physical space as Collier (2011) does, this 
chapter sees state control as only one aspect of the governing model, as it is brought 
together with individualised governing on the level of apartment buildings. The local 
state, thus, governs the construction of parking lots but does so by supporting flat-
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owners’ association (FOAs) to formalise what the drivers have informally created. The 
emergence of FOAs as active governors, however, owes to post-socialist processes. 
This discussion, thus, draws analytically on the term ‘post-socialism’ by highlighting 
the connections between continuity of socialist spatial forms (the physical layout of 
housing estates) and post-socialist changes and anti-continuities such as privatisation, 
increasing car use and diminishing importance of the state with concomitant value 
placed on individual responsibility. As the case reveals, although the local state acts in 
housing estates by providing financial and institutional support, it acts only through 
FOAs. In the society with diminished capacities of local states, the centralised control 
that housing estates require due to their material form has ended up as government 
through communities—flat-owners’ associations—in practice. Rather than developing 
radically new plans or challenging the car domination in housing estates, the city 
government of Tallinn has accepted the already informally created solutions and merely 
formalised them. This chapter thus attends to the analytical framework of neo-liberalism 
by showing how instead of purely ideological calculations, governing is dependent on 
the materiality (the physical plan of the space) as well as a pragmatic response to the 
ways in which decisions have been sequenced.  
The chapter takes the task of unpacking the concomitant nature of physical and material 
changes in the city through three steps. First, it defines the housing estate ‘parking 
problem’ that the chapter deals with and shows how residents have tackled it. This step 
lays the groundwork for seeing governing as a material endeavour by paying attention 
to the forces of cars and the malleability of grass. Second, the chapter draws out the 
material background for the emergence of the ‘problem’ and for the choice of solution 
by looking into the original urban planning ideas behind housing estates. Third, in the 
last section the chapter deals with the city’s response to the ‘parking problem’ by 
showing the individualised governing approach at work along with the continuing 
presence of the state.  
8.2 The housing estate ‘parking problem’ 
If the parking problem is ignored, the tenants will probably park their cars on the 
perimeter streets and beyond, so far as needed, possibly in violation of current or 
unforeseen future local regulations and certainly to the detriment of other 
neighbourhood residents. (National Housing Agency, 1946, p. 38) 
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Although the quote above is by an American housing association and is from the year 
1946 it captures precisely what happened in Tallinn’s housing estates after the fall of the 
Soviet Union in 1991. With the areas incapable of accommodating the increasing 
number of individual cars, the space has been adapted by parked cars. This has been 
going on mainly in an unorganised way, not overseen or managed by any central 
authority, including the local government (see Figure 8.1). The way in which cars have 
ended up taking over space is what is defined as a ‘parking problem’ by both residents 
and government officials alike. Still, even though the problem is defined in the same 
way, there are two different ways in which the cause of the problem, and thus also the 
solution, is seen. On the one hand, the problem is seen—mainly by residents and also by 
the city authorities—as the lack of parking lots. This perspective takes the increase in 
car ownership as a natural phenomenon and space as amenable to serve that trend. On 
the other hand, some of the actors concerned with the sustainable mobility perceive the 
problem to stem from the number of cars, and the solution to do with the management 
of parking activity which might include paid parking or parking restrictions to limit car 
use. 
 
Figure 8.1. Cars parking on the edge of green areas. Source: Author’s photo. 
Below are two pictures (Figure 8.2) that show these logics at work. The photo on the 
left hand side depicts the current situation where cars are parking in a row alongside the 
front of the building (see also Figure 8.1 above). Although in some places, cars have 
penetrated much deeper into the courtyard and taken over spaces used for other 
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functions
81
, in general they have remained parked alongside the edges of green space. In 
this way, still, much space is left for other functions besides parking. In contrast, the 
photo on the right of the Figure 8.2 is from Mustamäe General Plan (E-Konsult and AB 
Koot & Koot, 2006) and depicts a sample design plan for one site. In that case the 
whole of the inner courtyard would remain for pedestrians while cars are parked 
alongside a larger street (see red blocks drawn alongside roads in the picture on the right 
on Figure 8.2). In many ways it follows the underlying design logic of these housing 
estates—parking on the edges and as little traffic as possible close to the buildings 
(discussed more in Section 8.3). The planner who proposed this idea, and whom I 
interviewed for the research
82
, exhibited awareness of many innovative traffic planning 
ideas he had learnt at a university in another country (Germany) and through his own 
working practice. Nevertheless, even though this plan was exhibited in the General 
Plan, it has never materialised and has not become a general guiding principle for the 
future practice of governing the area. An urban planner employed by the city
83
, for 
instance, expressed her concerns about the plan as cars would be out of sight of their 
owners and, additionally, she claimed the need for children playgrounds to be less 
crucial than the need for parking lots.  
 
Figure 8.2. The current situation of parking (left) and the vision in the Mustamäe 
General Plan from 2006 (right). Sources: www.maaamet.ee (left) and E-Konsult, 2006. 
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82
 Interview no. 15 (14 March 2012)  
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The planner also echoed the position that the city holds: flat-owner associations (FOAs) 
themselves should be active themselves and take initiative in organising urban space 
around their buildings. In practice, and with city’s encouragement, this has meant the 
formalisation of the parking spaces that cars have already taken over. I will return to 
that point more thoroughly in Section 8.4. 
8.2.1 The malleability of grass 
While Minuchin (2013) notes how certain materials such as reinforced concrete allowed 
large-scale urban imaginations to be constructed, the materiality of grass allows new 
visions to materialise by being itself malleable to continual change. The material force 
of cars has been stronger than the force of the Soviet physical design of housing estates: 
rather than providing limits to the increase of car use, the physical environment with 
large grass fields has turned out to be amenable to transformation by parked cars. The 
lack of formal parking spaces did not restrict residents to acquire more cars and the 
space has been gradually adapted for automobiles. The regular occurrence of parking 
has slowly transformed the surface from grass to mud (see Figure 8.3).  
While in some cases governors have chosen to issue fines— for instance when cars 
extensively violate norms by parking on basketball courts—in the majority of the cases 
where cars are parked on the edge of the lawn, officials have refrained from issuing 
fines, even though they could easily spend a day ticketing parked cars in housing 
estates. With cars having turned grass into mud, such space has become a different 
entity for governors.  
 
Figure 8.3. The transformation of grass in progress. Left – a picture from winter of cars 
parking on ‘grass’. Right – the result of such activity. Source: Author’s photos. 
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Part of the reason for non-fining by the local government is the socio-legal question of 
materiality. Namely, while parking on the green without consent from the owner is a 
violation of Traffic Act (Riigikogu, 2010) article 21 and is enforced regularly, when no 
such ‘green’ materiality is visible any longer (as the surface has been transformed by 
parked cars so that it is no longer ‘green’ but mud) problems for officials emerge. An 
official interviewed for the research
84
 expressed that he would be unable to verify 
whether the car is parking on greenery or not if its wheels are not directly on the ‘grass-
blades’. I showed him photos taken while walking in the housing estate, which I 
considered to be showing clear violations of traffic rules. For him, however, they 
appeared to show nothing significant because no wheel was on the grass-blade. The 
winter, furthermore, as he explained, makes the rule enforcement impossible because 
nobody will scrape the snow off to see what is under it. Drivers, thus, through the 
mediation of cars, have carved out space that is no longer considered what it was, but is 
now a parking lot. The malleability of grass to the recurring weight of cars has allowed 
the transformation of space to occur: grass has been transformed into mud and the mud 
is not the target of law enforcement.  
Nevertheless, there are also factors at play other than the socio-legal question of grass. 
For example, as cars are increasingly accepted inside the blocks the organisation and 
understanding of the physical space moves further away from the underlying planning 
ideas of Mustamäe. The Scheme for Parking Provision (Tallinn City Government, 2012; 
my translation), which I introduce more fully in Section 8.4.3 below, admits that the 
construction of ‘[a]dditional parking spaces adjacent to dwellings takes place by 
reducing greenery and increasing somewhat the traffic in the residential quarter.’ 
Moreover, new projects for parking lot renovation often contain pavements for 
pedestrians, suggesting an increase of elements that according to the superblock 
planning ideas are not even necessary: traffic should be scarce enough that pedestrians 
and cars can share the street space inside the block.  
Thus, non-enforcement is not just the result of a socio-legal question of materiality but 
is also a manifestation of a new vision of urban space in the housing estates possessed 
by the local government, who works slowly towards making it a reality. The governing 
practices—such as decisions not to enforce parking on greenery/mud—that are ad hoc 
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and practical, still coagulate to an ideology about the way in which space is organised, 
who can use it and in what ways, and which actors should be responsible for the 
governing. The new vision of the space, as is claimed in this chapter, is not just 
something generated as an abstract idea but is significantly shaped by the physical and 
institutional conditions of housing estates. This takes the discussion back to the Soviet 
planning ideas and their sources of inspiration. Before moving on to discuss the 
governmental rationales behind the new vision of space for housing estates we need to 
understand the physical layout that this vision is adjusting and building on.  
8.3 The internal plan of housing estates and its relation to transport 
In order to understand the Soviet housing estates from this chapter’s point of view and 
pay attention to the organisation of transport, we need to make two shifts in the ways of 
looking at them. Firstly, we should position Soviet housing estates within a global 
process of urban planning where they evoke ideas used in various other instances. 
Secondly, we should transform the dominant idea of housing estates as a collection of 
living spaces in a bleak environment, a perspective epitomised by the case of Pruitt-
Igoe, and pay more attention to what was innovative in them. In order to pursue these 
two steps, I would like to start the discussion with a passage from a book written in 
1979 in Tallinn, the Soviet Republic of Estonia, by a renowned Estonian writer. The 
actions of the book are set in the oldest housing estate in Tallinn, Mustamäe—the same 
area that is the focus of this chapter
85—where six characters of the book are brought 
together not in a traditional narrative plot but rather through their shared everyday lives 
with additional thoughts about their environment added by the author. The following 
passage is by an architect who according to the script is a co-planner of Mustamäe and 
who aligns his thoughts with modernism. 
Architect Maurer knew very well that the city in which he lived [a Soviet 
housing estate] was an invention of the twentieth century. . . .  Maurer also shared 
the opinion that the creation of a new town was inevitable. One had to get rid of 
the evils of the previous formation. Le Corbusier and his numerous followers in 
all the countries of the world explained why the old town grew outdated . . .  The 
new towns had to be different . . .  The dark, dirty courtyards would disappear. 
Air and sunshine would be accessible from all sides. . . .  [However,] [b]uilding 
new towns came up against amazing, quite unpredictable obstacles. . . . For 
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 Mustamäe is built from 1964 to 1972 and is today home for about 68,000 inhabitants.  
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example, at the beginning of the fifties, a real new town was built in the United 
States, in St. Louis. It sprang up on the site of a former dirty suburb. It was 
designed by the finest architects. . . .  [But] [f]inally, the new town was almost 
empty. . . .  The attempt to change society and living conditions in the USA was 
reported to have ended in the municipality’s decision, in the mid-seventies, to 
blow up the abandoned dreamtown which had got out of control. This was the 
people’s answer to their benefactors! . . .  Maurer observed with astonishment 
how the architects of the new generation despised the City of the Sun . . . He 
remembered the sadness of a celebrated architect who liberated the outskirts of 
Rio de Janeiro from its squalid favelas and erected instead of them a beautiful, 
spacious, functional satellite town. Never again would hot-blooded samba 
rhythms ring here, the famous architect had sighed. And they hadn’t. But the 
architect made his choice. He preferred human happiness to the samba. Had the 
choice been wrong? Maurer asked himself indignantly. Would it be better to 
prefer the samba to human happiness? Down with Mustamäe! Let’s dance the 
tuljak between the vendors’ stands on Stroomi Beach. This was what the new 
generation of architects wanted to do in Maurer’s opinion . . . And they said the 
senseless large fields between the dull monsters that were the buildings were 
neither nature nor street, neither places nor spaces, neither roads nor squares. 
One could neither relax nor stroll there, neither lie down nor take a breath of 
fresh air, and the only idea they really seemed to suggest was that of drinking. 
Architect Maurer know very well that not everything had turned out perfectly at 
Mustamäe. . . .  [But] Maurer hated nostalgia. . . . He preferred the Sun to the 
Moon. (Unt, 1985 [1979], p. 85–91) 
In this text, one can recognise references to Pruitt-Igoe and what the character might 
have thought to be Brasília, there are references to Le Corbusier and Garden Cities, and 
one can also recognise Jane Jacobs and her critique of modernist planning. The book 
author’s own position appears to be more ambivalent than the positions that the 
architect Maurus refers to. Even though, Mustamäe appears as a bleak environment—
even the characters of the book do not really meet but rather coexist—the area is also a 
site for diverse lives each with their own particular challenge; it is a place for life. 
Those two representations of the site—everyday but slightly hopeful, drawn in contrast 
to dystopian—echo the story of the Pruitt-Igoe (Bristol, 1991) that Maurus in his 
musings briefly stopped at. The short life-cycle of the Pruitt-Igoe housing project has 
become an exemplary case for the critique of modernist planning as it has offered 
various grounds for such a critical perspective. While large residential buildings 
grouped together, opened for the sun and surrounded by greenery was seen initially as a 
road to happiness by many architects, the consensus changed rapidly. For the critics, the 
design was to blame for this failure. The internal galleries designed to be corridors 
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attracted gangs and the lack of traditional streets resulted in the lack of supervision by 
parents. Nevertheless, not every analyst has reached the same conclusion in terms of the 
physical environment. Bristol (1991), for instance, seeks to debunk the myth and show 
how economic crisis and racial discrimination played a larger role in the demise of 
Pruitt-Igoe than the design features. If we accept this critique and agree that the social 
and economic conditions of the place are what really matters rather than the 
architectural form, then one might raise questions about whether materiality is really 
important. 
Indeed, one should avoid ‘physical determinism’ and not jump from material 
manipulations of space to ideas of community. It is true that modernist planning 
concepts saw physical space as tied to the production of community which formed an 
easy target for critique due to the simplistic assumptions about the possible effects of 
physical design. Much of the critique on the neighbourhood unit has focused precisely 
on this (Brody, 2013, p. 341; see also Mumford, 1954). Yet we do not have to treat the 
influence of these designs in such radical ways. 
One can reasonably agree that there are certain things that manipulated materiality 
allows for or supports being done. The neighbourhood unit concept from 1929 was 
premised on physical design features like the size of the area that can be walked without 
crossing bigger streets, its related school catchment area, and arrangement of buildings 
so that they can receive more sunlight and greenery. Such aspects cannot be presumed 
to be insignificant. As Mumford (1954, p. 264) claimed: ‘even if no further advantages 
of face-to-face association and friendly intercourse and political cohesion followed from 
neighborhood planning, one could easily justify it on economic terms [rationalisation of 
movement patterns] alone.’ In parallel to Latour’s (1992) use of the speed bump 
example where he did not claim that new responsible citizens are created by this 
material intervention, we should not move to draw broad conclusions for the effectivity 
of neighbourhood plans. Nevertheless, while the speed bump does not immediately 
create new responsible citizens, that does not mean it does not affect cars—it certainly 
does. A speed bump’s physical effect leads to drivers slowing down. In the same way, a 
street that is too long and winding and with multiple intersections discourages driving 
through when there is a shorter and quicker passage around. The physical design of 
neighbourhood units, according to Lawhon (2009) drawing on the work of Jon Lang 
and Herbert Gans, should not be seen as deterministic but as creating physical 
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conditions for some actions to be possible or even probable. While not ascribing too 
much agency to materialities we still should be attentive to their effects. 
The material techniques of governing the housing estates—such as the internal plan of 
housing areas, street layout and courtyard structure—have their history in urban 
planning utopias that have utilised them as possible ways to programme behaviour. 
While Soviet urban planning sought to develop a ‘socialist’ vision of space in its earlier 
years, it settled with less ambitious plans from the 1930s onwards and since the 1960s 
adopted modernist housing construction principles. Soviet urban planning thus linked 
itself with ideas embedded in modernist housing such as the importance of greenery, 
sunlight and traffic planning. Before I move to explain those aspects, I will give an 
overview of the changing practices of Soviet urban planning before it settled on housing 
estates as the principal mode of urban expansion.  
8.3.1 The search for socialist housing and the adoption of modernist 
housing estates 
The search for socialist urban planning models and principles started with the formation 
of the Soviet Union in 1917. Whereas the 1950s signalled the beginning of 
industrialised city building and the 1930s/1940s were an era of pompous architecture, 
architects and urban thinkers in the 1920s were more idealists. They looked at how the 
form of the city could reflect and in turn support socialist ideology. The debates around 
the form of the socialist city that took place in the early Soviet period are usually 
divided into two camps (Bater, 1980; French, 1995; Ikonnikov, 1988; Sprague, 1974): 
de-urbanist and urbanist. De-urbanists drew inspiration from the Garden City idea and 
imagined people living in ribbon developments alongside roads where automobiles or 
buses took them to the places of work (French, 1995; Ikonnikov, 1988). Urbanists, by 
contrast, stressed the benefits of dense urban living but, departing from the existing 
forms of cities, focused on smaller urban centres with communal living quarters and 
extensive greenery. Nevertheless, in general both urbanist and de-urbanist schemes were 
quite utopian (Bater, 1980). For instance, de-urbanists wanted the city to be organised 
around automobiles, of which only about 1700 were produced annually in the Soviet 
Union at this time (Ikonnikov, 1988), while urbanists propagated collective living which 
was far from a widespread practice of the society (Bater, 1980). A third approach fitting 
to neither of the two camps was that of Nikolai Miliutin’s famous work Sotsgorod 
(Socialist City) (Miliutin, 1974 [1930]) where he envisioned a lineal city with physical 
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connections between production and living inbuilt to the idea of the city. However, 
those debates were eventually discontinued in 1931 when, at the Bolshevik Party 
Congress, the positions held by all three were criticised (Sprague, 1974) and the Soviet 
city was declared to be any city located on the territory of the Soviet Union.   
Before the debates on how socialist living should be contained in urban form were 
discarded in 1931, architects and thinkers in the Soviet Union were involved in 
discussions with urbanists around the world through various international linkages. 
Even though the Soviet Union was not known for its international openness, the 1920s 
were years of global learning for architects and urban thinkers. This was the time when 
a number of open architectural competitions with architects from Western European 
countries taking part were held. Famously, Le Corbusier visited Soviet Russia in the late 
1920s remarking of his works sent to Russia (Le Corbusier, 1967 [1933], p. 90): ‘My 
work will not remain – I trust – in some Soviet desk drawer until the next ice age.’ 
Soviet urban thinking at the time was not an isolated activity, but it rather reflected on 
and drew its inspiration from Western European and American ideas.  
After the years of major international influences and a more fundamentally ideological 
perspective, city construction from mid-1930s to 1950s was orientated towards 
grandiose architectural projects. It thus did not do enough to alleviate the lack of 
housing which became especially intense after the Second World War resulted in 
significant damages to the building stock. Then, large inner city apartments were often 
occupied room by room by families who shared a kitchen and a bathroom (see 
Gerasimova, 2002 on communal apartments). Such living conditions were tight and 
problematised by governors. Yet urban planning and construction were not ready for the 
task to change the situation drastically. However, after the death of Stalin in 1953, under 
the leadership of a new secretary of the Communist Party, Nikita Khrushchev, a new 
direction was taken towards extensive dwelling construction with—as was termed in 
1954 meeting with the Congress of Builders—the annihilation of extravagances in 
architecture and construction. This was the end of the pompous architectural style and 
the starting point for rational industrialised construction. In the late 1950s, the Soviet 
Union bought Camus factories from France to construct prefabricated blocks. This step 
signalled the starting point for massive urban building. Prefabricated blocks as building 
material and housing estates as the principle urban planning idea became tied together 
in practice. Almost all the cities in the Soviet Union as well as in the Eastern Bloc 
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received a ring of housing estates that surrounded the older parts of the city. These give 
cities today their ‘socialist’ character.  
Housing estates, of course, are not exclusively Soviet phenomena. They have been the 
response to urbanisation and industrialisation—or to slums that were the direct results 
of these processes—all over the world. Drawing on a study of large housing estates 
through the experience of seven cities from three continents, Florian Urban (2012) notes 
the intimate link between large scale housing and ideas of modernisation. Indeed, since 
the World War II, mass housing emerged as ‘the most efficient answer to the challenges 
posed by social plight’ (ibid., p. 13). Then, the USA and the UK had their social 
housing programmes, Sweden decided to build a million new homes for its residents, 
France built banlieus and Germany its Großsiedlungen.  
Nevertheless, even though mass housing in all these places shares similar planning ideas 
and historical roots, they have come to have different positions in different countries: in 
the USA, UK and France they have taken on a worse reputation than in Russia, India, 
China and Brazil, where they were ‘pragmatically accepted’ (Urban, 2012). In countries 
where half of the urban population lives in housing estates, as in the post-socialist 
countries, it is certainly difficult to simply disregard such residential forms or to 
imagine that they will soon disappear. While in Western European cities, the population 
that lives in housing estates is close to 10 per cent, in Eastern Europe the percentage is 
as high as 40% (Dekker et al., 2005) and in Tallinn, more than 50%. In socialist cities, 
building a city meant building housing estates. Rather than singular projects here and 
there in the city, the housing estate was a form of planned urbanisation. Like suburbs in 
American cities, housing estates were the way in which Soviet cities expanded outwards 
creating a new residential space which either improved living conditions for the current 
residents or was a first place in the city for those just moving in there. 
Housing estates offered not only high residential concentration but also ways of 
organising transport. As Bater (1980) argued through his reading of Russian sources, 
limiting the time used to get from home to work was a central principle in the Soviet 
town planning. There are different ways to achieve this: for instance, by mixing 
workplaces and residential areas as in contemporary ideas of sustainable cities. In a 
society where industrial jobs were dominant and the ‘strict separation’ of ‘non-
conforming urban land uses’ was one of the central principles of urban planning (Bater, 
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1980, p. 88), the solution was rather a concentration of housing with good links to the 
workplaces usually by public transit. However, housing estates were not just organising 
principles for travel from home to the workplace but offered innovative solutions for 
access to schools, kindergartens and shops. The way to deal with the latter issues was to 
use ‘micro-districts’ (mikrorayon in Russian, mikrorajoon in Estonian; see Figure 8.4 
and 8.5) as the principal building blocks of housing estates. Micro-districts contained 
(or were planned to contain) kindergartens, schools, shops and other services; all within 
walking distance from homes and accessible without the need to cross streets that had 
high traffic volume, thus providing safe passage for pedestrians.  
In the way micro-districts were planned they paralleled older neighbourhood utopias 
such as ‘neighbourhood unit’ proposed by Clarence Perry in the USA, as Triin Ojari 
(2004) argued through the case of Mustamäe. In the next section I unpack the ways in 
which neighbourhood utopias offered ideas to deal with greenery, sunlight and traffic to 
advance living quality of city residents. The next section thus draws out the material 
context in which the ‘parking problem’ (discussed in Section 8.2) emerged and where 
today the ‘governing through community’ techniques have been devised and put into 
use (Section 8.4).  
 
Figure 8.4. Micro-district no. 4 in Mustamäe forming a classical superblock. Borders 
between properties are shown with yellow lines. Source: Estonian Land Board’s web-
based mapping system, www.maaamet.ee. 
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Figure 8.5. Three micro-districts forming a residential complex (housing estate). 
Source: Bater, 1980, p. 103. 
8.3.2 Neighbourhood utopias: greenery, sunlight and traffic planning 
Surprising though it may sound, Modern blocks of flats went in many respects 
but a short logical step beyond Reilly Greens and Radburn cul-de-sacs. Some 
Zeilenbau blocks, with parks on one side and short access roads on the other 
appear, on plan, like Radburn cul-de-sacs with their end blocks shorn off. Blocks 
of flats constitute the logical conclusion in the attempts to provide open space 
around dwellings and to eliminate the ordinary corridor type of street. 
(Glendinning and Muthesius, 1994, p. 100) 
Considering the urban planning ideas behind large housing estates, what is important is 
not only their scale but also how they propose to move away from the traditional urban 
form. The planning ideas that housing estates draw from were based on three points: 
offering significant amount of accessible greenery; spacing buildings and arranging 
them in a way that dwellings would receive ample sunlight; and planning traffic in a 
way that safe pedestrian mobility is improved. Such ideas were combined into the 
concept of the ‘super-block’ that proposed a significant expansion of the street block in 
order for the space for pedestrians to be increased and the green space that residents can 
access—especially without crossing a street—to be larger. This might seem a simple 
idea, but it entails considering multiple aspects of the physical design of space. Such 
planning ideas are forms of material governing, as they organise people’s livelihoods 
through the ways in which physical space is organised.  
THIRD PARTY CONTENT REMOVED 
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Figure 8.6. Perry’s neighbourhood unit concept. Source: Perry, 2001 [1929], p. 88 
Even though the precise history of these ideas about neighbourhoods is contestable 
(Johnson, 2002), a widely accepted key figure is Clarence Perry through his work 
Neighbourhood Unit (Perry, 2001 [1929])
86
. He proposed (ibid., p. 34) that ‘an urban 
neighbourhood should be regarded both as a unit of a larger whole and as a distinct 
entity in itself.’ For him, neighbourhood units are areas with a certain size dictated by 
the services positioned inside a block, most particularly an elementary school, that 
should be located so that there is no need to cross large streets (see Figure 8.6 for key 
elements of ‘neighbourhood unit’). In order for roads inside the block to carry less 
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 Johnson (2002) argued that William Drummond proposed similar ideas decades earlier: “As 
Drummond set boundaries and size, so did Perry. As Drummond (and the City Club) called for open 
spaces and recreational facilities, and placed institutional buildings centrally, so did Perry. As Drummond 
located commerce close to peripheral rail and traffic junctions, so did Perry. As Drummond and the City 
Club suggested restricting local streets and banning through traffic, so did Perry. As Drummond and 
Unwin described a ‘Unit’, so did Perry.” (ibid., p. 241) 
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traffic, the arterial roads surrounding the block need to be widened. Such planning 
structure is known as a superblock: ‘a relatively large residential area bounded, in part 
at least, by through traffic streets but free from such traffic within its boundaries’ 
(Panerai et al., 2004, p. 26). In the words of this architecture dictionary, the superblock 
is an area ‘containing a complex of houses, shops, schools, offices, etc., around a central 
green or pedestrian space, [and] ringed by roads from which cul-de-sac service roads 
provide access’ (Fleming et al., 1998 [1966], p. 468).  
While the neighbourhood units in practice have been mainly suburban single-family 
residential areas, in Perry’s work the neighbourhood unit was not restricted to low-rise 
built forms and also included drafts for inner city redevelopments. In the latter case his 
ideas look quite similar to those of Le Corbusier’ that I will discuss next. It is therefore 
not surprising to see the superblock form also in ‘housing estates’ of the Soviet Union, 
‘superquadras’ in Brasilia, ‘environmental areas’ in the influential British town planning 
report known as ‘The Buchanan Report’ (Buchanan, 1963) and elsewhere (see 
Glendinning and Muthesius, 1994, p. 97 – 100 on British mass housing development 
and its connections to neighbourhood unit).  
In La Ville Radieuse, Le Corbusier (1967 [1933]) offers an influential take on the 
superblock idea (see Figure 8.7), even though he does not refer to Perry. In this work, 
Le Corbusier directed his critique at the traditional street pattern that forms what he 
called ‘corridor-streets’ where tall buildings follow the street pattern in the perimeter of 
a city block curtailing sunlight for residents and where pedestrians and cars criss-cross 
each other in the streets. Le Corbusier did not assume that streets and buildings should 
be related to each other and positioned buildings, instead, all over city blocks that, at the 
same time, were larger than usual. In that way, he could surround each multi-storey 
apartment block with plenty of green space, leaving space between the buildings so that 
the apartments in them would receive plenty of sunlight. Still, not just concerned with 
access to sun and greenery, the planning structure was also concerned with the ways in 
which traffic should be organised. In La Ville Radieuse, cars and pedestrians are 
completely segregated. When cars enter the 400-by-400 metre car-free area—which is 
essentially a superblock, even though not called so by Le Corbusier—their movement is 
restricted to parking lots under the residential buildings from which a driver must 
continue as a pedestrian. For pedestrians, all the space of the superblock is left for 
walking or playing outdoor sports. From the block, only 12 per cent was planned to be 
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taken by apartment buildings meandering in various patterns whereas the other 88 per 
cent was, in Le Corbusier graphs, space for football grounds, tennis courts etc. 
 
Figure 8.7. A housing block in Le Corbusier’ La Ville Radieuse. Source: Le Corbusier, 
1967 [1933], p. 163. 
Superblock-planning devised vast green spaces that with their size attracted critique 
from influential critic of modernism, Jane Jabobs (1992 [1961], p. 22), who mockingly 
suggested that the greenery in Corbusier’ cities was only good for those like Cristopher 
Robin to go ‘hoppety-hoppety’ rather than for the actual urban residents. Indeed, the 
greenery would essentially form an open park which, like any park, is meant for people 
on foot. However, the difference from parks is that there are buildings inserted into it 
and those buildings also need access by cars, one way or another. There are different 
ways in which the issue of vehicular access can be solved. All of the parking could be 
centralised in the edges of the block and the houses inside the block would not have 
direct vehicular access. This is how Le Corbusier planned Ville Radieuse and this is, 
partly, how superblocks were planned in Mustamäe in Estonia. Parking, however, could 
also be organised adjacent to the buildings, in which case the cars would also need to be 
able to drive inside the area. This solution is what can be seen in many suburban type 
superblocks—such as Milton Keynes—where the main aim has not been a total 
segregation of pedestrians and cars but rather a general decline of traffic close to 
dwellings by limiting through-traffic inside superblocks.  
THIRD PARTY CONTENT REMOVED 
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While the organisation of transport is a central aspect of mass housing planning, the 
academic as well as popular perception towards such areas has centred mainly on 
housing. But houses do not stand in a vacuum and any planner has to consider the way 
that buildings are located and what happens between them. In mass housing estates 
where the buildings are increased to a significant height, their location in a superblock is 
not an epiphenomenon but an underlying aspect of the whole planning principle. Not 
only does the density matter—by making it easier for the areas to be serviced with 
public transport
87—but streets (or pathways) were planned by paying close attention to 
the pedestrian environment. On the one hand, large amounts of space are meant to be 
free of any form of vehicular traffic. On the other hand, streets are ordered in a 
hierarchy based on traffic volume whereby a pedestrian has to share space with only a 
limited amount of traffic in the superblock.  
 
Figure 8.8. Different cul-de-sac street patterns. The right-above is similar to the 
housing estate cul-de-sacs (see Figure 8.9). Source: Adapted from Southworth and Ben-
Joseph, 2004, p. 30. 
Therefore, the streets in superblocks are often cul-de-sacs that are defined by The 
Oxford English Dictionary (cit in Southworth and Ben-Joseph, 2004) as dead-end 
streets with entrance from only one side (see Figure 8.8). Already early neighbourhood 
planning examples such as the Garden City in Hampstead in London and in Radburn 
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 Nevertheless, public transit has not been the key concern in all of the mass housing developments (for 
instance, superquadras in Brasilia were oriented for cars) (Urban, 2012). 
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utilise cul-de-sacs. Southworth and Ben-Joseph (2004) offer an optimistic take on the 
cul-de-sac. In their view, it could provide safer and quieter urban environments when 
used in a thought-through way, rather than as it has often been applied in the post-
WWII American suburbs. The examples of using bollards, large concrete planters or 
other similar physical barriers—which, while easy for a pedestrian or cyclists to 
navigate, limit car traffic—could be conceptualised as creating cul-de-sacs even in 
traditional grid-patterned streets as depicted in Figure 8.8 (Southworth and Ben-Joseph, 
2004). Therefore, cul-de-sacs are design elements for reducing traffic and not just a 
cultural phenomenon of the American suburbs. They were put into use with the aim to 
reduce traffic in superblocks; also in Soviet housing estates.  
To sum up, the ‘environmental area’ of The Buchanan Report (Buchanan, 1963), 
Clarence Perry’s ‘neighbourhood units’, ‘superblocks’ in Radburn’s planning (1928), 
‘superquadras’ in Brasilia, ‘mikrorayons’ all over the Eastern Bloc are all products of 
the same line of thinking. What matters here is not so much the specific flow of ideas 
but similarities in the ways in which dwelling in the city has been conceptualised. There 
are three core ideas in those urban planning concepts: first, making city blocks large 
enough for a significant amount of accessible greenery to be provided; second, spacing 
buildings and arranging them in a way that dwellings would receive ample sunlight; and 
third, utilising superblock planning ideas for easy and safe access to services coupled 
with hierarchical street pattern with streets inside the block planned so as to restrict 
traffic (as cul-de-sacs with separate pedestrian paths cutting through super-blocs). On 
the latter point, the planning models have diverged slightly, with some authors (such as 
Le Corbusier) propagating the complete segregation of modes of transport where no car 
would meet a pedestrian whereas others take a tempered approach by limiting the need 
for cars to enter the inner parts of the block with roads planned as cul-de-sacs. The latter 
option works well with lower levels of car ownership and use. However, a rapid 
increase in car ownership—such as occurred in Estonia—may lead to the domination of 
automobiles in the inner streets of the block essentially rendering ideas of sharing space 
between pedestrians and cars useless. Before moving on to discuss approaches to 
governing these changes in Tallinn, it will be helpful to assess the original automobility-
restriction plans of Mustamäe. 
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8.3.3 The automobility-restriction plan of Mustamäe 
The physical plan of Mustamäe set out to restrict the movement of cars inside living 
quarters. On the one hand, the number of cars entering a block was limited by using the 
superblock/neighbourhood unit structure with wider streets at the outskirts and only 
small roads inside a block. On the other hand, vehicular mobility was restricted directly 
by blocking the possibility of driving through a superblock. Thus, some of the roads in 
the micro-districts were designed as cul-de-sacs that made it physically impossible to 
drive through (see Figure 8.9). The cul-de-sacs were already designated in the first 
planning documents for Mustamäe from the early-1960s (even though they were not 
called cul-de-sacs but rather ‘dead end streets’88): 
The width of dead end streets leading to the groups of houses is 5.5 metres; the 
width of the street to individual dwelling is 3.5 or 2.5 metres, depending on the 
circumstance. The streets with the width of 3.5 metres also have extensions for 
overtaking and turnaround triangles [visible on the Figure 8.9; where the arrow 
indicates]. (Eesti Projekt, 1964; my translation) 
In addition to the dead end streets, the plan regulated automobile use by narrowing 
streets so that parking on them would not be possible (or would be possible only for a 
limited number of vehicles). Parking was planned to take place in garages at the outer 
parts of the micro-district. Vehicles, then, were meant to be contained on the wide 
streets surrounding superblocks, only entering infrequently close to the buildings to 
deliver something to an apartment or to take residents on board. A later plan for a 
refurbishment project in 1985 more thoroughly conceptualised the traffic management 
by cul-de-sacs: 
With the new traffic organisation the aim has been to reduce driving through the 
micro-district. The traffic that would endanger pedestrians and children playing 
around buildings on streets in front of the houses is reduced. . . .  [W]ith the new 
traffic plan, dead end streets are created in front of the houses. In order to curtail 
traffic, metal bollards are planned to be fitted into the tarmac of roads. 
(Kommunaalprojekt, 1985, p. 5; my translation) 
Lastly, pedestrian circulation was not confined to the roads, but people could walk via 
direct routes through the courtyards and between buildings. This kind of pedestrian 
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 Although the term ‘dead end’ street would not have the same cultural connotation as cul-de-sac it has 
the same material function of not allowing through traffic. 
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movement exhibits the thinking by Le Corbusier and Perry for whom the superblock 
form provided freedom for people on foot.  
 
Figure 8.9. Cul-de-sacs in earlier Mustamäe Plan (black arrows). Source: Riigiarhiiv 
(Eesti Projekt, 1964)  
The focus on traffic planning here hopefully helps to decentre housing estates from the 
popular critique directed to the lack of construction quality, dull living environment and 
limitations to social interactions (e.g., Kalm, 2002; even Soviet Union authors such as 
Ikonnikov, 1988). I am not saying that this critique has been misdirected: there are 
certainly significant grounds for such sentiments. Yet, some of the ideas that housing 
estates embody are more forward looking than often discussed. I agree here with Dekker 
et al. (2005, p. 5) who propose that not only is it premature to claim that housing estates 
in Europe have reached the limits of their ‘useful existence’—they will be present for 
long time—but ‘large estates have an important part to play in promoting sustainable 
urban development more broadly, given their compact morphology, abundant open 
space, and their potential to benefit from public transport links and the development of 
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green heating and energy systems.’ The Soviet urban plan of housing estates, for 
example, exhibited a vision in which car use was meant to be curtailed. 
Those physical features of housing estates, however, are being modified in the changed 
political order. The increase of car use generated a ‘parking problem’ with cars taking 
over spaces initially meant for other functions (see Section 8.2). The contemporary 
process of official parking development in housing estates is primarily through a 
widening of existing cul-de-sacs (as well as other inner streets) so that parking becomes 
possible, with the result being that the whole traffic planning from Soviet times loses its 
meaning. Today, more and more cars are driving around the buildings making life 
increasingly difficult for pedestrians. In that way, the pedestrians are marginalised 
inside the housing estates and one of the principal aims of neighbourhood utopias—the 
pedestrian priority in superblocks—is gradually phased out.  
8.4 The city managing traffic and greenery in housing estates 
Having set out the ‘parking problem’ (Section 8.2) and the original planning ideas that 
generated physical design of the space accountable for the ‘parking problem’ (Section 
8.3), this section discusses the ways in which new governance arrangements have 
emerged to cope with the much increased demand for housing estate car parking, and 
how those ideas are related to materiality and post-socialism. This section draws out the 
effect of the physical layout of housing estates to the ways of urban governing and 
brings out the importance of post-socialist continuities, changes and anti-continuities 
relevant for the material governmentality of housing estates. As was argued earlier, the 
physical organisation of space has increasingly diverged from the ideas prevalent as the 
basis for the Mustamäe housing estate. However, in addition to shifts in ideas of traffic 
planning, the main actors responsible for governing in the area have also changed. No 
longer centralised housing associations but rather collectives of residents in each 
building—forming flat-owners’ associations (FOA)—are now important actors in 
governing and shaping the character of housing estates.  
Neighbourhood plans that utilise the superblock principle discussed in Section 8.3.2 
were planned to be centrally governed: either a central authority builds the area and 
carries out the daily management of multiple superblocks (neighbourhood units), or 
residents of a superblock themselves form an association responsible for governing 
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themselves. The latter was the way in which Perry perceived his neighbourhood units to 
function. He further hoped that such governing would provide residents with the means 
to learn basic democracy. It seems that none of the urban thinkers imagined the 
neighbourhood to be managed at the scale of the individual buildings.
89
 The physical 
plan of the neighbourhood makes such models of governing indeed complicated, as I 
will unpack below. Thus, despite the decentralisation of the governing of housing 
estates to the individual buildings (FOAs), the centralised actors—such as the local 
government and the state—are not entirely absent from the regulatory activities in the 
Estonian case.  
Even though all the dwellings are now privately owned, the state is an actor that 
influences and maintains those buildings as well as their surroundings and how this is 
carried out. We do not encounter a ‘void’ of the state regulations in this case as we did 
in Chapter 7. Rather, we encounter a helpful state that while not exactly building 
(parking lots) itself is less restrictive, for instance, as it does not push cars off the green. 
The state—as city government—rather increases possibilities for providing parking 
places. The state governs, but as we will see, only with the involvement of FOAs. The 
local state in this chapter draws more from the liberal diagram than the directive 
diagram in shaping how things are done in the residential district. The form of housing 
estates, however, is itself not a background but has a role to play in the forms of 
governing thus highlighting the points of post-socialism and materiality developed in 
this thesis. I will unpack these points by attending first to the general principles of 
governing housing estates, followed by a discussion on the context for governing 
generated by the privatisation. I end this section by discussing the Tallinn city 
government response of formalising the ‘informal’ parking provision of Mustamäe 
through activities of FOAs. 
8.4.1 How to govern housing estates? 
In a nutshell, three different governing actors are possible in residential areas (hereafter 
referred to as first, second and third model), from the most individualised to a collective 
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 Le Corbusier ideas are even associated with ‘authoritarianism’ and strong centralised control which 
does not leave much space for individual control whether on the level of building or even a 
neighbourhood (Scott, 1998) which is what at least Ebenezer Howard and Clarence Perry envisioned in 
their urban imaginations.  
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agent acting at the most encompassing level
90
. Firstly, a whole apartment building could 
have a single owner to whom residents pay rent (a typical model for apartment 
buildings built in 1920s and 1930s in Estonia). Secondly, apartments could form a 
collective that governs a particular building (as a condominium or cooperative). Thirdly, 
a large housing corporation or city/state department could be the one that takes 
responsibility for a number of buildings (common in the Netherlands, for instance). 
Each of those models defines a different relation between the resident and governing 
processes but also between the resident and the building and the surrounding 
environment.  
Housing estates in general have been built by the state and governed by the state (the 
third model). Such large scale construction has taken advantage of economies of scale 
by manufacturing a large number of standardised building elements as well as allowing 
the preparation of sizeable areas for construction. However, the governing procedure 
has also been in a major part influenced by the physical space of the housing 
development: both the materiality of a building and the physical layout of the housing 
area matter for governing procedures of maintenance, repair and physical amendments.  
Firstly, then, a building is not a static entity that remains intact once constructed and 
should thus be seen as a continuous process necessitating interference by human actors 
(Edensor, 2011). A building needs to be regularly maintained for it to exist: roof upheld, 
cracks and holes checked, pipes and wires changed and exteriors sustained. Multi-storey 
apartment buildings offer a particular challenge in this regard since the height and width 
of the building offer technological problems that need an organised undertaking. The 
materiality of the building is more than the sum of individual living spaces. While the 
roof covers only the upper floor it is essential for keeping the building up and needs to 
be maintained collectively. The same applies for water and heating pipes which are the 
responsibility of the house as a collective
91
. Exterior walls are more complicated in 
terms of ownership as each apartment has also a slice of exterior walls. Nevertheless, 
exterior walls are also those that carry the load of the house and are thus necessary for 
everyone in the building. Hence, the materiality of an apartment building necessitates 
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 I am interested here in the collective actors and thus leave an individual out.  
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 Pipes that enter an apartment belong to the flat. This is significant when a pipe bursts as the 
responsibility depends on whether it was the pipe inside an apartment of the one in the wall. The former 
makes apartment owner responsible for damages and the latter the house as a collective entity.  
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care by someone acting on a wider scale than individual apartments separately
92
. If the 
building is owned by a single institution such as a company (first model) or an 
association (third model) with individual apartments being rented, such an actor can be 
the larger organisation. In the second model—a condominium (or a flat-owner 
association but also cooperative
93
)—the separation of responsibilities between that of a 
single apartment and that of the house as a collective is a complicated matter, as one 
‘owns’ an apartment as well as a share in the building. In the second model then, the 
building is not managed by something separate from the residents but by each 
resident—who is an owner of the flat—as part of the collective. A house, then, is a 
socio-material entity that affects forms of governing.  
Secondly, in addition to the materiality of buildings, the way those buildings are 
positioned—that is, the physical plan of housing estates—is an aspect at play in 
affecting governing choices. Housing estates are planned as super-blocks which do not 
follow the traditional model of a city with houses, streets and parks all neatly separated 
but instead have all the three elements intermingled into a singular structure. With 
streets divided into hierarchies, the ones inside a superblock do not structure the city but 
rather meander inside a block in a relatively messy way. Green areas do not form 
separate parks but rather intermediary spaces between buildings. They are not so much 
spaces where one has to go but rather spaces where one is once one has exited a 
building. We can really claim that in housing estate superblocks, parks are not between 
houses but houses are located in vast parks. An area planned in this way necessitates 
governing on a wider scale than individual apartment buildings. With materialities of 
housing estates—such as benches, trees, children playgrounds, streets and parking 
spaces—not clearly divided between buildings, some form of coordination and 
governing on a more encompassing level has to be done. The case of Mustamäe parking 
governance will offer grounds to illuminate this point. With the direction taken towards 
housing privatisation in Estonia, complications have emerged in putting the second 
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 There have been debates in the Estonian legal discourse on whether one can become a member of a flat 
owners’ association against his/her will considering that FOAs are organised on the principles of non-
profit (and voluntary) organisations. In the courts’ deliberation, flat owners’ association are ‘compulsory 
associations’ to which one can join only through ownership of apartment or from which one can step out 
by selling the apartment. The building itself provides limits to the form of social organising devised. 
(Feldman, 2013) 
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 In a cooperative, the responsibilities are positioned more to the building as a collective but it still does 
not form something like the third model (association). 
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model of governing into practice. In the Estonian case, the shift in housing governance 
from the Soviet to the post-Soviet one has been from the third (centralised organisation) 
to the second (organised in flat-owner associations) model of governing. In the case of 
governing buildings this model has worked without major complications (although with 
quite active state intervention) but has been more complicated in relation to the housing 
estate’s physical landscape and thus for the management of car parking. 
In order to understand the background for such shifts in governing as well as how they 
have worked in the practice, the next section offers a discussion on the process that has 
become known as privatisation (e.g., Marcuse, 1996; Murie et al., 2005). The 
privatisation, however, was not simply something that was decided on paper and 
worked into practice. Rather the decisions of what to privatise and to whom were 
affected by the physical space in which the privatisation had to take place.  
8.4.2 Privatisation of housing estates 
Estonia’s strategy in terms of privatisation was a rapid transfer of assets from state 
ownership to that of individuals: in the case of housing estates, this was not done 
through restitution (see Feldman, 1999) but by using Vouchers given based on working 
years, former tenants of apartments could purchase their dwelling on very affordable 
terms (Kährik et al., 2004). Whereas at the beginning of 1994, 29% of dwellings were 
privately owned, five years later, at the beginning of 1999, the percentage was already 
93% (Statistikaamet, n.d.). The shift was thus from the almost complete state ownership 
of housing at the end of the Soviet time (in 1991) to more than 97 per cent of private 
ownership today (2014). Eventually, houses were transformed into condominiums with 
each flat-owner owning their apartment and a share of the land under the building and 
around it. Those two privatisations—dwelling and land—however, were not 
coterminous, with the transfer of dwellings taking place sooner than the transfer of the 
surrounding territory. In Tallinn’s housing estates, some of the land is still classified as 
‘un-reformed land’ officially managed by a central state authority (Estonian Land 
Board). Thus, the two key points in this section are: first, the emergence of individual 
apartment buildings—each with tens if not hundreds of apartments—as units for 
decision-making; and, second, the way in which the housing estates’ land is distributed 
amongst a number of different owners—individual apartment buildings, different local 
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government authorities
94
 and in some housing estates also the central state authority. 
Rather than a transfer of assets from the central authority to individual subjects, the 
privatisation therefore appears as a more complex mapping of a range of different 
administrative divisions onto the physical space. The physical space itself was moreover 
not a background but a participant in the privatisation process. The way it acted then, 
has consequences for contemporary local government practices, notably, as discussed 
later, in terms of parking.  
While some apartment buildings are still managed by large housing companies 
(although flats are privatised), the shift has been towards management by FOAs. FOAs 
are formed by residents who have shown that at least half of the apartment owners of a 
building are in agreement that the association should be set up. FOAs range from small 
ones with less than ten members mainly located in inner-city early-20
th
-century 
apartment districts to those with more than a hundred members located in Soviet 
housing estates. An FOA is responsible for all the collectively owned spaces and, as the 
representative of FOAs stressed in the interview
95
, does not form a separate entity but is 
a collective body where every flat-owner is an equal partner. FOAs are responsible for 
the general governance (collecting money from flat-owners to pay utilities), 
maintenance and repair (hiring private firms to do the work and organising financing 
from the flat-owners, sometimes with the help of bank loans). In addition to taking care 
of the building, which understandably is a key concern for residents, FOAs also manage 
the land plot they have privatised. This marks a move away from the Soviet time 
governing procedures where maintenance and renovation of buildings and surrounding 
areas was the responsibility of large state-owned corporations. Even in 2011, the 
Minister of Economic Affairs expressed (Parts, 2011, p. 8; my translation) how ‘[i]n 
five decades the occupation power managed to make the majority of dwelling owners 
into indifferent residents’ who the state now wants to support to become ‘true owners’ 
who are capable of making the right decisions and managing their buildings 
respectfully. 
The privatisation of land—known as the Land Reform—was legislated to start in 1991 
and for apartment buildings some years later. The start itself was slow and newspapers 
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 For instance, the land of schools and kindergartens belong to the responsibility of education department 
while other land to the city borough. 
95
 Interview no. 30 (17 July 2012) 
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reported how by 1999 most of the apartment buildings still had not privatised a land 
parcel (Hagelberg, 1999). While as little as 26% of land was reformed by the year 
1999
96
, in 2012 the percentage of land reformed had increased to 91% from the total 
land in Harju county (where Tallinn located) (Maaamet, 2014). Today, most of the 
buildings have privatised at least a certain portion of land. The size of the land to be 
allocated to each building was expectedly one important question in the whole process. 
If a land privatisation takes place, it is expected that the land under the building should 
belong to it. However, questions of whether more land than this should be privatised, 
and if so how much, are less clear.  
Regarding the amount of land to be privatised for the building, the Estonian Land 
Reform operated with the term ‘land required for servicing buildings’ (‘teenindamiseks 
vajalik maa’) which was defined as a legal concept in law even though the exact 
meaning remained vague and subject to interpretation. In most of the privatisation cases 
it was conceptualised as a couple of meters around the building. Whether it was set at 
this level in order to avoid paying more Land Tax as a planning expert and one of the 
authors of Mustamäe General Plan from 2006 suggested97 or for some other reason98, 
during the 1990s, car parking was not seen to belong to the ‘teenindamiseks vajalik 
maa’. A Supreme Court case from 1995 (Supreme Court of Estonia, 1995) echoed this 
opinion most vocally; it declined to see parking lots as land for servicing the building, 
in this case, for a hotel. A governmental document from 1998 defines ‘teenindamiseks 
vajalik maa’ as:  
the least necessary and sufficient amount of land under the construction and 
surrounding the construction that assures the use of the construction for intended 
purpose, its maintenances (repair etc), safe use (accident, rescue, fire safety and 
sanitation distances) and physical preservation. (Government of the Republic of 
Estonia, 1998; my translation) 
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 That is, either privatised or given to the state (mainly municipality) ownership.  
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 Interview no. 15 (14 March 2012) 
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 A city’s urban planner reasoned that the legal term was set for only some metres around the building 
following an old Germanic understanding of property. According to that understanding, as she claimed, 
the property extended as far that a repairman could be able to walk around and paint (Interview no. 23; 7 
May 2012). 
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Yet the ‘least necessary’ shows the desire to keep the land plot small and none of the 
examples given include parking. In contemporary parlance, however, this term has 
started to refer also to the parking lot. For instance, The Scheme for Parking Provision 
(Tallinn City Government, 2012, p. 2; my translation) that is going to be discussed in 
the next section, explains how ‘important facilities for servicing the apartment 
buildings, including parking spaces, cannot be accommodated on most of the apartment 
buildings’ properties.’ Even though the Scheme is not using the term in as legally 
precise way as it was used in the privatisation process, the intent and vision of the city 
governors is visible. A similar approach is elaborated in the Instructions for the 
Preparation of Detailed Plans
99
 where examples of the land necessary for servicing a 
building include a lawn and a parking lot. Thus, whereas initially the parking lot was 
not conceptualised as belonging to the building, the conceptualisation has since become 
more and more about seeing the parking lot as associated with a singular building. The 
Land Reform thus provided the basis for the emergence of a distinction within 
neighbourhood units between ‘our/ their’ land.  
Yet this process has been subtle and intertwined with multiple currents whereby no neat 
correspondence between spatial elements and their owners has emerged: land parcels, 
usually, are not gated while the individualising use of various spatial elements extends 
beyond the land linked to one’s apartment building. Such individualising uses include 
activities such as taking care of the vegetation (e.g., cutting branches of trees or 
maintaining flowers/bushes that are officially on the city land) or parking informally on 
the green that legally belongs to the local government (see Section 8.2). Streets inside 
blocks were not municipalised as ‘transport land’ as in other areas of the city and were 
lumped together either with the building (rare option) or with the courtyard (more 
common). Commenting on the privatisation process when the borders were being 
drawn, a councillor at the Mustamäe borough argued that in the superblock form of 
urban plan every piece of land belongs to everyone and it cannot be simply privatised 
(Hagelberg, 1999). Nonetheless, the basis for ‘ours/theirs’ land was created with 
privatisation, but this distinction has remained ambiguous and due to this uncertainty 
has complicated the assignment of responsibility (see also Figure 8.11).  
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 ‘Detailplaneeringu vormistamise täpsustatud nõuded’; available in web: 
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The privatisation of housing and the Land Reform generated the context whereby 
residents are organised into collectives based on apartment buildings with residents 
usually being the owners of their flats (organised into FOAs) while the land has been 
parcelled to those collectives only to a limited extent. Those FOAs have thus emerged 
as important actors in governing while much of the land in the neighbourhood has 
remained in collective use and in many cases in collective ownership (represented by 
the district government). Such physical space has required some wider level of 
intervention which in practice is done by the district government. Mustamäe district 
government has also intervened to the issue of parking provision and has started to 
formalise parking spaces already informally generated by car drivers.  
8.4.3 Formalising the informal response to the ‘parking problem’ 
The informal solution to the parking problem (parking on malleable grass) introduced in 
Section 8.2 turned out to be only a temporary informality. While it is ‘informal’ as it 
does not accord with formal rules, it is accepted and largely not contested by the 
governing bodies. It is contested only when the informal activity has gone too far, for 
instance extended to the basketball grounds or taking over entrances to the building. In 
other cases the enforcement officers
100
 have considered the ticketing impossible and 
overzealous. In such cases we are thus talking about the ‘normalisation’ of parking on 
greenery and a new vision of space whereby cars have acquired a more central position 
in the housing estates.  
Hence, while a number of individual activities of car drivers have altered the urban 
environment in housing estates, such alteration eventually has been solidified through 
formalisation by state authorities. The formalisation takes place mainly through FOAs 
but with the help of the city government authorities. Some FOAs have put up traffic 
signs of their own—sometimes with an agreement from the city authorities, but often 
without—to designate areas where cars can go or cannot go. Some FOAs have also 
improved existing informal parking lots by buying gravel and updating the parking 
areas turned into muddy and unpleasant spaces. In such cases, the city, however, could 
possibly interpret gravel as illegal—for instance terming it ‘rubbish’ stored on the city’s 
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property—and the FOA may receive a fine.101 Thus, for the situation to be fully 
formalised and settled, the state has to verify the actions that FOAs have taken. The 
state authorities’ measures towards such informal governing activities demonstrate that 
despite privatisation, the city is still an active player in the field of housing estate 
governance.  
While citizens have generated and dealt with the ‘parking problem’ because the city has 
been passive, their activeness has more recently been encouraged by the city authorities. 
In recent years the city has devised three measures that tackle the housing estate 
‘parking problem’: the city has devised a policy, the city provides funding for parking 
provision and the city privatises the use of land. What is significant in all those three 
measures is the way in which the city acts but does so only through a pro-active 
engagement of FOAs who, as I show below, are expected to be self-governing and 
responsible actors.   
The first of those measures—a particular policy scheme—was put together in 2012 by 
the city government to organise the provision of parking lots in residential areas. Even 
though it might look like a planning document that forms an agreement between 
different parties in terms of how and where the parking lots would be provided, it was 
merely an internal governmental document aimed to coordinate practices between 
departments to create parking lots. What is more significant, however, is the nature of 
the Scheme for Parking Provision (Tallinn City Government, 2012). To my question as 
to whether the city has a preference for where the parking lots should be provided, 
officials at Mustamäe district government showed me a planning document ordered 
from a private company mapping planned parking lots around apartment buildings
102
. 
Nevertheless, not only was this document prepared for less than a third of the Mustamäe 
territory but it also did not show where parking lots should be built but merely pointed 
out all the places where parking lots could potentially be constructed. In the end—as 
municipality officials stressed during an interview
103—parking spaces will be provided 
where FOAs ask for them to be provided. Thus, even though the city has a specific 
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 A concern expressed in an interview with a head of a flat-owner association (Interview no. 39; 24 
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 Interview no. 27 (9 July 2012) 
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 In multiple interviews and documents. 
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policy for dealing with the parking problem, the policy is not the blueprint for action but 
merely an idea that will be transformed into practice only when FOAs show initiative.  
The second measure applied by the city is funding provided for constructing parking 
lots. The most important of those financing measures is a programme Hoovid Korda 
(direct translation is ‘courtyards into order’) which annually supports approximately one 
hundred applicants. Despite the funding by the city, however, a significant portion still 
needs to be provided by city residents. The programme covers at the moment no more 
than 50 per cent of applicants’ construction costs. It thus assumes that each FOA is 
capable of securing finances among the apartment owners of the building. The 
programme, moreover, is competitive. While in 2010 the number of successful 
applications for the whole city was 68% (with 22 projects from 30 that applied in 
Mustamäe got funding), a year later the percentage for the whole city had dropped to 
43% (with only seven projects from 31 funded in Mustamäe) (Tallinn City Government, 
2011a). In response to my question as to how the selection of applicants is done and 
whether there is an underlying principle about where parking lots should be provided in 
the housing estate, the officials claimed the decisions to be based on the merits of the 
application rather than the logics of urban planning
104
. In advancing their parking 
options, hence, apartment buildings can compete for the city funding which also 
requires at least one third of self-funding
105
. Therefore, the funding by the city indeed 
exists but it is limited, competitive and dependent on the initiative of individual FOAs.  
The third measure for the municipality to be involved in ‘easing the parking problem’ of 
FOAs, as the vice-mayor claims in the local borough newspaper (Võrk, 2012), is by 
offering the use of municipal land to individual FOAs. Namely, the city has opened up 
the opportunity to enclose a portion of land for the exclusive use of a single building. 
While some houses decided and managed to privatise a larger land plot around their 
buildings, including parking lots and would thus not need land from the city, other 
FOAs have now acquired the ‘personal right to use’ on the city land. ‘Personal right to 
use’ is a 15-year rental agreement with the city for the utilisation (but also maintenance 
and renovation) of the parking lot (only; and not including street; see figure 8.10 
below). The existence of such a governmental tool, as city authorities have claimed, is a 
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 Furthermore, the city funding is giver only after the construction is done meaning that the FOA needs 
to fund the project initially itself.  
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result of the demands of FOAs. Those FOAs that had formalised their parking lots and 
financed it either fully or half from their own budgets felt it unjustified that cars from 
other buildings could also use the land. FOAs, having received the right from the city to 
use a land plot exclusively for a house, then hired private companies to enforce parking. 
These companies make use of a special registry set up for an apartment building to 
ensure that only cars from one building park there and cars from neighbouring buildings 
are ticketed. With the formalisation provided by the city, ‘us’ and ‘them’ is not anymore 
a matter of dispute or informal conflict between people, but is an enforceable principle 
where one group enjoys the right to park and the other group has to pay a fine in case of 
non-compliance with the rules. The third measure, similarly to the previous two, is 
utilised by city authorities but only through an active—even pro-active—engagement 
by FOAs. 
 
Figure 8.10. An example of ‘isiklik kasutusõigus’ [private use right] for an apartment 
building, shown with the blue striped area on this map (the red line demarcates city 
property). (Source: Tallinn City Government, 2011b)  
Thus, it is possible to conclude from the discussion of such measures that car parking in 
housing estates is very much a problem for the city government to solve. Even though 
the city does not act as citizens expect—that is, by providing parking lots for citizens to 
use—the city officials still draw plans, give advice, supply funding and offer city owned 
land for use to FOAs. Nevertheless, the ones expected to be pro-active are FOAs, who 
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are expected to organise themselves so that they can devise plans, manage financing and 
provide at least thirty per cent of the funding. The latter, for instance, positions FOAs in 
the sphere of financial relations where they might need to acquire loans and could even 
go into a bankruptcy. FOAs are thus expected to be ‘entrepreneurial, self-responsible’ 
actors (Larner, 2003) who manage their own matters themselves. It is fair to argue here 
that the city has policies that resemble neo-liberal tools of governing.
106
 From the two 
approaches to neo-liberalism—Marxist and Foucauldian (Clarke, 2008)—the former 
conceptualises neo-liberalism as a ‘class-based ideological project’ while the latter sees 
neoliberalism as ‘arts of government’ (Ferguson, 2010). The arts of governing car 
parking in Mustamäe involve techniques such as governing at the distance and through 
the freedom of individual actors. As the following section sets out, however, such 
governing techniques should not be perceived as purely instances of neo-liberal 
ideology but as particular manifestations of materiality as well as consequences of 
history (post-socialism) regarding the already made decisions that have lead to the 
ineffective and under-resourced local government where pro-active citizens step in as a 
response to fill the gaps of state capacities. 
8.4.4 Governing through flat-owner associations: materiality and post-
socialism 
The measures of governing introduced in the previous section are not merely elements 
of a neo-liberal city vision but are in many ways pragmatic and related to the spatial 
reality that city officials encounter in the housing estates. This section highlights why 
governing in Mustamäe is interventionist rather than simply laissez faire. The state lets 
residents know that solving car parking—as well as many other issues in the housing 
estate (see Figure 8.11)—is their problem but still intervenes in many ways to support 
their (pro-)activity (as I elaborated in the previous section). Then again, this section also 
reflects on the reasons why the city still does not intervene to a more significant extent 
by, for instance, organising the land it actually owns (similar to the way that it otherwise 
deals with streets in the central parts of the city).  
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 A vice-mayor, with whom I had an e-mail correspondence as well as a phone call regarding city’s 
support for parking provision (19 August 2013), referred to these measures as PPP procedures where flat-
owner associations have to act as ‘owners’. Nevertheless, I would not stress her reference to PPP too 
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contradiction to the country’s dominant neo-liberal developments (free public transit, social housing, 
municipal shops, but also more pensions).  
206 
 
Figure 8.11. The share of responsibilities in terms of various tasks between FOAs and 
the city authorities. 
From the different models that were discussed in Section 8.4.1, the city of Tallinn 
possesses a vision whereby FOAs are the ones that lead the decision-making, and they 
do that not only in terms of their buildings but also land around the building.
107
 
However, land plots are not fenced or clearly assigned to single apartment buildings as 
in older parts of the city and the city government does not sell or give the land away. 
The city remains a decision-maker in the housing estate. The conditions for the 
emergence of the ‘neo-liberal’ model of governing housing estates, with two 
components—active state and active individuals—present, are provided by the 
materiality of housing estates. In order to elaborate on the connection between neo-
liberal ideas and materiality, it is helpful to consider the analysis by Collier (2011) 
about the transformation—or rather the non-transformation—of the heating system in a 
post-Soviet Russian city.  
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what to another. Yet, for city officials I interviewed it seemed as a question of common sense rather than 
something that causes problems.  
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With the market reforms taking place after 1991 in Russia, the state with 
recommendations from WTO aimed to transform the heating system into a ‘pay for 
what you use’ type of a system. Such an idea, as Collier (2011) meticulously tracks, has 
its roots in basic neo-liberal thinking and was supported by bureaucrats in the higher 
level of the state apparatus. Nevertheless, such ideas could not be translated into 
practice due to the obduracy of the heating system itself. With the heat produced 
centrally and distributed via pipes to individual apartments, the adjustments in single 
apartments could not be effectively translated into the change of actual heat production. 
The material limits to governing procedures lead Collier (2011, p. 238) to argue that: 
‘Without a technical overhaul of entire heating systems involving massive capital 
investment—which is for the moment unanticipated and quite unlikely—there is not, 
and will not be, a sovereign consumer of heat in Russia.’ Thus, Collier claims the 
persistence of Soviet forms of governing—such as using norms rather than actual use 
for assessing tariffs—as directly linked to the persistence of physical environment. 
Nevertheless, I will highlight below how the physical form not only curtails 
individualising governing practices (which is still a more important aspect) but partly 
supports new and more neo-liberal forms of governing.  
Collier draws attention to the need to attend not only to the idea but also to the context 
that the idea deals with for understanding neo-liberalism. In order for the ideas to work, 
there are various aspects that have to fit with it; including that of the material 
environment. For instance, if the city of Tallinn wants citizens to act independently, 
why does the city not take a more laissez faire approach in housing estates? Why does 
the city help FOAs administratively, draw plans and offer funding? The answer for why 
the state-citizen relation in housing estates is not an anti-state freedom as described in 
Chapter 6 but rather a more neo-liberal model rests, similarly to what Collier (2011) 
discovered in the case of heating systems, on the materiality of the socialist housing 
estates. In the case discussed in this chapter, the crucial aspect is the physical plan of 
housing estates. Namely, the way housing estates are organised and the way in which 
the land is privatised to the buildings leads to certain expectations on how the FOAs 
should act. That is, if the efforts by apartment buildings are not coordinated, problems 
will occur.  
First of all, the vast green space is not clearly belonging to one house or another. The 
greenery is intermediary space in between houses belonging by the initial planning 
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ideas to everyone. Officially, it usually still does so today. Thus, all the new borders 
drawn in the public space of housing estates appear as problematic in relation to the way 
it has functioned for decades. Second, designating a land plot around apartment 
buildings to belong to the FOA also means the inclusion of street sections leading to 
other buildings which produces at least two problems: vehicular and pedestrian access 
to other buildings is compromised and responsibility for repair and maintenance of the 
road section is unclear. In the case of street privatisation it then must be clearly 
designated who, under what conditions, can pass through the property to prevent on-
going conflicts between the residents of different buildings. If street sections for public 
use are privatised to FOAs, each FOA will have only a limited incentive to renovate and 
maintain the street, as many other buildings will benefit as well. An FOA would be 
funding services for other buildings from its own budget. This would hardly be accepted 
by the district residents. 
Thus, due to the physical layout, someone has to govern at a more encompassing level 
than one building and its surroundings. In today’s situation in Tallinn, the only such 
institution is the local district government which acts in accordance with the general city 
guidelines. If FOAs plan anything, their first contact is with the district government. 
However, the respondents showed discontent with the lack of maintenance that 
courtyards and playgrounds have received by the city authorities. Similarly, the city 
district does not form a platform for discussing developments in the area, or a centre for 
considering what is lacking or what needs to be done largely due to its lack of 
institutional capacities for the whole district with 68,000 residents. This critique of the 
capacity of district authorities shows that even if the state wants to act—as it clearly 
does when we consider the ways it intervenes to support parking provision—it lacks the 
capacities to do so.  
The intention for the city to act pro-actively is also supported by the political context of 
Tallinn. Politically, Mustamäe is one of the main voter bases for the city’s most popular 
party (Keskerakond) that has been governing Tallinn—with some breaks—throughout 
the post-Soviet years. The party Keskerakond enjoys a stronger base in Mustamäe than 
they do in more central (and older) city neighbourhoods such as Kalamaja where the 
city authorities have been in more confrontational stance with local residents than in 
Mustamäe (leading also to a public outcry against paid parking in 2010). In Kalamaja, 
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however, the protest against paid parking also helped to induce
108
 a more active and 
capable citizen movement competent also in becoming a participant in the 
neighbourhood governing. Such a neighbourhood movement has become an actor on a 
wider scale than individual buildings while being still more attentive to specificities of 
the neighbourhood than the city district. The development of neighbourhood 
associations thus offers a model of mid-level governing between the city government 
(with its districts government) and individual buildings. Nevertheless, while one can 
talk of a trend in historical districts
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, no such neighbourhood movement has emerged 
in Mustamäe and FOAs face the incapacities of the city on their own. Due to those 
incapacities resulting from post-socialist changes and anti-continuities FOAs have been, 
by necessity, the actors that have become more capable in Mustamäe.  
With the central government decision to move towards private ownership and FOAs in 
1990s, individual apartment buildings have become the primary actors to take the 
responsibility of their living environment and it has been an understandable move to 
attach other responsibilities to their agenda. The FOAs’ field of responsibility has 
enlarged so they are now expected to take care of parking lots as well as renovating the 
building. While parking lots on the kerbside space of traditional city streets (as in 
Kalamaja) are seen as a local government responsibility, the physical layout of housing 
estates lacks clearly designated streets. Housing estates, as showed in Section 8.3.2, are 
rather like vast parks with buildings in them and roads meandering between the 
buildings allowing access. Buildings do not line streets with their own designated and 
fenced backyards, with parks located in separate areas as in older districts such as 
Kalamaja. FOAs in housing estates are thus centres of deliberation, decision-making 
and activity inside these park-like structures, capable not only of showing interest but 
also of acting in areas around them. With the number of flats usually around one 
hundred (if not more), such FOAs are quite powerful actors in governing and have 
emerged as pragmatic targets for taking over some of the responsibilities of governing 
in housing estates.  
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 The conversations with activists who challenged the city in 2010—many of whom are also my friends 
or acquaintances in Tallinn—highlighted the value of a common enemy (the paid parking in their 
neighbourhood) for citizen organising. The ‘enemy’ had different meaning for different people but it was 
yet a singular entity and in that, a uniting force.  
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 See, for instance, www.linnaidee.ee (last accessed 3 September 2014). Nevertheless, it must be noted, 
that these neighbourhood associations are collectives of active citizens and thus do not necessarily 
represent everyone’s voice in the area.  
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The decisions in the early-1990s also affected the financial capacities of the local 
government, making governing through FOAs a logical and pragmatic response. The 
fact that apartment buildings pay for their own utilities as well as maintain their own 
construction fund for repair and maintenance leaves no funding sources for local 
government to act in the collective interests of housing estates. This generates a context 
whereby the city can only use its general budget for intervention. The general budget, 
however, is also the source for many other expenses in the city.
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 Local governments 
are indeed responsible for many tasks in Estonia—the list of responsibilities is open and 
could contain anything that is important for the local life—while municipalities do not 
possess many options to increase their budget on their own.
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 Therefore, the current 
situation where the government is extended without extending the general budget, by 
using PPP approaches
112
 whereby funding comes in a large amount from the affected 
private actors (the FOAs) could be seen as a pragmatic response to solve the ‘parking 
problem’.  
There is thus a sequencing of decisions: by privatising all the residential blocks the 
decision-making by FOAs becomes a pragmatic governing solution. The city is not 
providing parking lots in a top-down way because it does not have to (FOAs have been 
created and are capable in taking over the tasks) and because it cannot do so (as there 
are no finances that would match the tasks). Even though the decisions made in early 
1990s did not anticipate the decisions in the late 2000s, they still provided conditions 
for the later decisions. The early 1990s aim of a radical break with the socialist reality—
as discussed in this thesis through anti-continuity (see more in Section 4.3 and 6.4.2)—
poses limits as to what can be done later on. If one would thus argue that the city 
follows neoliberal governmental technologies by governing through FOAs, it is not 
because it has done so by design but rather because alternative solutions to achieve 
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 This conundrum of how city’s financing is curtailed and dependent on ‘choices’ where other issues 
might be more important for the city than car parking was expressed by two city officials I interviewed 
about the management of parking provision in housing estates (Interview no. 49; 23 August 2013).  
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 An example of year 2013 income for the city of Tallinn illustrates this. Over half of the city’s income 
(56%) was from the Income Tax which is collected by central state institutions and transferred to local 
governments based on where citizens are registered; 22% was direct transfers from the central 
government for education, social care and other services, and investments; a further 6% was from Land 
Tax also managed by the central state. From the remaining 16%, about two thirds (12% of total city 
budget) is fees for services (including bus tickets, schools and kindergartens, renting of city’s properties). 
Local taxes are just about 2% of Tallinn’s income; half of it is parking tax.   
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 As a vice-mayor expressed in private e-mail correspondence on 19 August 2013 (see also note 106).  
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goals are limited and the solution described in this section emerged pragmatically. Thus, 
as the section highlighted, the two components of neo-liberalism—an active state and 
active citizens organised into groups—result more from the historical contingency and 
physical space than any actual ideology. The physical space of housing estates requires 
centralised intervention. Formerly made decisions to privatise apartments/land while 
also forming FOAs curtail centralised planning; it leads then to a historically specific 
and pragmatic post-socialist form of neo-liberal governance.  
8.5 Chapter conclusions  
While the regular narrative of neo-liberalism focuses on the role of (a circulating) 
ideology, this chapter showed the importance of materiality and post-socialism in 
understanding the working of governing procedures which could be named ‘neo-
liberal’. It is true that governors also exhibited ideas regularly characterised by the term 
neo-liberal by, for instance, promoting the responsibilisation of housing estates’ 
residents, so that they take their lives into their own hands. However, such a way of 
subjecting is not merely the consequence of a vision possessed by the governors but is 
also based on various other factors, among which I identified materiality and post-
socialism (and their combination).  
The selection of techniques by the governing authorities is shaped by the materialities to 
be governed which in the case discussed in this chapter also embodied planning 
thoughts from the Soviet times as post-socialist continuity. The materiality firstly led to 
a problem—the ‘parking problem’—as the physical plan did not fit with the increased 
car ownership levels. The Soviet housing estates were planned for low car-use and 
utilised a model whereby large numbers of cars were not planned to penetrate inside the 
superblocks. Such a model, however, has been radically transformed by increasing car 
use in Tallinn, creating a new and more car-oriented vision of housing estates. Such a 
model, generated by the recurring activities of cars, has also received backing from the 
local government who devised policy, offer funding and land to be used for parking 
lots. Secondly, the physical reality of the housing estate necessitates a centralised form 
of governing. The way buildings are positioned makes laissez faire approaches 
impossible and requires an actor on a more encompassing scale than a single building to 
mediate and make decisions. Thirdly, the way buildings are positioned also makes them 
possible centres for decision-making and acting. The members of FOAs routinely show 
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interest in their surroundings even if it is not the land they own: trees, bushes, green 
plots and parking spaces around a particular apartment building all fall within the area 
that residents from that FOA actively use.  
Post-socialist changes from the early 1990s onwards have also affected contemporary 
policy decisions. When the decision was made to privatise housing estates and form 
FOAs in Estonia, the shift towards governing based on those collectives was as well 
initiated. As FOAs possess governing capacities as well as finances that they can 
leverage from their members, they have become centres for organising in the housing 
estates. That has also been the case with car parking. Even though in the early 1990s 
nobody knew exactly who was going to organise parking in housing estates but as 
FOAs existed, tasks could be attached to them. Those governmental tasks also had to be 
attached as the local government lacks financial capacities to carry out the range of 
tasks requested by the citizens. FOAs are now the principal actors of governing in 
housing estates. They take care of parking provision but possibly of even more tasks in 
the future unless some neighbourhood-wide associations emerge as in some older 
districts closer to the city centre of Tallinn. 
This expanding use of neo-liberal governing techniques—governing (car parking) 
through FOAs in the housing estate—is thus not simply a result of an ideology but 
conditioned both by materiality and post-socialist continuities and changes. The chapter 
thus drew attention to the two key notions of the thesis—material governmentality and 
post-socialism—by highlighting how they could help in understanding urban governing 
procedures that otherwise invite the use of the term neo-liberalism. 
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9 Conclusion 
This dissertation set out to explore materialities of urban governing in relation to the 
increasing car use and strong value placed on individual freedom in post-socialist 
Tallinn. Noting the complex nature of governing whereby different actors pull in 
diverging directions, the investigation highlighted the importance of materiality in 
shaping technologies of governing. With the study located in the city of the former 
Soviet Union, moreover, it was possible to engage with the notion of ‘post-socialist 
cities’ and to draw theoretical insights from a context less often considered for 
conceptual development in urban studies.  
The study of car parking governing in the city of Tallinn showed how such an 
apparently mundane aspect of city life—car immobility—is in many ways a 
complicated matter where questions about governing are also questions about how the 
state and citizens should interact. While such everyday facets of cities often fall under 
city government capacity to direct, the twenty years of post-socialist parking disputes 
analysed here demonstrated that questions about liberty or constitutionality are not too 
abstract or too important to be dealt with in conjunction with how city regulations are 
enforced and parking lots built. The ‘freedom to park’ in post-socialist automobility is 
to keep the state at bay. However, it is also to summon the state to the help when the 
freedom to park is restricted by someone (like businesses enforcing their rules in 
Chapter 7) or something (such as the Soviet built environment in Chapter 8). Thus, the 
freedom to park denotes mainly an antagonistic stance towards the state in Tallinn but 
in many ways still needs the support of it.  
9.1 Conceptual advances offered by the thesis 
Overall, the thesis offers three key advances for urban studies. Firstly, the dissertation 
advanced the research ethos that understands cities as complex entities with no 
underlying or fundamental development or process to focus on. Secondly, the 
dissertation showed the importance of attending to materiality in order to understand 
governmental processes in cities. Thirdly, the dissertation showed the way in which the 
local conditions in specific contexts can be brought into analysis as analytical aspects 
rather than as descriptive differences. These three advances will be addressed in what 
follows before highlighting some lines where the research opened up in this thesis can 
be taken further. 
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9.1.1 An argument for paying attention to details 
First, the thesis sees states, societies and cities as characterised by a complexity 
whereby one should not only focus on bigger political processes or economic aspects. 
There is a lot going on in cities; a lot of it is mundane and hardly paid attention to in 
traditional analyses. The theoretical current in urban studies that has been most attentive 
to such complexity of cities has been actor-network theory as well as science and 
technology studies and assemblage approaches. These were used as inspiration in the 
thesis and reviewed more thoroughly in Chapter 2. However, in order to add the 
analytical attention to political questions and power relations, the research framework of 
governmentality was drawn into the analysis. The concept of material governmentality 
developed in Chapter 2 aims to capture the material relations of governing alongside 
with various manifestations of freedom.  
The thesis dealt with a particular socio-materiality too often neglected until about a 
decade ago: automobility. With the analysis of automobility as a system, cars and their 
spaces have firmly found their way into sociological analysis of cities. There is an 
understanding in urban studies now that contemporary urban forms such as suburban 
living patterns with sprawling residential areas, motorways and large shopping malls 
were enabled by automobiles and various elements that have been assembled to the 
system of automobility. Nevertheless, despite its spatial and political effects in cities, 
strongly evident in the case of Tallinn, car parking has been a neglected aspect of 
automobility. This thesis, thus, aimed to undertake a socio-material analysis of car 
parking. The question of parking, indeed, is not just about parking as such but raises 
questions about how the state deals with its citizens, how governing can be carried out 
and how residential districts—such as housing estates which house half of the Tallinn’s 
population—should be organised and governed. Attending to the details in the 
complexity makes possible a more comprehensive view of cities than offered by critical 
urban studies. However, by introducing the notion of material governmentality, I aimed 
to provide a way to be at the same time attentive to materialities and political processes 
in the complexities.  
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9.1.2 The importance of materiality: material governmentality 
The second key advancement of the thesis—drawing attention to materiality in 
governing processes—emerged in the discussion of the car parking governing in three 
ways.  
First, the problems that governors set out to tackle often have a material character. The 
accommodation of automobiles in the city—which was the problematic that this thesis 
dealt with—is a complicated question largely due to the materiality of cars. Cars require 
space and space is in lack in urban environments. Each chapter treated a different 
material characteristic of the increasing car use in Tallinn: the problem of governing 
parking on public streets (Chapter 6), the question of providing more parking spaces 
outside the street space (Chapter 7) and the question of dealing with instances where 
cars have already claimed space for them (Chapter 8). Transport planning engaged with 
all the three issues. It suggested certain measures for governing (wheel clamp), the use 
of minimum parking standards, or in other ways considered the matter of parking as in 
general a question for governors to deal with rather than for individuals or individual 
companies to solve. While the material nature of problems often makes them topics for 
specialist fields of knowledge, there are other rationales that are involved with the 
question of governing. Material problems are criss-crossed with political, cultural and 
social concerns. The suggestion for a social scientist here, however, is not to see the 
latter as over-riding materiality but to see social and material questions as intermixed. 
The other two points outlined here give more substance to why one should attend to the 
materiality in the socio-material assemblages. 
Secondly, materiality is a tool of governing which can be utilised to allow certain 
activities and restrict others. In transport planning such material limits include different 
road elements that restrict cars from crossing lanes on highways or driving out of the 
road. Regarding parking regulations, cities often utilise bollards that block cars from 
entering pedestrian spaces. The case of wheel clamp presented in Chapter 6 is similar as 
it blocks a car in such a way that it cannot escape the parking spot without the driver 
paying the fine. Artefacts are also brought into use in order to allow certain practices. 
The examples include devices introduced to shift the behaviour of drivers into more 
sustainable practices. Braun (2014), for instance, gives an example of fuel consumption 
gauge in cars that by showing more precise information about fuel burning up than 
usual fuel consumption measuring devices aims to bring ‘economy’ in to drivers’ 
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behaviour. Jones et al (2013, chapter 4) similarly deal with the street design as a nudge 
to citizens’ travel choices. The neighbourhood unit design as well as cul-de-sacs that 
were discussed in Chapter 8, are all socio-material governing devices that at once 
restrict (cars to drive through) and allow (pedestrians to take shorter routes). 
Nevertheless, while materiality is a tool of governing, it is not only that, being itself 
more than a mere device in the hands of regulators.  
There are at least two ways in which materialities exceed governing. Materialities, 
firstly, draw in other concerns than simply the aim to govern more effectively. A wheel 
clamp in Chapter 6 turned out to be a too effective governing device, raising questions 
about the extent to which citizens should accept the state intervention into the use of 
private property. Materialities, secondly, cannot be fully tamed for the governing 
purposes. The materiality always exceeds the thoughts that try to direct and control it. 
The legal experts in Chapter 6, for instance, faced the limit of the materiality of parked 
cars as a direct obstacle that could not be overcome and governed in a way they thought 
post-socialist citizens should be. Faced with these material limits, they had to take into 
account that governing is a materialist activity. This leads to the final, third, point here. 
Thirdly, the thesis proposed to see governing as essentially a materialist activity—
material governmentality. To regulate, thus, means to regulate ‘men and things’ 
(Foucault, 2007) rather than merely the society as a human collective. Governing is 
linked with materiality so that to govern is at the same to govern in association with 
various materialities. The governing procedures that legal practitioners eventually 
devised in Chapter 6 were attentive to the material problematic of the materiality of 
parked cars that have no driver present. In Chapter 7, the governing of private parking 
lots was shown to be tied to the surface material of the areas. The tools of governing 
were related to ways of materialisation. Gravel positioned parking lots outside the local 
government’s governing tools. With different materialisations—for instance tarmac 
instead of gravel—such private parking lots would have been subject for urban planning 
regulations. In Chapter 8, the governing of housing estates emerged as an intensely 
materialised problematic. The ways of governing in those sites are both shaped by the 
physical layout and aim to deal with the various physical objects such as parking lots, 
children playgrounds, trees, benches, etc. Residents’ lives are interwoven with those 
physical entities in housing estates so that the improvement of their lives is also the 
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question about how to govern materialities. To govern means, thus, to govern the cities 
and societies as material phenomena. 
9.1.3 Re-thinking post-socialism  
The third advancement in urban studies after complexity and materiality that the thesis 
offered was that of re-conceptualising the notion of ‘post-socialism’. I proposed to 
rework the term away from it being merely a description of a certain region—a post-
1991 Central and Eastern Europe—which it tends to be even in otherwise sophisticated 
and critical analysis of post-socialist cities (e.g., Hirt, 2013) and societies (e.g., Stenning 
and Hörschelmann, 2008). Compared to previous approaches, the ‘post-socialism’ as 
conceptualised in this thesis applies to particular details rather than to the societies and 
cities as totalities. The term could apply to these aspects as continuity denoting 
longevity of certain socialist ways of doing, and as anti-continuity referring to a 
situation whereby change has occurred but the change is still in many ways bound to 
what has taken place before. Those three points about post-socialism—applying to 
certain aspect, referring to continuities and bringing out anti-continuities—are the main 
facets that this thesis stresses for urban studies in relation to the term ‘post-socialism’.  
Firstly, post-socialism should be seen as applying to certain aspects rather than to 
cities or societies as totalities. While being ‘post-socialist’ echoes difference from other 
cities and temporariness of their existence, the conceptual move whereby the term is 
applied to certain aspects reduces the danger of subscribing whole societies into 
backwardness or on the development path. As ‘post-socialism’ would not apply to the 
whole region or characterise a particular condition, it can be introduced for making 
sense of specific details whereas different analytical terms can be used for all sorts of 
other aspects. I do not argue, thus, that Tallinn is post-socialist but I claim it to have 
many aspects that can be analysed through the notion of ‘post-socialism’.  
Understanding post-socialism as a characteristic of certain aspects comes into 
conjunction with the research ethos of material governmentality proposed in Chapter 2 
and summarised in the previous section of the conclusion. The researcher attending to 
the complex character of cities will note particular techniques of governing, specific 
artefacts and materialisations, and particular references to ‘post-socialism’. In this 
thesis, I applied post-socialism in relation to the Constitution (Chapter 6), parking 
standards (Chapter 7) and physical layout of Soviet housing estates (Chapter 8). While 
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post-socialism applies to particular aspects it nevertheless does not do that in the same 
way. The ‘post’ referring to ‘socialism’ could mean different things: it could be change, 
continuity or anti-continuity. With the first one already taken for granted by researchers 
and public, I will unpack the latter two below.  
Secondly, the concept of ‘post-socialism’ can be analysed as continuity. This 
understanding of ‘post-socialism’ refers to the contemporary cities as hybrid with some 
of the elements also having their histories in the Soviet time. The focus on continuity 
thus challenges the understanding of social change as transition from one order to 
another. In the thesis I pointed out two such continuities. Firstly, Chapter 7 discussed 
the parking standard which is one of the few characteristics of a strong state that could 
be identified in relation to the governing of urban car parking. Parking standards, 
however, existed in their basic form throughout the late-Soviet era. It was thus argued 
that their strength in the contemporary times rested precisely on their continuity. 
Secondly, Chapter 8 discussed the continuities of a Soviet housing estate. A significant 
share of the urban population in Central and Eastern Europe lives in housing estates 
built from early 1960s till the end of 1980s with the percentage in Tallinn as high as 
fifty per cent, making housing estate the principal form of urban living in many cities in 
Central and Eastern Europe. The physical form of housing estates, which remains as 
continuity of what was built and designed in the Soviet times, does not just exist 
passively but is intermingled with the lives of its inhabitants. For instance, the physical 
form of housing estates provides possibilities for adaptation to automobiles. The lack of 
parking spaces that was built into the urban form has been overcome through the 
malleability of grass, whereby grass itself was provided in abundance following the 
principles of modernist housing. The continuity of the physical form moreover requires 
an active hand from the state, leading to forms of governing that are more centralised 
than could be expected from sites mainly in private ownership. To understand what 
happens in a contemporary city, thus, there is a need to pay attention to what the city is 
building on as the past influences the contemporary processes. 
Thirdly, the concept of ‘post-socialism’ can be analysed as anti-continuity. I argue that 
in addition to post-socialist continuities and undeniable changes, there are aspects that 
might seem simply to be changes but are not quite so straightforward. Even if the issues 
that the researcher encounters in Tallinn appear to be different from the Soviet ones, 
they can still have a connection to what happened before. They are related to the past as 
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a negation of it. In this thesis, Chapter 6 discussed the Constitution and rights for 
individual property in relation to anti-continuity. Namely, the legal construction of cars 
as property and property as a constitutional object posing restrictions on municipal 
interference to its use was not simply characteristic of the new importance positioned on 
private property. In practice, as the chapter traced, the protection of private property 
relied on the desire to move away from the ways in which the Soviet system treated—or 
was thought to have treated—its citizens. The city authorities restricting the car use by 
using wheel clamps or assuming the guilt of car owner instead of determining the actual 
driver who violated norms appeared thus as what a totalitarian state acting outside the 
proper ‘democratic’ legal procedures would do. The governing methods utilised by 
Tallinn were thus contested by legal actors drawing from constitutional rights in the 
country. Such contestation of what is seen to have existed before is precisely what is 
meant by the notion of anti-continuity.  
By these revisions of ‘post-socialism’ I hope to provide urban studies with a tool for 
analysis that moves beyond area studies’ limitations. I will next outline what the main 
theoretical framing of the thesis—material governmentality—offers for urban studies. 
9.2 Material governmentality and urban studies 
The research offered the framework of material governmentality to capture 
developments in contemporary societies. In this thesis, I elaborated on the concept 
particularly in an urban area that has also been characterised by history of the Soviet 
power. The notion is made of two components and it also offers two lessons for urban 
studies. One the one hand, it stresses the importance of materiality in influencing the 
ways in which cities are organised and change. On the other hand, it draws attention to 
processes of governing which are integral parts of the urban life. I will now unpack 
those points below. 
Firstly, while it is a simple claim that cities are made of material elements, comprising 
buildings, streets, pipes, wires, cars, bicycles, human and non-human flesh and so on 
and so forth, the point is to make them matter for urban analysis. The thesis offered a 
case where materialities were taken into account not only in order to acknowledge cities 
as socio-material entities, but also to understand post-socialism and the construction of 
state. Similar analysis could be taken further to other topics. Thus, the analysis 
regarding such popular themes in urban studies as gated communities, suburbanisation, 
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neo-liberalism or gentrification—increasingly so in relation to the cities in Central and 
Eastern Europe—could be revised by more consistent attention to what material entities 
are at play, or how questions have an implicit material nature. It does not need much 
imagination to perceive materialities in relation to all these four topics, whether 
regarding gates, buildings or motorways. Putting more importance to the particular 
entities thus revises the ways in which urban studies concepts are perceived.  
Secondly, the issues of city life can and should be seen as questions of governing. The 
city does not emerge merely on its own, nor is a development determined by such 
underlying processes as shifts in capitalism. Instead, there are a variety of activities 
going on aiming to manage the interaction between individuals and things. While it is 
true that cities are ‘self-governing’ by various groups and street-level regulators as 
discussed by Jane Jacobs (Magnusson, 2011), the city governors still intervene into 
many of the aspects of the city life including those of traffic, visual order of private 
property or social behaviour (which I discussed in Chapter 3). Such activities offer a 
rich source of material to be studied for understanding how cities function. These 
regulations also draw attention to questions of freedom. On the one hand, those 
governing activities clash with freedom and could become sources of controversy from 
the position of ‘left’ and ‘right’ alike. On the other hand, such governing procedures 
provide freedom in dense urban environments where the interests of some come into 
conflict with those of others. Municipality parking regulations—such as paid parking—
that this thesis dealt with are great examples of regulations that are targets for critique 
due to being municipality cash machines but that also manage the otherwise limited 
resource of urban space. Thus, urban studies could attend more to the arts of governing 
urban living, drawing out the complexity of this task and its political nature.  
Attending to the combinations of materiality and governing in urban environments 
makes visible the situations in which urban environment necessitates, in certain aspects 
and times, directive diagram of governing instead of liberal ones. The way in which 
urban environment might be particularly susceptible for such governing procedures 
merits further analysis.  
9.3 Potential future research 
While there are thus many instances in which materiality and governmentality could be 
comprehended in future studies, there are two which started to particularly interest me 
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while carrying out the doctoral research and which I aim to investigate further in the 
future.  
One of these themes is the analysis of apartment buildings as socio-technical questions 
bringing together human collective, materiality, and property relations. An apartment 
building forms a collective of individuals who in Estonian case are mostly owners of 
their homes. At the same time, however, an apartment building forms a material entity 
that needs to be managed in some way collectively. In the thesis I looked into housing 
estates that contain buildings governed by flat-owner associations (Chapter 8). Even 
though in the post-socialist order those buildings are privatised and invite sentiments of 
privatism (Hirt, 2012), the building itself still necessitates the community to be held 
together. I am interested in unpacking the relationship between what the materiality 
prescribes and what members of the building desire. A building is thus criss-crossed by 
material governmentalities that span the level of the building, a local government and 
the state, and consider various governing initiatives as well as property relations. Soviet 
apartment buildings are seen by some governors in Tallinn as material problems in need 
of renovations, perhaps even demolition, but all these governmental questions are 
problematic due to the private property rights. Furthermore, as I showed in Chapter 8, 
the building with its socio-technical community extends beyond the confines of the 
house itself to the streets and courtyards. Managing or seeking to manage areas around 
the building thus further complicates the socio-material problematic that a building is. It 
also brings to the fore the ways in which the city is made of various governing bodies 
that deal with the city as not only a social entity but also a material one.  
Another theme that the dissertation opened up in terms of auto-mobility, but that further 
invites the analysis through the framework of material governmentality, is the condition 
of pedestrians in urban mobility. Pedestrians designate a very different materiality than 
cars. Yet, pedestrians are also subject to governing which is what Blomley (2011) 
unpacks in relation to pavement. I am interested in critically examining the different 
ways in which pedestrians are governed, how those regulations relate to the materiality 
of the question at hand and in what ways the notion of freedom comes in. In Estonia, for 
instance, pedestrians are treated in various ways similarly to cars: they have to follow 
traffic laws as cars do or face fines, and they are obliged by law to wear a particular 
material device—a reflector—to increase their visibility. Like automobiles, then, 
pedestrians would be checked by police to ensure that they are ‘road-worthy’. 
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Pedestrians are not considered the same way in different societies, as the ways they are 
considered depends also on the diverging understandings of law and governing. While 
in the UK, for instance, pedestrians are allowed to cross streets whenever and wherever 
they wish for, in Estonia there are legally designated zones and times when this can be 
done whereas violations of those rules will result in punishments. Pedestrian mobility is 
thus a question of material governmentality in the ways in which pedestrians as bodies 
are considered by governors, how pedestrians behave in actual urban space, how laws 
treat freedom of movement, and how the urban environment is designed to either limit 
or enhance pedestrian mobility. 
There are, of course, a wide-variety of governmental questions regarding freedom and 
materiality to be explored. One could, for instance, use the concept of material 
governmentality to study spatial regulations of smoking in cities or the governance of 
pets. Nevertheless, the two topics summarised above are those that most directly grow 
out of the investigation of urban car parking offered in this thesis and thus allow for 
expanding the notion of material governmentality to other aspects of life, with the first 
suggested topic also continuing an elaboration on ‘post-socialism’.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: The list of interviews 
No. Date Role Reasons for interview 
1 4 April 2011 
Municipality transport 
expert 
City official who has worked in the city 
government for nearly two decades and 
has been responsible for managing 
parking issues during all the time 
2 5 April 2011 Former MP 
MP during the debates of the Parking Act 
in 1995; led the law-making process 
3 6 April 2011 Transport expert Leading transport expert in the country 
4 11 April 2011 Transport expert 
Leading researcher on parking related 
topics 
5 12 April 2011 
Municipality transport 
expert (former) 
Worked in the city transport department 
since 1968, a head of it in early 1990s 
6 4 February 2012 Transport expert 
Leading transport expert in the country 
and specialist on parking standards 
7 8 February 2012 Transport expert 
Leading transport expert, a head of the 
group that compiled the first post-Soviet 
Transport policy document in Tallinn 
8 16 February 2012 Environmental activist 
Head of the first parking management 
company in Tallinn 
9 17 February 2012 municipality expert 
Expert who has been employed by the 
city but also by various central state 
authorities. One of the persons 
responsible for drafting the Parking Act 
10 20 February 2012 Environmental activist 
Leading environmentalist who supported 
the introduction of paid parking in 
Tallinn (in 1993) 
11 2 March 2012 Environmental activist 
Leading environmentalist in the late 
1980s and early 1990s 
12 29 February 2012 
municipality transport 
expert 
Works in the city’s transport department 
since late 2000s and is responsible for 
parking issues 
13 1 March 2012 
municipality transport 
expert (2
nd
 time) 
[see interview no. 1] 
14 6 March 2012 Journalist 
Journalist who documented traffic issues 
in early 1990s 
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15 14 March 2012 municipality expert 
Former municipality official in 
environmental matters and architect (one 
of the Mustamäe General Plan authors) 
16 15 March 2012 
municipality transport 
expert (3
rd
 time) 
[see interview no. 1] 
17 28 March 2012 
municipality transport 
expert 
Former head of the city’s transport 
department (in the middle of 1990s) 
18 10 April 2012 former politician Vice-mayor of Tallinn in early 1990s 
19 14 April 2012 Lawyer Lawyer in traffic related issues 
20 3 May 2012 
municipality transport 
expert 
Head of city traffic department 
21 3 May 2012 
municipality transport 
expert 
Official responsible for handling the 
database containing all the traffic signs 
22 3 May 2012 
municipality transport 
expert 
Official responsible for all sorts of traffic 
management elements in areas around the 
city centre 
23 7 May 2012 municipality expert 
Official in urban planning department 
(expert on general planning); long term 
experience of working in planning 
24 16 May 2012 
municipality transport 
expert 
Official responsible for all sorts of traffic 
management elements in the city centre 
25 11 June 2012 Member of Parliament MP and citizen activist 
26 6 July 2012 Environmental activist 
Environmentalist who was active in early 
1990s 
27 9 July 2012 municipality expert 
City official in Mustamäe city district 
government 
28 12 July 2012 municipality police official 
City official working at municipal police 
Mustamäe sub-unit. 
29 17 July 2012 apartment association Head of a flat-owners’ association 
30 17 July 2012 apartment association 
Head of Estonian Union of Cooperative 
Housing 
31 17 July 2012 apartment association Head of flat-owners’ association 
32 27 July 2012 apartment association Head of flat-owners’ association 
33 31 July 2012 apartment association Head of flat-owners’ association 
34 
10 September 
2012 
municipality transport 
expert 
City official, responsible for parking 
issues in late 2000s 
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35 
17 September 
2012 apartment association 
Head of flat-owners’ association 
36 
18 September 
2012 municipality expert 
Head of Urban Planning Department (a 
sub-unit of detailed plans) 
37 
24 September 
2012 municipality expert 
City official in the planning department, 
responsible for application of parking 
standards 
37 
24 September 
2012 (together 
with the previous 
one) municipality expert 
City official in the planning department, 
responsible for application of parking 
standards 
38 
19 September 
2012 
municipality expert 
(Helsinki, Finland) 
Finnish parking experts interviewed to 
get an insight of parking governing in 
Helsinki that is near to Tallinn and often 
considered an inspiration 
39 
24 September 
2012 apartment association 
Head of flat-owners’ association 
40 
25 September 
2012 
municipality transport 
expert 
Head of Tallinn Transport Department 
41 2 April 2013 Private parking 
Manager of one of the private parking 
companies 
42 2 April 2013 Developer 
Former board member of country’s 
leading real estate development company; 
still works in the business sector 
43 3 April 2013 Developer 
Representative of one of the leading real 
estate development company 
44 3 April 2013 former politician 
Former municipal politician and head of 
real estate developers’ association 
45 3 April 2013 Developer 
Representative of one of the leading real 
estate development company 
45 
3 April 2013 
(together with the 
previous one Developer 
Representative of one of the leading real 
estate development company 
46 4 April 2013 Private parking 
Manager of one of the private parking 
companies 
47 4 April 2013 Private parking 
Manager of one of the private parking 
companies 
48 4 April 2013 Architect 
Head of Estonian Association of Design 
Bureaus 
48 4 April 2013 
(together with the 
Architect A well-known architect. The other person 
I organised interview with invited her to 
250 
previous one) participate as well.  
49 23 August 2013 municipality expert 
City official dealing with the programme 
Hoovid Korda (‘Courtyards into order’) 
49 
23 August 2013 
(interviewed 
together with the 
previous one municipality expert 
City official dealing with the programme 
Hoovid Korda (‘Courtyards into order’) 
  
 
